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This dissertation explores sovereignty and statehood in the Transnistrian Moldovan 
Republic (PMR), a de facto state located in eastern Moldova. Unrecognized for more 
than two decades, this project explores how non-recognition modifies our 
understanding of sovereignty. An ethnographic investigation of sovereignty and 
statehood in an unrecognized polity, this dissertation takes sovereignty and its 
performances as its central theme not by interrogating axiologically whether the PMR 
fulfills some or all of the criteria of a sovereign state, whether or not sovereignty is a 
relevant concept for political authority in the 21st century, or whether the PMR has a 
right to exist under international law. The context of non-recognition that gives rise to 
these performances of sovereignty constitutes this dissertation’s central operating 
principle. The domains in which these performances occur become zones for 
contending with questions about the role of the state and the fate of a people unmoored 
from the utopian project that provided a sense of belonging and provided for them 
materially. The sovereign performances provided a means for public and private 
negotiations of these and other fundamental questions. This study is intended as a 
contribution to the growing literature on post-socialist sovereignty and political 
economy, as well as new developments in the social sciences and the humanities that 
look to the role of images and perceptions in political practice.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The first time I tested my then-shaky knowledge of Russian could not have come at a 
worse time. I was taking a bus from Chișinău, Moldova, to Odessa, Ukraine in June 2006. At the 
time, I was beginning preliminary field research on Moldova and its separatist region, 
Transnistria. I had never actually been to Transnistria, though when the aging German bus 
stopped and everybody instinctively stood up, gathered their passports, and began to exit the bus, 
I knew I finally had arrived. As I exited the bus, I scanned the scene — a border guard in a green 
uniform was examining passports, cars stood motionless in lines while their drivers smoked, and 
stray dogs lazily roamed the grounds. As the only passenger with an American passport 
(everybody else was a citizen of Moldova, Ukraine, or Russia), I was told I needed to have my 
documents checked by the senior officer in charge. Inside a bare office that could not have been 
larger than one square meter, I handed my passport to a middle-aged officer of the Transnistrian 
Ministry of State Security (MGB). He asked me a series of question that focused primarily on 
why I needed to go to Transnistria and why I spoke Russian. Unable to persuade him that I really 
was going to Odessa, I confessed that I was “interested in Moldova.” This only heightened his 
curiosity, and after convincing him that, upon my return, I would sample the region’s famous 
cognac, he waved me by after recording my passport information in his black book.1 As I stood 
in line with the rest of the passengers, I filled out a small form indicating my name, passport 
data, nationality, and purpose of visit, paid my fee of just under one dollar, and was back on the 
bus. My passport was not stamped, though I was required to keep my registration paper with my 
passport during my time in Transnistria.  
                                                
1 The system for recording the passport information of foreigners has since been digitized. This occurred in early 
2009 in order to modernize PMR border crossings. 
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Barely an hour later as we were leaving Transnistria, I was again shepherded by a border 
guard to a Transnistrian customs agent on the Ukrainian border. Unlike my first encounter, I 
could not persuade this particular officer to let me leave. His reasons were simple: I did not have 
an exit stamp from Moldova, and since I was transporting goods (my luggage), I needed a 
Transnistrian customs stamp. Obtaining these two items would be impossible: Moldova does not 
grant exit stamps along its eastern border, since it is not controlled by the Republic of Moldova; 
the latter was merely a ruse to lighten my wallet. I attempted to wear him down by waiting in 
plain view, one method for avoiding bribes. After twenty minutes, the bus driver grew anxious 
and was unwilling (or unable) to save me from this shakedown. I asked quietly if there was a 
“fine” I could pay, and he immediately asked whether I had dollars, Euros, or Moldovan lei. I 
ended up settling on a fine of about twenty dollars, which I reluctantly paid in order be allowed 
the privilege of leaving.2  
Crossing the Transnistrian border is a unique experience insofar as the border delineates a 
political entity that is not recognized by any other government as its own state. While a boundary 
maintained and regulated by force, in practice this border is an ill-defined line between 
competing sovereigns and their associated institutional forms and practices. Besides the formal 
registration procedures required to cross the border, one becomes immediately cognizant of 
being in a conflict zone. Tanks and machine gun nests dot the demilitarized zone on both the 
Moldovan and Transnistrian sides of the border. After crossing multiple times, however, one 
notices that this militarization of space serves a performative function. The bored Russian and 
Moldovan soldiers staffing the security checkpoints scarcely glance at the cars, buses, and 
pedestrians who briskly pass by — the only stop is the passport check on the Transnistrian side. 
Posted traffic signs are ignored, and in the summer these peacekeepers have even been rumored 
                                                
2 The price of this “fine” was negotiated in dollars but paid for in Moldova lei. 
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to strip down to their underwear to work on their tan.3 Though perhaps a violation of the 
protocol, their jobs remain safe insofar as the conflict has been “frozen” and unresolved since 
Transnistria and Moldova signed a peace agreement in 1992.  
Citizens of both Moldova and Transnistria have accepted this border and its peculiarities 
as objective facts — they follow its rules and submit to its inspections from both sides. Political 
elites on each side view these borders differently in terms of what authorities and jurisdictions 
they delineate. On the Moldovan side, a few customs agents who sit lazily and inspect passing 
vehicles staff the border. On most days, they sit outside at a small table and accept cold drinks 
purchased just up the road from drivers seeking their good grace in the hopes of avoiding 
inspection. Since the Republic of Moldova does not recognize Transnistria, these customs 
officers enforce Moldovan customs and immigration law from a place that officially constitutes 
neither an (inter)national border nor a normal stretch in the road. Moldovan officials regulate a 
transit point within a “security zone” that spans the eastern border Moldova shares with 
Transnistria. During one trip I encountered soldiers lazily guarding a bridge destroyed in 1992. 
Both the wider security zone and all of Transnistria lie within the recognized boundaries of the 
Republic of Moldova. As part of the peace agreement signed in 1992 between Transnistria, 
Russia, and Moldova, a contingent of around one thousand Russian troops are deployed in left-
bank Moldova as peacekeeping forces.4  
How one refers to this contested strip of land is complicated. Romanian-speakers refer to 
the separatist region of Moldova as Transnistria; to Russian-speakers it is Pridnestrov’e.5 Others 
                                                
3 This observation was pointed out by multiple people when we visited a popular summer resort area on the outskirts 
of Chișinău along the Dniester River. 
4 Russia’s position is odd insofar as it was both a party to the conflict (as the legal successor to the Soviet Union it 
was responsible for the former 14th Soviet Army that intervened on behalf of Transnistrian separatists). 
5 Transnistria is literally across or beyond the Nistru river, while the literal translation of the Russian Pridnestrov’e 
means at or near the Dniester. Though subtle, these toponyms are politically charged because of the languages they 
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seek to maintain a degree of neutrality and refer to the region as Transdniester. Transnistria is 
located within the Republic of Moldova’s recognized borders east of the Dniester River. To the 
north, east and south Transnistria borders Ukraine. In Russian, the leadership of this 
unrecognized state official calls this territory the Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublica 
(PMR); in English, it is commonly referred to as the Dnestr Moldovan Republic (DMR). Less 
than thirty kilometers wide and covering 4,118 square kilometers (compared to 33,846 for 
Moldova, including Transnistria), the PMR is a de facto sovereign state that separated from 
Moldova in 1990. Estimates of the region’s population range from official figures6 of more than 
half a million (555,000) inhabitants to unofficial estimates7 of less than four hundred thousand 
(370,000); Moldovans (31.9%), Russians (30.3%), and Ukrainians (28.8%) constitute the most 
populous nationalities.  
Like any recognized state, the PMR forces those crossing its borders to become legible to 
the state bureaucracy and its representatives. At the border, officials input one’s information 
manually into a centralized information system through a paper-based registration system. This 
is required of all individuals except for citizens of the PMR. The border is also a source of 
income for the state and its representatives. State institutions and positions with the state become 
sources of income (Humphrey 2004: 429), spaces where the state’s authority is a commodity for 
sale. The PMR’s borders serve as a means of collecting tribute in exchange for passage. As a 
polity with pretensions to statehood and recognition, the border is a space for the PMR to project 
authority and to force those who may not recognize the legitimacy of the PMR to acknowledge 
                                                                                                                                                       
index and the perspectives they embody. The politically neutral labels of left and right-bank Moldova are 
occasionally used throughout this dissertation. 
6 “Preliminary Results Announced of the Transnistrian Census” ОГЛАШЕНЫ ПРЕДВАРИТЕЛЬНЫЕ ИТОГИ 
ПРИДНЕСТРОВСКОЙ ПЕРЕПИСИ НАСЕЛЕНИЯ http://www.olvia.idknet.com/ol37-09-05.htm  Accessed 
September 10, 2011. 
7 “Genocide – Transnistria?”  Геноцид по – приднестровски? In Man and His Rights, Человек и его права. No. 
37(84). http://dnestrnews.info/n37-84/597-genocid-po-pridnestrovski.html Accessed November 8, 2010. 
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its existence, at least a momentary, in exchange for the right to enter or leave. These gestures, 
like any other mundane or everyday encounter with the state, can be symbolic, pecuniary, or 
communicative. Be interacting with its institutions, the state is created and made salient to those 
engaging with it. Acknowledging PMR authority, even symbolically, challenges the region’s 
contested status and constitutes a minor degree of recognition. When I first arrived in Moldova, I 
had to attend a required orientation program at the US Embassy in Chișinău. There, I was asked 
by a public affairs officer not to show my passport at the PMR border because the United States 
does not recognize the PMR as a state. Though aware that I would do otherwise, protocol 
dictated that he impart the official government line to me. Similarly, when I conducted one of my 
first interviews with the head of a Moldovan NGO and mentioned that I was interested in 
learning about sovereignty in Moldova, his response was that “Moldova is a sovereign state.”8 
                                                
8 Interview with the head of a Moldovan NGO located in Chișinău. The NGO is funded by an array of European and 
American democracy promotion organizations. In the 2009 parliamentary elections in Moldova, the organization led 
a pro-European, anti-communist advertising campaign. 
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Fig 1. The Republic of Moldova (King 2000: xxxii). 
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De Facto Sovereignty  
 The PMR controls a defined territory and projects authority within its borders. Despite 
having many of the attributes of a sovereign state, the region has been unrecognized since it 
separated from Moldova in 1990. As a polity that exists in a very visible gap on the political map 
of Europe, the PMR offers a unique opportunity to see how individuals live within a space that is 
geopolitically overdetermined yet which exists outside of any normative, regulated realm.  
 Constructed by the western media as a “black hole” in which corruption, smuggling, and 
criminality flourishes (Bobick 2011), Transnistria remains an object of contention between 
Moldova, a country wishing to join the European Union and reassert control over its de jure 
territory, and Russia, eager to (re)assert its influence across the Soviet space. By supporting the 
PMR, the Russian government preserves a means of continued influence in Moldova, a territory 
it (and the Soviet state) has ruled since the early 19th century.9 As the Russian Federation 
becomes integrated into the world economy, its unofficial means of influencing its former 
possessions – through control of infrastructure, energy supplies, peacekeeping troops, and 
material and economic support for Kremlin-friendly leaders – constitute tangible mechanisms for 
creating and undermining authority in the post-Soviet world. 
While a fundamental concept of international law, sovereignty in the former Soviet 
Union remains understudied.10 As a revolutionary worker’s state under the control of the 
Communist Party, which served as the legitimating embodiment of the revolution, the Soviet 
state was not a bounded entity but was coextensive with the whole of the people (Buck-Morss 
2002: 30). Those excluded from the polity were political or ideological opponents, not 
                                                
9 From 1918 until 1940, Moldova was part of Greater Romania. For an overview of the social situation and relations 
between the Moldova and the centralized Romanian state, see Lizeveanu 2000, chapter 3. 
10 Notable exceptions include Bernstein 2010, Grant 2009, and Humphrey 2004. For recent reviews of the 
anthropology and archaeology of sovereignty, see Hansen and Stepputat 2006 and Smith 2011. 
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criminal.11 While crime shades discussions of Transnistria, from the perspective of left-bank 
residents sovereignty oscillates between ideals — of economic prosperity, recognition, and 
internationalism — and a post-Soviet reality based around loss (Oushakine 2009). Residents 
paradoxically live in an area that is simultaneously both a “rogue” region and a nostalgic Soviet 
homeland, rodina.   
 As an entity claiming to be a sovereign state but lacking international recognition, the PMR 
raises a host of concerns related to the nature of sovereignty, nationalism, and the state. Since its 
secession from the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) in 1990 — recognized neither 
by authorities in Moscow or in Chișinău12 — the PMR has existed as an international orphan, 
acting and claiming to be a state but remaining unrecognized as such.13 Russia, the PMR’s 
primary sponsor and ally, refuses to recognize the PMR as a sovereign state. Russia has 
stipulated that any solution must maintain the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova. 
Given repeated statements by the Russian Foreign Ministry stressing a need for any settlement to 
maintain Moldova’s territorial integrity, one can intimate that, unlike Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, the Russian Federation will not recognize the PMR.14   
 PMR state institutions include a bureaucracy; a tripartite government with legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches; a standing army; a police force; a territory delineated by state 
borders that it maintains, secures, and regulates; and a “national” economy with its own 
                                                
11 This is reversal of Soviet revolutionaries borrowed who borrowed heavily from this criminal repertoire. For more 
on this, see Alexopoulos 1998. 
12 Chișinău was the capital of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, and today is the capital of the Republic of 
Moldova. It is common metonym for the Moldovan people and the Moldovan state. 
13 Transnistria declared its independence as a constituent republic of the Soviet Union. After the demise of the 
Soviet Union, the PMR claimed full sovereignty and independence. Only Abkhazia and South Ossetia formally 
recognize the PMR. 
14 The origin of this conflict is complex, and chapter two offers some of the necessary background, including a 
historical overview of Transnistria and of the events that led to the region’s separation from Moldova in 1990. As a 
result of the peace agreement signed between Moldova, the PMR, and Russia in 1992, Russia maintains a small 
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currency, the Transnistrian ruble. The one, five, ten, and twenty-five ruble banknotes depict 
Alexander Suvorov, the Imperial Russian general. The fifty ruble note depicts the Ukrainian poet 
and artist Taras Shevchenko; the hundred ruble note depicts the eighteenth century Moldovan 
prince Dmitrie Cantemir, and the five hundred ruble note depicts Catherine the Great, leader of 
the Russian Empire at the time of Tiraspol’s founding by Alexander Suvorov. The reverse side of 
each banknote depicts important places and buildings in the PMR like factories, memorials, 
monasteries, cathedrals, and government buildings. Important to note with the symbology of the 
banknotes is their inclusion of historical characters from Russian, Moldovan, and Ukrainian 
history, an important gesture to the three largest nationalities in the region.  
 
 
Fig 2. PMR rubles. Image courtesy of the Transnistrian Central Bank website.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
contingent in the PMR. The presence of Russian peacekeeping forces informally guarantee the region’s continued 
existence and security, since any attack on the PMR would be considered an attack on Russia. 
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The PMR also has a functioning tax system, a central bank, and local and Russian banks that 
provide financial services.15 The PMR issues a variety of documents, including birth certificates, 
passports, residency permits, marriage certificates, and spravki, ubiquitous certificates and 
attestations common in the former Soviet Union.16 Though useless outside the region, a PMR 
passport is required to purchase a mobile phone, hook up utilities, obtain internal registration 
[propiska], enroll in school, receive healthcare, or register property transactions. This passport, 
like all other documents issued by the PMR, is not recognized outside its borders, though births 
and marriages in the PMR can be legalized in Moldova. Often, PMR citizens simply do not exist 
for the Republic of Moldova, given than many have only Russian passports and Soviet birth 
certificates.17 When traveling abroad, residents must use the passports and documents of another 
state to be in compliance with the international system in which every person must have a 
passport issued by a recognized sovereign authority linked to a territory.18  
 The international system in which states exist is based on the mutual recognition of states 
as equals (Rée 1992). States (along with those movements that strive for statehood) implicitly 
                                                
15 In 2011, the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued an advisory concerning financial transactions from the 
Transnistrian region: “Currently, the anti-money laundering laws of Moldova are not being enforced against banks 
operating within Transnistria because financial institutions within this specific region are not under the supervision 
of the Moldovan government.” The Wall Street Journal, April 15, 2011. “FinCEN Warms Financial Institutions On 
Transactions From Separatist Region in Moldova.” 
16 The Russian word spravka denotes any kind of certificate bearing a piece of information issued from an institution 
or individual that proves something: that one is not a criminal, healthy, never been married, etc. 
17 Transnistria's population travels internationally with "foreign" passports. The 2004 census gives a Transnistrian 
population of 550,000 (from 600,000 in 1989, though some claim it is now closer to 400,000. Moldovan passport 
holders make up between 200-300,000 (estimates range from 100,000 from Transnistrian officials to 400,000 by 
Moldovan officials. The Moldovan Ministry of Reintegration has issued 360,000 passports. Moldovan passports 
have been free for Transnistrian residents since 2006.  Estimates of Russian passport holders range from a high of 
140,000 to 100,000 from the Moldovan Ministry of Reintegration. The vast majority of ruling elites hold Russian 
passports (often multiple). Estimates of Ukrainian passport holders range from a high of 90,000 to a more likely 
number between 70-80,000. Data from AAASS roundtable on frozen conflicts, November 14th, 2009. Thanks to 
Lyndon Allin for this data. 
18 One notable exception to this is the travel documents issues by the United Nations in conflict zones. For more on 
the effort to issue UN-travel documents in Abkhazia, see Lyndon Allin n.d, “Citizens of Convenience? Russia’s 
Passportization of the Population of Abkhazia.” 
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have a teleology that ends with recognition.19 Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and 
Nagorno-Karabakh are curious polities insofar as they exist, have borders, provide services, and 
make wars despite the fact that the international community does not acknowledge them as 
recognized states. Despite this lack of recognition, they are real polities with real effects. The 
PMR, like other anomalies, challenges the idea that any given state or polity’s authority — its 
unchallenged supremacy in a given territory — must be recognized (vetted) by an exterior 
presence like the United Nations.  
 What is the threshold for sovereignty? What happens to states or polities that project a 
durable (for lack of a better term) “stateness” but which are not acknowledged as states? Are 
they to be ignored, engaged, or catalogued as conceptual anomalies? With the PMR, one finds a 
situation whereby a small group of people elaborated a fundamental division that, in the context 
of a dissolving Soviet Union, allowed them to create a political community and a constituent 
people. PMR elites steadfastly believe that the state is deserving of international recognition, and 
residents have internalized this belief. This unrecognized state counts residents, registers their 
births, deaths, and marriages; it conscripts their sons, pays their pensions, and provides a sense of 
belonging. What happens when a group of people collectively acts as if they are a sovereign 
state? What occurs when de facto sovereignty successfully fends off de jure claims to 
sovereignty?20  
 Having all of the symbolic and institutional aspects that a state that should have, 
recognition aside, the PMR problematizes the distinction between de jure and de facto 
sovereignty. As the de jure sovereign, Moldova frames the issue in the language of international 
                                                
19 It must be noted that some states, particularly multi-ethnic socialist states, have successfully divorced or have 
forsaken their earlier forms. 
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law: Moldovan territory is occupied by a foreign army that supports a separatist regime, since 
there is only one lawful sovereign.  
 Angew (2005) argues that conventional understandings of sovereignty as unlimited and 
indivisible rule over a territory and a people are in need of scrutiny.21 As a conceptual form with 
fixed rights, attributes, and a subject position, the state is ontologically equivalent to an 
individual person in classical liberalism (Agnew 2005: 440). As a result, the state is treated as a 
given and remains rooted in a world of fixed boundaries and identities. Yet statehood, like 
personhood, is not pre-given; it arises out of interaction.22 “Statehood results from mutual 
recognition among states. It is not the outcome of “isolated states” achieving statehood 
separately and then engaging with one another as abstract individuals.” (Agnew 2005: 440). 
Statehood, like personhood, can be multiply authored. Just as a person is a composite of the 
substances and actions of multiple individuals (Strathern 1988), a state too consists of multiple 
objects, forms, and relations received from other states or polities. States always emerge out of 
processes, but once a state is recognized, the processual aspects of statehood disappear in favor 
of an entity commonly viewed as fixed or ossified. International recognition reifies the state as 
an entity inhabiting a unitary subject position vis-à-vis international law. Only recognized states 
can confer claims to citizenship that are recognized by other states.23 Despite claims of 
                                                                                                                                                       
20 Historically, the “marks” of modern sovereignty have included supremacy (no higher power), perpetuity (without 
temporal limit), decisionism (not bounded by or subject to law), absoluteness and completeness (sovereignty cannot 
be partial), non-transferability, and its exercise over a delimited jurisdiction (territoriality) (Brown 2010: 21-22). 
21 "Sovereignty is based on territoriality, the use of territory for political, social, and economic ends, is widely seen 
as a largely successful strategy for establishing the exclusive jurisdiction implied by state sovereignty” (Agnew 
2005: 437). 
22 Statehood, like Melanesian personhood, can be multiply authored. Just as a person is, to paraphrase Strathern 
(1988), a composite of the substances and actions of others, a state or polity can consist of multiple objects, forms, 
and relations received from other states or polities. There is also an intermediary group, collective, or state level that 
is a subset of the larger phenomenon of statehood. Formal de jure recognition is but a gloss on these multiple forms 
and relations. 
23 This is similar to the situation with Russian citizenship in Abkhazia, where Abkhazian authorities resisted 
attempts by Georgia to confer Georgian citizenship on residents. The UN denied their requests for UN travel 
documents. In this context - having only Soviet-era travel documents and living in a Georgian state that considered 
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equality,24 some states’ claims to being sovereign are more likely to be recognized or, for that 
matter, respected, than others. For example, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan both have seats in the 
United Nations and are both formally recognized as sovereign states, yet the sovereignty of both 
is undermined by other states that in fact formally recognize them as sovereigns.    
 Despite being one of dominant spatial and organizational structure of the 20th century, 
states today exist in a world in which the political map increasingly fails to reflect existing 
economic and social arrangements.25 The fact that the PMR controls territory but lacks a 
recognized legal claim for it problematizes the link between power and territory. The modern 
territorial structure makes it difficult to conceptualize a geographic order that is not state-based 
(Murphy 1996: 83). While being a recognized state conveys tangible benefits, notably a seat in 
the United Nations and the opportunity to partake in international law, de jure sovereignty is an 
ideal, something rarely realized but which constitutes a kind of political “gold standard.” Just as 
gold once served as a universal measure of value for much of the world’s economy, only to be 
abandoned, why must de jure sovereignty be the norm when there exist so many challenges and 
exceptions to it? 
 This dissertation is concerned with how non-recognition modifies our understanding of 
sovereignty. While Agnew (2005) argues that de jure sovereignty is in fact irrelevant, it remains 
the foundation of an international system that, for better or worse, is a defining feature of modern 
life. An ethnographic investigation of sovereignty and statehood in an unrecognized polity, this 
                                                                                                                                                       
them its de jure subjects but which took no steps to allow them to realize their right to travel outside of Abkhazia. In 
response to this, most acquired Russian citizenship. For more on this, see Allin, n.d. “Citizens of Convenience: 
Russia’s Passportization of the Population of Abkhazia.” 
24 Article two of the Charter of the United Nations states that “the Organization is based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all of its Members.” The Charter of the United Nations. 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml Accessed September 18, 2011. 
25 “The general acceptance of the current political-territorial order is a reflection of one particular and highly 
significant effect of the modern state system, that is, its role in shaping peoples’ thinking about the geographical 
structure and organization of their world.” (Murphy 1996: 82) 
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dissertation looks at how individuals negotiate this unsettled terrain, living in a state that 
provides a sense of order (law) and belonging but which, paradoxically, exists outside the 
purview of international law. Residents are subject to two contradictory forces: of a polity that is 
the sole provider of state benefits within its borders, and of an international system that does not 
recognize deviations from the norm. For residents, everyday existence as a political subject of an 
unrecognized state resembles an ongoing ritual vital to the internal functioning of the PMR that 
is unacknowledged and largely invisible to outsiders. 
 
Sovereignty and Anthropology 
 Though states, or, certainly, the people within them, aspire to sovereignty, it is more 
accurate to speak of sovereignty as a fiction that suffuses the internal and external relations of 
nation-states. With the PMR, one notices a visible tension between the traditional view of 
sovereignty as an indivisible condition and the actual dispersion of political and legal authority. 
Herein lies another paradox of modern sovereignty: while its form has proliferated insofar as it 
remains the foundation of the international system, sovereignty’s unimpeachable foundations are 
weakened by transnational flows of capital, people, goods, and violence. Everyone wants 
sovereignty because it is a condition for joining the realm of nations, yet exactly what 
sovereignty is in the twenty-first century is open to debate. 
In anthropology, there has been a focus on bodies as the locus of sovereign power.26 
Early conceptions of sovereignty placed the sovereign (usually a monarch) in familial relation to 
his political subjects. The term sovereignty encompasses at least two distinct forms: the 
                                                
26 For an overview on sovereignty in anthropology, see Hansen and Stepputat. "Sovereignty Revisited," Annual 
Review of Anthropology 35: 295-315. For more on bodies and sovereignty, see Grant 2009; Hansen & Stepputat,eds. 
2005. For a discussion of sovereignty as a national ritual, see Fiskesjö 2003, 2010. 
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premodern sovereignty of kings, monarchs, and absolute rulers and the modern, modern, 
international system of sovereign states that can be traced to the Peace of Westphalia. Foucault 
(2003) viewed sovereignty largely as a pre-modern form of political power staked on a 
homology between the body of the monarch and the body politic, in contrast to modern forms of 
biopolitics that inscribe authority directly on the physical bodies of subjects.27 Agamben (1998: 
6) implicates bodies further, arguing that the inclusion of bare life in the political realm 
constitutes the nucleus of sovereign power. Modern techniques of authorization and technologies 
of subjection that draw “bare life” into the political sphere represent “the original activity of 
sovereign power” (Agamben 1998: 6). For Agamben, sovereign power is premised on the 
capacity to decide on life and death, the capacity to visit excessive violence on those declared 
enemies or banished from the political community as undesirables.28 Sovereign power operates 
through the “state of exception”—the suspension of rules and conventions that creates a zero-
point from where the law, the norms, and the political order can be constituted.29 This focus on 
the exception is based on Schmitt’s dictum that the “sovereign is he who decides on the 
exception” (2005:5). In the PMR, sovereignty is not premised on a single decision or set of 
decisions by an individual; it is the domain of a political community and those actors that can 
legitimately claim to speak for it.  
                                                
27 In his essay "Governmentality," Foucault illustrates how sovereign power in the modern world operates through 
“a triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as its primary target the population and as its essential 
mechanism the apparatuses of security.” (1991: 93). Foucault’s most famous disciplinary form, Bentham’s 
panopticon, became the basis for disciplinary power in factories, hospitals, and schools. As an instrument of modern 
discipline, it came to replace pre-modern sovereignty as the fundamental power relation. Foucault misses the 
relation between modern capitalism (and its property division of the globe) and sovereignty. 
28 Agamben’s homo sacer (1998) and the state of exception (2005) are but a means of constructing an analytics of 
power over sovereignty as a limit concept, since sovereignty signifies both the political power constituting the law 
as well as the law restraining that very power. In his earlier work, Agamben does not emphasize how would-be 
sovereigns perform it, but this is the main topic of Agamben’s more recent book The Kingdom and the Glory (2011). 
29 In anthropology one must note how the state of exception has become the norm. Its popularity as an analytical 
framework for approaching “sovereignty” leads to, paradoxically, the ubiquity of the exception. How widespread 
must the exception be for it to cease being exceptional? 
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 Anthropological approaches to sovereignty look not to formal political orders but instead to 
the “tentative and always emergent form of authority grounded in violence that is performed and 
designed to generate loyalty, fear, and legitimacy from the neighborhood to the summit of the 
state” (Hansen & Stepputat 2006: 297). Though grounded in violence, the PMR’s de facto 
sovereignty is a performance designed to achieve certain goals. This idea of sovereignty as 
performance remains connected with more formal presentations of sovereignty both at the level 
of the state and the individual. Despite Hansen and Stepputat’s dismissal of the formal realm, 
formal arrangements remain important insofar as they relate to the everyday exercise of 
sovereignty. For example, as ideology, abstract concepts like the nation-state, the monarchy, or 
homeland are naturalized for subjects and citizens. In becoming “the way things are,” these 
formal political orders must be analyzed together with the ethnographic evidence that clarifies 
what they mean for people and how they are manipulated by elites. For example, one can view 
the traditional Soviet victory parade both as the state’s presentation of its military might to its 
citizens and the world while at the same providing an opportunity for citizen to place themselves 
within the state’s experiential and imaginary awe. Similarly, Cattelino argues that sovereignty 
not something possessed, but rather a condition of interaction (2008: 190). Humphrey argues that 
anthropological approaches to sovereignty draw attention to the “actualities of relations” (2004: 
420) that ground any such association.30 Post-socialist sovereignty is constituted in a vast array 
of places, objects and practices that mediate practices of authorization and subjection. 
 The PMR formally presents itself to its constituents and to its critics as a sovereign state. It 
has all of the pageantry of a state, including an anthem, emblem, symbols, flag, currency, and 
                                                
30 “When sovereignty is identified within a particular configuration, then sovereignty itself, which has to consist of 
practices, may be rethought not simply as a set of political capacities but as a formation in society that engages with 
ways of life that have temporality and their own characteristic aesthetics” (Humphrey 2004: 421). 
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historiography, among other things.31 When PMR representatives meet with other state 
representatives, they act as equals and present themselves as such. Officials from the Republic of 
Moldova and Western diplomats refuse to show their passports on the PMR border, as showing 
their diplomatic passport would in fact constitute recognition of PMR authority. When I began 
my field research under the auspices of a fellowship administered by the US Embassy in 
Moldova, I was asked not to show my passport on the border and instead show my Moldovan 
identity card. These diplomatic rituals occur amidst a more generalized sense of liminality. 
 
Liminality-at-Large: States, Ritual Subjects, Structures 
 Ritual is transformative, a process of leaving one social position and embodying another.32 
During the liminal period, ritual subjects are structurally, if not physically, “invisible” (Turner 
1967: 95). Liminality is concerned “with the essentially unstructured (which is at once 
destructured and prestructured)” (Turner 1967: 98). Ritual subjects lack a position in what 
Turner calls the “politico-jural structure” (1967: 99). The rituals and rites de passage described 
by Turner end in aggregation whereby the transitional being is reincorporated into society: the 
not-boy-not-man becomes a man, the initiates become full members of society.33  
                                                
31 The flag of the PMR is in fact the flag of Soviet Moldova, the MSSR. Similarly, its state emblem is the emblem of 
the MSSR too. 
32 Turner takes the liminal period as a formative process that imparts the traditions (and knowledge) of society. In 
the liminality, neophytes are an unnamed (undifferentiated) yet essential social body; essential in that they insure the 
continuity of the social system yet unnamed because of their structural ambiguity. Although neophytes lack 
symbolic status (unnamed, unmarked, and undifferentiated), they are symbolically separated vis-à-vis other 
members of the community. 
33 Following Van Gennep (1961), Victor Turner described rites de passage as “rites which accompany every change 
of place, state, social postion and age.” These rites of passage, “transitions,” are marked by three phases: separation, 
margin (limen), and aggregation. In the first phase, the individual or group is detached from an earlier fixed position 
in the given social structure. In the second phase, there is a pervasive liminality — the characteristics of the ritual 
subject are ambiguous insofar as the participant has few or none of the attributes of the previous or future state; the 
subject is, in a very real sense, unbound by the ritual process. The third phrase, aggregation, is the consummation of 
the passage whereby the individual is reincorporated in the social, into society. Turner’s writings constitute some of 
the canonical texts of symbolic and interpretive anthropology and remain widely cited both within and outside the 
discipline. 
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 Non-recognition is akin to a kind of liminality-at-large. The uncertainty in which residents 
live is akin to an unending ritual whose periodic re-affirmations and performances of sovereignty 
never achieve their ultimate goal. When one thinks about sovereignty in the context of liminality, 
a recurring structure emerges whereby sovereignty is performed as ritual. This performative 
sovereignty requires involvement, acting out — some sort of embodiment or acknowledgement, 
but by its very nature it can never be decisively established.34 The PMR’s failure to simply “be” 
sovereign as opposed to performing it leads to situation in which the PMR cannot be associated 
with any recognized state of existence and instead remains mired in an uncertain, liminal state. 
This failure constitutes a structural deferral of sorts, an unending ritual that remains generative 
despite its failure. The PMR is structurally invisible and polluting, an unrecognized polity that 
poses a threat to international security.35 The PMR generates effects that cannot be reduced or 
conjured away. As this dissertation shows through a variety of ethnographic and historical 
examples, liminality-at-large and its associated performative sovereignty remain generative of a 
host of institutions, communities, narratives, rents, and subject positions. Throughout this 
dissertation, I will show how this performative sovereignty cannot be finalized and/or anchored 
in any institution and as a result must be re-staged over and over again.  
 Transnistria’s liminality-at-large exemplifies the structural liminality of the post-Soviet 
condition insofar as both the PMR and the post-Soviet subject (previously defined in relation to 
the collective and the socialist state) both lack a clear subject position. PMR citizens do not see 
themselves in the context of the Moldovan nation, just as similarly two decades ago Soviet 
citizens awoke to find that Soviet power no longer existed and the socialist project was quickly 
and thoroughly replaced by a capitalist system that was its antithesis. For individuals, this lack of 
                                                
34 For more on performativity and politics, see Butler 1997. 
 19 
a fixed subject position is reflected in the trope of disorder, bespredel, a lack of any visible 
obstacles or limits that also denotes an absence of shared rules or laws. Residents are left with 
participation and traumatic memories of the 1992 conflict with Moldova as the experience that 
provides the liminal subject with the means to navigate an otherwise disorienting post-Soviet 
landscape. The former offers a phenomenological way to apprehend politics and, as described 
below, state formation, while the latter uses the images of the violated corpse as the basis for 
creating a political community marked by victimhood. Since PMR citizens reside within 
Moldova’s recognized borders, they are ostensibly subject to Moldovan law and protections. Due 
to the PMR’s success in limiting sovereign competitors, Moldova is unable to assert control over 
the region. To create the constituent holders of sovereignty, the people [narod], the PMR 
developed its own local democracy practiced through the institution of the referendum.36 
Referenda offer residents a means of participating in the affairs of state.37 Mass participation 
allows the PMR to offer up a visible form of democracy to challenge the norms of democracy as 
imagined by the West.38  
 PMR historiography elaborates a narrative of victimization that is overcome only through 
the establishment of a state. The 1992 war with Moldova is a collective trauma internalized by 
the population and repeated in a variety of settings — state holidays and historiography/civic 
                                                                                                                                                       
35 For more about Transnistria and the issue of international security, see Bobick 2011, Galeotti 2004, Kliment 2005, 
and Sanchez 2009. 
36 The word narod is typically translated as people, typically understood to be an ethnos or nation bearing a common 
language, culture, territory, religion, and history. This is Stalin’s standard definition of the nation. The Transnistrian 
narod is closer to the sovetskii narod, the Soviet people. In his speech at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961, 
Khrushchev declared that the Soviet narod had been formed. The Soviet narod were a mix of the old and new, of 
nations and peoples tempered by internationalism. The Soviet narod were a new historical, social, and international 
community of people having a common territory, economy, and socialist content; a culture that reflected and 
preserved the particularities of its constituent nationalities; and a common federal state. Above all, the Soviet narod 
shared a common goal: the construction of communism. 
37 Referenda are supplemented by other means of civic participation such as elections and public holidays. 
38 This fear of the West remains something of a historical position in the Russian cultural area and figures into the 
eternal debate over whether Russia is or is not European. Most recently, this has taken the form of Eurasianism. For 
more on Eurasianism as a contemporary intellectual movement, see Laruelle 2008. 
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education being the most prominent examples. The violated corpses of those who perished died 
in armed conflict with Moldova serve as a corporeal base upon which to differentiate the 
region’s internationalist populace vis-à-vis Moldova, the logic being that we are different, and 
these bodies prove it — the narod has been the victim of a primordial crime of aggression by 
Moldovan nationalists, with Romanian support. This intrusion of nationalism into a peaceful, 
productive internationalist region fundamentally differentiated left-bank Moldova (Transnistria) 
from the rest of Moldova. PMR elites reap significant benefits by citing this aggression as an 
ongoing mandate for the PMR’s existence — above all, the state protects its citizens. The PMR’s 
lack of recognition is profitable to both locals and outsiders, allowing access to rents and 
monopolies that have led to the region being referred to as the “black hole” of Europe, a zone of 
criminality (Galeotti 2004). 
 
Ritual, Power, and Inequality 
 The aforementioned discussion of ritual and sovereignty is largely silent on the issues of 
power and inequality. One must remember, however, that Turner was concerned above all with 
the role of ritual as it relates to the community, itself affirmed and renewed through ritual. 
Despite pronouncements of unity, equality remains a myth. While the performances of 
sovereignty outlined above affirm the PMR as a community, discrepancies remain. These rituals 
reaffirm, re-establish, and set up these inequalities. By focusing singularly on performance of 
statehood, these rituals constitute economic inequality in the region, for to focus on any 
particular (e.g., on the needs of a particular subset of the population) at the expense of the 
general (the region’s quest for international recognition) would demolish the appearances of 
unity required by the PMR’s internationalist ethos.  
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 Political rituals and performative sovereignty sanctify the existing order. Framing its 
longstanding quest for international recognition in collective terms creates a situation whereby 
individuals largely cannot object to the state. The obvious parallel with political rituals and 
performances can be found in the religious realm. The Russian Orthodox Church had an uneasy 
relationship with Soviet power which posited socialism as a secular religion. Now that this 
tension is gone, Orthodoxy can ascend to its rightful place as the default mode of existence.39 
The Orthodox Church’s ascendant social position was foreclosed by the existence of the 
Communist Party.  
 Similarly, in the realm of secular authority, the PMR emerged as a corrective in response to 
the abuses of Soviet power and the threat of nationalism. This was described to me on multiple 
occasions as communism without the party. Once the tension between the moral universe of the 
Soviet people [sovetskii narod] and the party bureaucracy disappeared, people could embrace the 
former category unproblematically. This shift preserved the ideals and symbolic universe of the 
Soviet Union but left the practical instruments of governance and authority open to manipulation, 
since there was no clear break between the Soviet state and an independent nation. Individuals 
could embrace the symbolic and practical aspects of PMR life that appeared to be Soviet  — the 
multinational identity, Soviet nationality categories, the rhetorical invocation of the narod as the 
holders of popular — but withhold any moral or ethical judgment on the PMR state and its 
officials due to unresolved political questions. This eternal uncertainty and liminality allow for 
performances and rituals to become the primary means of political engagement. Participation, 
both active and passive, allows these rituals to constitute and gloss over the inequality between 
those in power and those who are not, between the rich and the poor. As a whole, these state 
rituals and the larger performance of sovereignty legitimize the PMR. 
                                                
39 This mode of existence is the main subject of Agamben’s The Kingdom and the Glory. 
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A Brief Note on Sovereignty and Performance 
 
The exercise of sovereign power has always been a performance, though it is a 
performance backed by violence or the threat of it. Since its premodern forms in which the king 
or monarch existed as a presence over and above his subjects, with the actual exercise of 
sovereignty what we find is a mass of individuals who, through the threat of violence (actual, 
symbolic, or divine) accept the authority of the monarch, and, later, the state.40⁠ Though this 
subjection may have been violent, the sovereign’s authority came to be adorned with symbolic 
and religious rituals that sanctify, reify, and reproduce the social order in which the sovereign 
exists above his subjects. Similarly, with the PMR, state power is constituted through rituals, 
both mundane and grandiose. The narod exist and are active in politics to the extent that they 
serve the state and those who profit from it, both literally (chapters two and five) and figuratively 
(chapter three).   
Just as Marx noted that each mode of production contains elements of its predecessors, 
our political system too contains traces of past rituals and practices. To get a sense of the modern 
analogues that stress the importance of the ritual performance of sovereignty, one need only look 
to the ritual pardoning of a Thanksgiving turkey in the United States (Fiskesjö 2003, 2010). In 
this somewhat bizarre ritual, the President visibly “pardons” a turkey and spares it from the 
Thanksgiving table. In actuality this ritual is a fruits sacrifice in which the leader symbolically 
refrains from consuming a token sample in order to open the way for mass consumption. This 
ritual, as part of the whole set of rituals which forms “Thanksgiving,” effectively recreates and 
reaffirms citizens as members of a common tribe, with the Commander-in-Chief serving as the 
leader charged with channeling divine forces for the common good (Fiskesjö 2010: 13).  
                                                
40 Rooted in divine law and natural law, the sovereign exists above positive law, all law made by humans. 
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Similarly, the issue of how the British monarch relates to the City of London offers an 
example of how trade and commerce dictate to the ostensible sovereign of the land. The City of 
London is a privately owned corporation masquerading as a state that is in fact not part of 
England or the United Kingdom. Her majesty and the Prime Minister are symbolically and 
fiscally subordinate to the Crown (the governing board of the City) and the City’s Lord Mayor, 
given that the City is the financial engine of the United Kingdom. Before the Queen enters the 
City, she must bow and ask permission to enter this private, sovereign state.41 The Lord Mayor, 
dressed in full regalia, meets the Queen at the City’s borders. Noteworthy is the fact that the 
Queen and her handlers must be in plainclothes. Though this ritual has historical origins, the idea 
that economic interests symbolically dictate to the constitutional monarch show how 
performances and rituals of sovereignty clarify the underlying structures of political authority 
and in the process illustrate the material interests that come to undermine this authority and its 
presentations. Just as the City of London exists fully within the recognized borders of the United 
Kingdom and acts as if it is separate, despite its obvious physical contiguity, the PMR acts as a if 
it is not part of Moldova and requires visitors and those crossing its borders to show the proper 
symbolic deferral to its authority. While the City of London and the rest of the United Kingdom 
are economically integrated to the point that the City’s existence is largely invisible, save for the 
occasional royal visit, the economies of Moldova and the PMR are separate and operated under 
different laws and use different currencies.  
                                                
41 Halsbury's Laws of England says this about the relationship between the Lord Mayor of the City of London (not 
the Mayor of Greater London) and the Queen: “By ancient custom the Lord Mayor tenders the City Sword to the 
Sovereign when she enters the City on state occasions, in token acknowledgement of her overriding authority. The 
Sovereign touches the sword and, by that gesture, returns it to the Lord Mayor with implied permission to carry it 
before her whilst she is in the City. Also by ancient custom the permission of the Lord Mayor is sought for the 
passage of troops through the City, and he receives quarterly, under the Sovereign's sign manual, the password of 
the Tower of London. As spokesman for the citizens, he is entitled to the right of special access to the Sovereign.” 
http://ask.metafilter.com/94476/Is-the-British-Queen-regnantreigning-King-allowed-into-the-City-of-London 
Accessed April 25, 2012.  
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The Subject(s) of Post-Socialist Sovereignty 
 Recognition requires another entity, an Other, since by its nature recognition implies 
communication, exchange, or acknowledgement. International recognition is an act of 
communication that is about everything but supremacy in a given territory, enmeshed as the 
process is in the messy realities of geopolitics, economic interests, and (inter)national egos. 
Recognition implies communication, but by definition a sovereign should simply “be” sovereign. 
Though one might observe, following Rée (2002) and Murphy (1996), that sovereignty today 
requires an international system to have any meaning, the international orphans42 of the former 
socialist world show that sovereign-like entities do exist, and that their constituents believe in 
them despite their well-documented failings.43 Despite state socialism ending in Eastern Europe 
more than two decades ago, states with varying degrees of recognition continue to emerge from 
the socialist world, the most recent being Kosovo, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Each of these 
states performs their sovereignty with varying degrees of success, and each shows how 
perceptions, performances, and beliefs play an outsized role in claims of sovereignty and 
recognition.  
 A state with limited recognition, Kosovo is only a viable polity because of western 
intervention against Serbian ethnic cleansing that legitimized a government described by the 
Council of Europe as being led by a Prime Minister who serves as the “boss” of a “mafia-like” 
group involved in heroin smuggling, organ smuggling, and other criminal activities.44 A media-
driven war with Serbia brought the plight of Kosovars to the television screens of millions, 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
42 To expand upon this extended familial metaphor, Transnistria remains an international orphan. South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia are in the process of being adopted, and Kosovo has successfully been adopted and its adoption as a 
sovereign state legalized under the tutelage of the United Nations, with the support of the United States. 
43 Within this frame, sovereignty becomes almost a natural right of sorts, the ideology of human rights applied to 
state-formation. 
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which generated support for an independent Kosovo — Kosovars needed a state to protect 
themselves. For Transnistrians, to see Kosovo receive international recognition is an indication 
of “double standards” that thwart the PMR quest for recognition. The suffering and ethnic 
cleansing wrought upon Kosovars (and its circulation in the media) led their collective voices to 
be heard. Subsequently, these claims were legitimated by the mechanisms of international law.45 
Despite the alleged criminal deeds of its leaders, Kosovo is a relatively successful example of 
international intervention.46  
 Similarly, PMR elites look to the tortured, violated corpses of those killed during armed 
conflict in 1992 as necessitating a state. Photographs of the bodies of those killed serve as 
building blocks, connective tissues in service of a sovereign claims that will be recognized once 
the world realizes that Transnistrians too, have been victimized and require their own state for 
protection. Given the PMR’s lack of international support, these photos cannot translate into a 
claim for protection by an independent state. The repeated display of dead bodies signifies, 
implicitly at least, that these bodies (and loses they point to) are not yet symbolizable. These 
bodies are not symbolizable for residents, given that there is no available symbolic framework 
into which representations of dead bodies could be translated. These photographs are silent 
arguments, evoked when all other narrative tools fail. Ultimately, these photographs hark back to 
the idea of non-recognition, since recognition requires a shared symbolic vocabulary, a shared 
understanding about one’s positionality.    
                                                                                                                                                       
44 See “Inhuman treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo” 
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/APFeaturesManager/defaultArtSiteView.asp?ID=964 
45 The International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on Kosovo declared that “the declaration of independence of 
the 17th of February 2008 did not violate general international law. The decision stated that the case of Kosovo was 
unique and did not set a precedent (as Russia has claimed). For the complete decision, see http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf 
46 For more on Kosovo as a successful example of international recognition, see Mulaj 2008 and Wilton 2008. For a 
discussion of the illicit economy and international politics in Kosovo, see Strazzari 2008. 
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 Sovereignty has turned into a commodity that can be bartered, bought, and sold. In the 
former Soviet Union, two new states emerged in 2008, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Besides 
Russia, only Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru have recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Nauru’s recognition was secured in exchange for an estimated $50 million in Russian foreign 
aid, or more than $5,200 per Nauruan.47 With a negligible population, far-flung location, and 
destitute economy, Nauru traded perhaps the only thing it could: its ability to recognize other 
countries as sovereign.48 With Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a series of conflicts with Georgia 
dating to the Soviet period allowed the Russian Federation to intervene and to recognize both.  
 With each of these examples, victimization becomes the basis for a sovereignty later 
confirmed through intervention and recognition. Though recognition creates a sense of finality, 
what precedes recognition is what authorizes it. With each of the aforementioned, staging a 
memorable performance was integral to being recognized as sovereign.49 For the United States 
and its allies, Kosovo is a sovereign state, just as South Ossetia and Abkhazia are for Russia.  
 As a concept term, sovereignty contains a certain normative ideal that is self-policing — 
only recognized sovereigns can legitimately perform certain functions, and only recognized 
states can decide whether or not a polity is recognized as sovereign. Regardless as to whether 
these functions occur at the level of international relations or as a legal framework for American 
Indian rights claims, sovereignty is above all a recognized claim. This claim need not be solely 
political. Cattelino has argued that sovereignty is a worldview, not simply a legal and political 
                                                
47 Nauru has a history of exchanging recognition for international aid. As a UN member it has oscillated between 
recognizing China and Taiwan at various times in exchange for development aid. 
48 Sergei Markedonov, the Director of the Department for Problems of Interethnic Relations at the Institute for 
Political and Military Analysis, remarked cynically, “There is no question of morality here … it’s the smallest 
country in the world. It has no potential, just to trade in independence. Independence is a commodity – people will 
trade it." “Abkhazia is Recognized by Even Smaller Nauru” Ellen Barry, December 15, 2009. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/world/europe/16georgia.html  
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status. The Seminole casinos studied by Cattelino are not simply moneymakers, but a means to 
reinforce Seminole sovereignty and cultural distinctiveness. Even recent biopolitical 
theorizations of sovereignty are premised on the marking of bodies by political authority 
(Agamben 1998, Foucault 2003, Hansen and Stepputat 2006). This tension between sovereign as 
a fixed, recognized claim and its inherent relativity mires the term in uncertainty.  
 Recognition as sovereign entity is the starting point for political science and international 
relations: one can act as a sovereign as long as one is perceived to be such. This is the political 
component to reader-response theory. Reader-response theory holds that it does not matter what 
the intention of the author is; what matters is how others read the text. Yet the PMR illustrates a 
different trend whereby intention matters (and may even come to be self-sufficient).50 Acting or 
pretending as if the PMR is sovereign has proved to be a durable means of organizing the polity. 
  The successor states of the Soviet Union became independent long after the template of 
the nation-state was forged. Most obtained their current forms primarily because of socialist 
concerns, not national ones. Multi-ethnic socialist states used the nation as an organizational 
form, the goal being not to create independent nations but the constituent units of a socialist state 
that would transcend the nation.51 Ironically, these national forms originally were created to 
drain the nation of its national content. With the demise of socialism, these states were left with 
the institutional forms bequeathed by socialism. Most declared sovereignty and were afforded all 
of the accoutrements of recognized states, the most important being a seat in the United Nations. 
With the emergence of these unrecognized successor states in the 1990s, the former socialist 
                                                                                                                                                       
49 The fact that I characterize these events as a performance is not intended to minimize those killed in these conflict 
zones. My argument is that these bodies and conflicts are real, as are the institutions, polities, sentiments, and 
subjectivities made possible by them. 
50 The recent examples of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya are negative examples of this insofar as they show how little 
sovereignty means when it ceases to be recognized. 
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world is, despite longstanding claims of deficiencies across the board, a laboratory containing 
novel forms of democracy, capitalism, and statehood. 
 
 
On Narrative and Belonging 
 
 Recent ethnography from the post-Soviet periphery (Oushakine 2009) illustrates how a 
state’s failure to provide a coherent narrative can offer a means of belonging to communities that 
have experienced profound loss and disorder. From the PMR, the periphery of the periphery, the 
slightest acknowledgment (symbolic, financial, ideological) from Russia strengthens a durable 
sense of stability and belonging. After an initial decade of state building and consolidation, PMR 
political discourse is oriented around the idea that Russia will recognize the PMR, annex it, or 
otherwise support it in perpetuity. Locally, annexation remains popular because it forecloses the 
possibility of living under the Moldovan state. Though contradictory, annexation would enable 
locals to preserve their linguistic and cultural distinctiveness. These hopeful yet contradictory 
semiotics are inscribed on billboards, buildings, and in public spaces. These may appear in the 
form of banners that declare, “Wherever we stand, we stand with Russia” and “Our Strength is in 
Unity with Russia,” or they may touch upon past revolutionary desires and fervor.  
 As I sat on a private bus headed to Tiraspol in 2006, my eyes were drawn to a large wall 
that prominently displayed the motto of the French Revolution in block Cyrillic characters: 
“Liberty, equality, fraternity!” In September 2010, as the PMR celebrated its twentieth 
anniversary, the font’s once crisp outlines had visibly faded. These temporarily halted semiotics, 
weathered by time, were ignored yet remained a part of the symbolic landscape. This is but one 
                                                                                                                                                       
51 According to Lenin, nations emerged in response to the demands of capital. "The tendency of every national 
movement is towards the formation of national states, under which these requirements of modern capitalism are best 
satisfied" (Lenin 1975: 154). 
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example of how residents live amidst other symbolic remnants of the PMR’s carefully cultivated 
revolutionary origins. 
 Over the course of two decades a profitable system has grown amidst this liminality. 
Today, the PMR has its own vested economic interests, a regional political class, legions of 
bureaucrats, and a veritable army of pensioners who benefit from the status quo. Some collect a 
paycheck or a pension, while others collect immense rents from the control of state institutions 
and bureaucratic fiefdoms. PMR elites have been successful in creating the accoutrements of a 
sovereign state and making integration with Moldova difficult. 
 
The PMR as System 
 
The PMR state offers residents a sense of belonging that they would otherwise not feel in 
a Moldovan national state. At the material level, the region is a sinkhole for questionable capital 
accumulation that takes advantage of the region’s lax regulatory and jurisdictional environment 
to enrich well-connected businessmen, both local and foreign. Russian investors own energy-
intensive infrastructure like steel and electrical generation that consume the bulk of the region’s 
gas, provided without the expectation of payment from Gazprom (estimated to be between 100 
and 500 million dollars worth annually). ⁠ 
Russia provides humanitarian aid directly to the PMR President and Supreme Soviet 
without audit controls, though accounting controls were instituted in 2012. Though a visible part 
of this aid subsidizes pensioners, small businesses, orphans, and other charitable causes, one 
hears less in the media about how this aid is indirectly embezzled (destined for “business credits” 
and economic development). This functional role as a kind of near abroad money laundering hub 
allows a portion of this wealth to come back to private hands in Russia. Russian foreign aid, 
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profits from free natural gas, and revenue generated by local economic enterprises like Sheriff 
return to the Russian Federation in the form of kickbacks to Duma deputies (a cast of defenders 
of Transnistria from afar) who keep the region on the Russian political agenda. I myself have 
encountered more than one intoxicated Duma deputy in Tiraspol on September 2nd, Day of the 
Republic [den’ respublika].  
The PMR is not a system in which everybody profits, but a system in which everybody 
believes that they profit. This profitability, real or symbolic, offers a means of enrichment for 
neighboring Ukraine and Moldova. As a means of illustrating how profit trumps all else, I give 
the following examples. One ethnic Moldovan I met in Chișinău spoke of a neighbor whose 
cousin, a Moldovan policeman from a town bordering the PMR, had purchased a cargo van to 
smuggle goods into Moldova from the PMR. Though it was unclear what he was transporting, 
the fact that a representative of the state that fought the PMR in armed conflict would profit from 
it only goes to show how the PMR’s existence as a state remains predicated on maintaining a 
clear cut distinction between conflict parties, though in reality these parties are more similar than 
different. Similarly, when interviewing veterans of the 1992 conflict in both Moldova and in the 
PMR, both sides spoke of putting down their guns and drinking wine together in the evenings. 
The fact that each could put aside their differences after a hard day of fighting illustrates above 
all the power the political holds over us despite our common sense. While “politics” is cited as 
the reason this conflict remains unsolved, in actuality the conflict remains about control of the 
spoils of the Soviet state. To speak of the conflict as one between elites would be too simple, for 
if this line between conflict parties were to become blurred in the public imagination the state 
and its performances would cease to be felicitous.  
 31 
This idea of a system that functions above the individual displaces blame and agency. 
Given the context of the (relatively) recent demise of the Soviet Union, an all-encompassing 
system that provided for its citizens from the cradle to the grave, the benefits of being part of a 
system far outweigh its negatives, even if the net result is impoverishment. In terms of the 
former, the PMR contains just enough of the detritus of Soviet life — its knowledge, categories, 
and practices — to draw attention away from its extractive aspects. Residents themselves cite the 
PMR’s durability as a system alongside its claims to be a legitimate, if momentarily 
unrecognized, successor state to the Soviet Union. 
One question lurking throughout this dissertation is the question of who exactly needs 
Transnistria to exist. The initial idealism of the state project was hijacked and today the state 
exists largely to enrich those at its helm. The dissertation begins with a series of referenda in the 
early 1990s that codified and annunciated the political demands of the left-bank populace and 
ends with an ethnographic excursion into a self-professed postmodern social movement. These 
examples were chosen because of the way they show how political performances shifted from 
sincere participation in uncertain times to a situation today in which individuals exercise little 
agency in the political process.  
One informant active in the earliest state-building efforts told me that when the first PMR 
president’s two sons arrived in the region in the late 1990s, everything changed. He described 
this as simple fiscal greed “father has a country,” [u papa est’ stana] the implication being that 
their arrival was an invitation to enrich themselves. This singular focus on extraction and 
impoverishment at the expense of sustainable economic development lessened the importance of 
the people as the constituent holders of sovereignty and increased their importance as passive 
individuals. As a population, residents today are required as the literal income-generating 
 32 
material for enterprises like Sheriff (chapter four). As a result of this diminishing importance, the 
performativity that was the initial impetus for a separate state comes to be emptied of meaning. 
This itself begs the question why these performances continue? Why does Sheriff (chapter four) 
provide discounts for the elder? Why does a movement such as Proryv (chapter five) demand 
belief? Along the same lines, why is it necessary for people to appear to believe in a system 
where their actual belief is in fact unnecessary — why pretend? The short answer to these 
questions is that in the context of a post-Soviet existence that is precisely lacking any certainty52, 
people need to believe for themselves. This impetus to believe is tempered by a pragmatic 
tendency not to probe the particulars of how (and why) things are how they are. If one scratches 
the surface of this largely performative and participatory sovereignty, one may catch a glimpse 
of what everyone knows but nobody says: that the body politic is decaying. If one probes 
beneath the surface they will encounter decay and malaise — the shallowness of collective life 
will be exposed and the unitary narod will be vivisectioned into its decaying constituent parts, 
the individual nationalities that together constitute the PMR. 
 
The (Post-)Soviet Past 
 In the PMR, identification with the Soviet period is premised upon identities and 
subjectivities that emerged during postwar Soviet development.53 During fieldwork, residents of 
both left- and right-bank Moldova spoke of Transnistria as a Soviet paradise. The region enjoyed 
                                                
52 What was not altered by the fall of the Soviet state has been irreparably altered by the introduction of capitalist 
values. 
53 Particularly important for residents of left-bank Moldova was the fact that internal Soviet passports listed an 
individual’s nationality.This was a particularly important point in the emergence of the region as an internationalist 
haven in a nationalizing Moldova. 
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a temperate climate, fertile soil, proximity to the Black sea, and unparalleled productivity.54 Both 
in terms of subjective recollections and objective economic indicators, the region was incredibly 
productive, a place whose bounty was measured in the sweetness of its fruits and by its booming 
factories. 
 As a polity created explicitly in opposition to Moldovan nationalism, the PMR takes on 
national qualities due to the normative demands of statehood and nationhood in the late 20th 
century. The Transnistrian citizen-subject is caught between the symbolic and semiotic legacy of 
the Soviet state and an unrecognized one that uses internationalism as a means to create national 
subjects. And while certain aspects of what made the region great still exist (e.g., its fertile soil), 
others have disappeared (its factories are largely shuttered). During interviews and everyday 
interactions, residents recalled the Soviet period as a time of plentitude and purpose — they 
belonged to a superpower. This contemporary lack is compensated for by a hyper-identification 
with the Soviet Union’s legal successor, the Russian Federation. Residents’ existence as subjects 
of a non-state connects them with a Soviet past from which they do not want to (and largely 
cannot) escape.55 The requirement to remain visible forces residents to utilize the institutions, 
documents, and practices of a state that tried to liquidate their tenuous statehood.56 This doubled 
citizenship, not duplicated but supplemented, only increases the burden placed on the 
performative aspects of sovereignty, since the PMR must show that the recognized supplement 
(passports, travel documents) remains secondary to the unrecognized core. I found that 
individuals fielded competing tenders for citizenship, with each offering its own benefits. This 
                                                
54 Though left-bank Moldova included only 12% of Moldova’s territory, it accounted for 33% of all industrial and 
56% of all consumer goods produced in the MSSR. As a part of the military-industrial complex, its factories were 
not controlled by the MSSR in Chișinău, but were under the direct control of Moscow (Zabarah 2011: 161). 
55 I.e., this rootedness in past offers an existential comfort in addition to other more tangible material benefits. For 
example, PMR citizens receive monthly pension supplements from Russia. The Soviet past is also a necessity and 
vital resource for state -building insofar as in the PMR carries the banner of Soviet internationalism. 
56 This is applicable to the majority of residents who hold Moldovan citizenship. See footnote 18 above. 
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cleavage between polities and subjects animates the normative framework that prolongs this 
conflict.57 The fact that everybody has two, possibly three, or even four passports offers the 
opportunity to act within competing (and often contradictory) political parameters. Liminality-at-
large authorizes the uncertain subject to try on competing guises and masks (cf. Goffman 1959).  
 Over the course of fieldwork, I came to see that while in certain situations people would 
claim to care about recognition, later I would realize that many did not feel strongly about it. 
This fluidity is a result of the PMR’s liminality whereby politics becomes a ritual without 
efficacy or any lasting effect.58 PMR sovereignty is structurally akin to an empty set or an empty 
signifier, a placeholder with delimited boundaries (literally and symbolically policed by the PMR 
state) and set terms that afford flexibility. This performed sovereignty serves as a cover for 
certain things (e.g., economic plunder), but at the same time offers a compelling narrative when 
faced with capitulation.59  
 The unrealized teleology of the PMR demands public participation during holidays, 
academic conferences, state events, official negotiations, elections, and the like. Participation 
occurs in small, often unremarkable domains: domesticating the language of the state through the 
use of the possessive adjective form my state, [moe gosudarstvo], our state, [nashe gosudarstvo]; 
using the documents provided by the PMR state; or simply being at a public holiday or state-
sponsored event. Alternately, performances of sovereignty can be grandiose, public spectacles 
                                                
57 The international system’s inflexibility and selective exceptions (e.g., Kosovo) have left places like Transnistria 
unacknowledged yet devoid of any durable framework for their current existence. This becomes an issue insofar as 
becoming “normal” or “resolving” the conflict is seen locally as negating its more than two decades as an 
independent polity. 
58 Perhaps the most cited ethnographic example of the state as performance is Geertz’s “theatre state” where 
“stupendous cremations, tooth filings, temple dedications, pilgrimages and blood sacrifices, mobilizing hundreds 
and even thousands of people and great quantities of wealth, were not means to political ends: they were the ends 
themselves, they were what the state was for” (Geertz 1980:13). The state served ritual: “mass ritual was not a 
device to shore up the state, but rather the state, even in its final gasp, was a device for the enactment of mass ritual” 
(Geertz 1980: 13). 
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staged for foreign and domestic audiences. Others can be intimate and private — recounting a 
story of a fallen friend or comrade. Such performances seek to a liminality-at-large that cannot 
be pinned down or foreclosed.  
 I stumbled upon a performance one summer evening as I witnessed a group of local 
athletes receiving a blessing and an official send-off at the memorial complex in the center of 
Tiraspol. This group of sportsmen was about to embark on a trip to Russia for a martial arts 
competition. After a blessing by a local Orthodox priest, a high-ranking official from the PMR 
Ministry of Defense exhorted the youths to explain to Russians and others “what Transnistria is” 
— to communicate to the world that the PMR is. Ritually blessed by the sacred and encouraged 
by the secular, these athletes were sent forth to engage in public relations.60 This performance 
indirectly acknowledged the PMR’s liminality-at-large and sought to overcome this uncertainty. 
While the PMR’s state-building project enjoys success among residents, the PMR’s reality must 
still be imparted to outsiders. Recognition requires a common vocabulary and a degree of shared 
understanding about each other’s positionality — it is this common ground that makes 
abstractions and translations between an apparent incommensurability possible. 
 
The Orthodox Faith and the Post-Soviet State 
 In Transnistria religious and ethical practices influence present social forms. In the post-
Soviet period, the Orthodox Church emerged as a social and political force. This might appear 
odd, given that Soviet Union was the first state to have as an ideological objective the 
elimination of religion (Peris 1998), but Soviet attitudes and policies toward religion vacillated 
                                                                                                                                                       
59 Transnistria’s ongoing struggle with Moldova is framed with the same structure and historical content as the 
historic timeline of the Soviet state, beginning with the revolution and ending with victory in the Great Patriotic 
War. 
60 Their send-off was filmed and later shown on state television. 
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between a utopian determination to substitute secular rationalism for superstition and a pragmatic 
acceptance of religious practices and institutions. After seventy years of repression, Orthodox 
Christianity now constitutes a de facto state religion. 
 As an institution, the Russian Orthodox Church, like other religions, is in competition 
with other forms of authority like the family. This clash of authority pits religion against more 
traditional, parochial forms of knowledge. At the level of establishing worldly authority, one can 
view the witchcraft allegations in late medieval Europe not as a wider concern with persecuting 
witches but with the church and the state together breaking the authority of the family. Given 
that traditional beliefs and superstition passed through women, the church and state persecuted 
women under the guise of witchcraft allegations. As an institution that is thoroughly corrupt but 
exists beyond any discourse of corruption61, the Russia Orthodox Church provides an 
authorization as a subject of God that is both hierarchical and subject to a durable authority — 
the rule of the Elders that traces its authority to the time of Christ (Pelikan 1977). The Orthodox 
Church provides for its followers by giving them an identity as spiritual subjects when other 
secular identifications (citizenship, nationality) remain in question. Orthodox Christianity 
provides a structure that, given the absence of a stable subject position and a generalized lack of 
agency, confers a more stable sense of identity to those who identify with the Orthodox faith, 
even if their engagement is superficial at best. 
 The Russian word for Orthodoxy [pravoslavie] literally translates as right praising. As 
the de facto religion in the region, Orthodoxy is both a presence and a non-factor in terms of 
spurning engagement in the political realm. Its reemergence alongside two “foreign” ideas — 
capitalism and democracy — position it as a spiritual gloss on a material and political existence 
 37 
premised on loss (of everything associated with the Soviet Union). Given this context, 
Orthodoxy provides a guarantee that the individual remains, at some level, important. This 
cannot be underestimated in a time when common values remain ill-defined. Religious spaces 
are open to all: they are places to gather, light candles, silently pray, or request prayers. The 
Russian Orthodox Church exists largely beyond the realm of formal politics, though it overlaps 
and remains part of the same circuits of authority and capital.    
 The PMR state-building project is framed as a secular, internationalist project with roots 
in the Soviet period, but the PMR state remains similar to the Russian Federation insofar as it 
legitimizes the state through Orthodox Christianity (in the PMR more than 95% of residents are 
Orthodox Christians). Religious power becomes another instrument deployed by the elite to 
sanctify the status quo. During public appearances a bishop or metropolitan in full regalia flanks 
the president, the head of the secular government. Authorities use religion to consolidate power 
by presenting Orthodox Christianity as the de facto state religion. Invoking the Orthodox Church 
as a constituent element of the region and its inhabitants strengthens the image of a singular, 
unitary people. The holders of popular sovereignty, the people [narod], are marked as Orthodox 
believers. Dissent and opposition are viewed through the frame of religious deviancy, since they 
threaten established customs. This instrumental use of religion can be traced to both pre-Soviet 
and Soviet-era practices. 
 Orthodox Christian practices permeated the Soviet institutions that formed the basis of 
Soviet society. One such institution was the collective. The collective was a social group 
organized around a place or activity (e.g. school, workplace, farm, club, or military 
organization); it was the fundamental social unit, and together collectives formed the skeleton of 
                                                                                                                                                       
61 One bishop in the PMR was a known pedophile and he remained in the good graces both of the diocese as well as 
the state. While people voiced these allegations with He received a promotion and now works for the Russian 
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Soviet society (Kharkhordin 1998: 958).  This and other Soviet institutions were based upon 
long-established practices of the Orthodox Church. At the societal level, the Orthodox Church 
sought to not to coexist with the state or to dominate it, but for the secular world to dissolve into 
the church. This is analogous to Marx’s communism in which the state would gradually wither 
away. In the Soviet Union, Marxism was akin to a secular religion that permeated the social 
fabric insofar as it purported to explain the logic and course of history.   
 In the Soviet Union the writings of Lenin and Stalin literally dictated the forms taken by 
the Soviet state. Similarly, in the Orthodox Church the authority of the elders determined the 
contours of belief. The Orthodox Church was concerned with three primary practices: 
denouncing sin, admonishing the flock into righteousness, and, when necessary, 
excommunicating. The Soviet state sought to control deviation from the official line through 
control and surveillance. The collective guided society, not a unitary, totalitarian power. Soviet 
schools, factories, offices, military regiments, and agricultural enterprises enforced discipline 
through word and deed (Kharkhordin 1999).   
 In Transnistria, these Soviet-era economic enterprises and collectives agitated for a 
separate state to protect their rights. These collectives, cut off from their Soviet foundation, were 
recalibrated according to new economic, political, and ethical imperatives. In Orthodox 
Christianity, salvation is a process of reestablishing man's communion with God. With the 
demise of Marxism, residents sought salvation through politics by constituting a state whose 
content is religious and its form secular. Today the Orthodox faith occupies different parts in 
people’s lives, and its place within society remains unquestioned and unchallenged. This 
ascendant position sanctifies a unique merging of material and spiritual interests whereby 
                                                                                                                                                       
Orthodox Church in the United States. 
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theological demands to revive a religion that above all defines the Russian cultural space overlap 
with economic pressures and charitable opportunities created by capitalism. 
 In the PMR religion provides a convenient cover for capital accumulation. A local 
company, Sheriff, mitigates its otherwise predatory economic position in the region through 
charity — religious charity provides a cover for economic plunder.62 In the center of Tiraspol, 
the most prominent new Orthodox cathedral is the newly built Cathedral of the Birth of Christ. 
Located in the center of town only steps from the PMR Supreme Soviet, the cathedral was build 
with the financial support of the Sheriff holding company. During one interview with a local 
priest, I asked him whether this church really was the “Sheriff Cathedral,” as locals commonly 
refer it to. He responded by affirming that Sheriff did indeed help financially with construction, 
and that he did not see a problem with this: “long after Sheriff is gone, the cathedral will 
remain.”  
 The Orthodox Church and organized crime have much in common. In one documentary 
film, Thieves by Law, a prominent organized crime figure shows his collection of Andrei Rublev 
icons that he donated to the local Orthodox Church in Cannes, France. Those who have gained 
through criminal means turn to charity as a means of assuaging their often-predatory position in 
as gangsters or racketeers. Similarly, Varese (2005: 180-187) has described how the turn to 
religious charity by organized crime figures is a means of legitimizing ill-gotten gains both to 
God and to society. In one instance cited by Varese, the church utilized the same strategies of 
criminal racketeers to get monasteries and congregations to pay up. One Bishop in Yekaterinburg 
who resorted to harsh collection methods to shake down congregations rationalized his severe 
financial policies, explaining “money is the blood of the church” (Varese 2005: 186). 
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A Note on the State 
 Throughout this dissertation, the PMR state plays an outsized role. From being the 
organizer of the performances of sovereignty to serving as the placeholder that temporarily 
assuages the liminality of non-recognition, the PMR state remains a central facet of life for 
residents. It is not my intention to reify the state as an actor, but to show how the state functions 
for a variety of constituencies.63  
 Who is the agent when one speaks of the PMR state? While there is a tendency to speak of 
a state that acts and makes decisions, the state often refers to certain people, in this case a small 
cadre of individuals directly involved in establishing the PMR. The most visible individuals 
exercising influence on the PMR state are its elected legislators and the PMR president and his 
family.64 Less visible are the “power” ministries: the ministry of defense, the interior ministry, 
and the feared ministry of state security. Vested economic entities (both foreign and domestic) 
exercise undue influence over the state due to the external support they secure (namely a supply 
of cheap natural gas from Russia) that allows the PMR state to finance itself. It is thus difficult to 
speak of the state as a single actor. Instead, we must replace the state with those individuals or 
institutions that we are talking about. Yet one must not lose sight of the fact that the PMR state is 
not simply individuals, ideas, or institutions. While individuals occupy certain influential 
positions, no single individual determines its course.  
                                                                                                                                                       
62 The phenomenon of Sheriff is addressed in chapter four and Bobick 2011. 
63 Abrams (1988) famously declared that the state is an ideological project, not an agent: it is institutions, people, 
and interest that do not always agree with one another. The state is perpetuated by a minority (some) setting 
themselves up over others 
64 The minister I am alluding to is the head of the PMR Ministry of State Security (MGB), Vladimir Antuifeev. The 
PMR president Igor Smirnov’s two sons are intimately involved in business and politics. Smirnov’s younger son 
Oleg is chairman of the Transnistria branch of Gazprombank, a fully owned subsidiary of the state monopoly 
Gazprom, and his elder son Vladimir is the head of the PMR Customs service. Unofficial estimates of customs 
“revenue” reach as high as $2 billion dollars a year, compared to an official PMR state budget of around $150 
million dollars. 
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 In the PMR, the state generates immense profits for certain individuals and groups. The 
profitability of the status quo allows elites to use recognition for their own benefit insofar as they 
profess it vocally but profit from its antithesis. A large part of governance in the PMR is 
concerned with managing this ritual of (non-)recognition. Pro-PMR interests and their supporters 
in Moscow have successfully limited the influence of other competing sovereigns in the region. 
This allows for the PMR state, along with Sheriff, to be the sole provider of jobs, pensions, 
education, public services, utilities, protection, and property rights. In a system in which the state 
and a single holding company are the sole providers of benefits, change is viewed as threatening. 
As a set of institutions and as an idea with widespread salience among the populace, the PMR 
state capitalizes on subtle differences between Transnistria and Moldova to create identifications 
and knowledge that foreclose change or rapprochement. This implicit choice between an 
imperfect state that is “ours” and a Moldovan one creates an environment in which criticism of 
that state is unpatriotic. 
 
Performing Sovereignty 
 The PMR sheds light on practices that underlie any state but which are invisible when the 
state is seen as a recognized sovereign entity. Political theory focuses on sovereignty as 
supremacy, as the right to rule over others by force, custom, or law. Less attention is given to 
how sovereignty operates, to how a right to sovereignty comes to be recognized or, in this case, 
does not (Grant 2009: 1). Bartelson (1995) calls this the “givenness of sovereignty.” Transnistria 
illustrates how a self-authorized polity can, in the context of uncertainties created by the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, come to challenge the system of sovereign states. When recognition is 
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lacking, one must turn to other means of creating authority. The PMR illustrates how sovereignty 
has shifted to a concept based on performance.  
Despite its stated goal of independence and international recognition, the PMR elite use 
recognition to distract attention away from policies that have plundered the region’s once 
booming economy. A single local holding company, Sheriff, has monopolized the region’s 
economy.65 Sheriff became the dominant economic entity in the region because of its ability to 
exploit the PMR’s murky regulator environment. For Sheriff and the PMR political class, the 
people are a resource to be exploited for gain. Despite mass impoverishment and obvious 
economic predation, state officials and elected representatives blame the region’s problems on 
outsiders. Independence would force the PMR to diversify revenues to fund the state budget 
instead of the current arrangement in which the PMR finances its budget by reselling Russian 
natural gas, supplemented by local tax collection and Russian humanitarian aid.66 Performing its 
sovereignty is important because the stalled teleology of the PMR requires it as a placeholder. 
Though those at the helm of the PMR state proclaim that the PMR is in fact sovereign, though 
without mass participation, their visible and well-known enrichment via the state will be even 
more visible. Likewise, local and foreign business interests need this participatory, performative 
sovereignty to keep Moldovan claims to the region at bay. Similarly, if there were no support 
among residents for statehood, the political separation from Moldova that has been so profitable 
for some would be increasingly untenable. As it stands now, with Russia serving as a guarantor 
of PMR security (due to the 1992 peace agreement), strategic investor, and donor, the region 
appears more independent than it would be without financial support from Russia.  
                                                
65 Sheriff’s transcription into Latin characters is Sherif, based on the Cyrillic word Шериф. 
66 The PMR’s debt to Gazprom is today over two billion dollars. For more on Moldova and Transnistria’s natural 
gas sector, see Bruce and Yafimava 2009. 
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As this dissertation will show, sovereignty is both performative and practical. Performing 
sovereignty to its constituents is just as important as keeping competitors at bay. Recent 
ethnographies (Lemon 2000; Pesmen 2000) have illustrated how performativity is notoriously 
difficult to institutionalize and is instead efficacious in the moment, in the here and now. Many 
of the phenomena described in this dissertation might appear at first glance to be only 
tangentially about sovereignty. 
In terms of the economy, the PMR economy is based on a subjective component in which 
images of past productivity mask a predatory system in which the people are fodder for a system 
that ceaselessly realizes a profit. To maintain this facade, authorities highlight a few visible 
subsidies available to residents and contrast the region’s economy with neighboring Moldova, 
Europe’s poorest country. A single local holding company, Sheriff, has monopolized the regional 
economy while building a network of companies that provide vital services like television, 
internet, and fixed and mobile telephone service. For Sheriff, the people generate revenue and 
state institutions remain beholden for tax receipts and financing. Sheriff has created charitable 
programs to ensure that pensioners spend the bulk of their pension in its supermarkets — doing 
well is good for the bottom line.67 Similarly, individuals can choose where to shop, though 
Sheriff supplies the goods they purchase.68 Choice is an illusion insofar as the conditions of 
possibility in which residents live are managed and carefully calibrated. This captive consumer 
existence, along with the means of political participate described in chapter two, are but two 
instances in which the people constitute a required component of a larger spectacle and serve as 
the literal source of revenue. The people, residents — the collective origin of political power in 
the region — forms the basis for a polity that generates hundreds of millions of dollars not 
                                                
67 This is a kind of post-Soviet Corporate Social Responsibility. For more on CSR as an object of ethnographic 
inquiry, see Welker 2009, and Welker, Partridge, and Hardin 2011. 
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despite, but because of, its unrecognized status. Turning a profit has been an anticipated 
consequence of the PMR’s existence. In the 1990s, the region was a money-laundering zone 
capable of converting useless Soviet rubles into cash.69 Today, goods from Ukraine and Russia 
enter the region and quietly leave as “exports.” These import-export schemes run the gamut from 
the mundane (used cars, alcohol, and frozen chicken) to illicit cargoes of arms, goods, and 
bodies.    
At the level of political practice, local formations (i.e., parties, movements, initiative 
groups) seek to overcome non-recognition by creating durable identifications and 
understandings. One PMR social movement, Proryv, the subject of chapter five, began as a 
student initiative in 2005 and is today a political party with representation in the PMR 
legislature. Formed in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution and led by an enigmatic 
sociologist wanted by Interpol for murder, Proryv allegedly received startup financing from the 
Kremlin to thwart any future color revolutions in the post-Soviet space.70 As an organization 
founded in the context of an ongoing “information war” between the West and Russia, Proryv 
points not to an incommensurable geopolitical opposition between the PMR/Russia and the West 
but to a set of structural commonalities between them. Proryv is indicative of the modern ritual 
of politics in the former Soviet space and illustrates how new knowledge and practices (“political 
technology”) becomes a means of creating, at least temporarily, the identifications, brands, and 
the vocabulary required by democracy. Proryv shows how Western knowledge and marketing 
concepts have migrated to new contexts in the former Soviet Union. 
                                                                                                                                                       
68 Small business owners told of having to purchase their stock at one of Sheriff’s wholesale retail centers.  
69 This scheme, instigated at the behest of Boris Yeltsin's Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, was centered around the 
Soviet 14th Army's military field bank. For more on this, see chapter four. 
70 Color revolution is a term that was widely used by the media to describe related movements that developed in 
several countries in the former USSR during the early 2000s. These include the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003) 
and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004). Each of these led to the defeat of pro-Russian leaders. 
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Transnistria, Irony, and the West 
As an ambiguous region in a peripheral country, Transnistria serves as a mirror that 
refracts many of the underlying political and economic practices that underpin our existence as 
political subjects in the 21st century. As a political entity that has all of the institutional and 
symbolic aspects of statehood but lacks international recognition, Transnistria and the wider 
post-Soviet space offer unique sites for reconceptualizing political and legal authority from the 
murky underside of an increasingly globalized world. Transnistria elucidates the increasingly 
contingent, even desperate, character of liberal-democratic sovereignty in an era of unfettered 
finance capital, opaque state-corporate alliances, militarized borders, and popular alienation. 
These processes operate relatively transparently in Transnistria. Elsewhere, particularly in the 
West, elites go to even greater lengths to mask the “performative” dimension of their 
sovereignty. 
Transnistria emerged as a direct result of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991; by 
whatever metric one measures the Soviet Union by (size, space, body count, etc.), the Soviet 
Union was a unique phenomenon with no analogues in history. As the defining project of the 20th 
century, the Soviet Union and its recognized and unrecognized offspring serve as a strange 
mirror capable of alienating and estranging one from our own, comfortable, settled reality. When 
one looks at a place like Transnistria through the normative lens of democracy and capitalism as 
practiced by the West, one cannot help but notice how abnormal the region and its processes 
look to us, yet how strikingly normal these same processes are for residents. While it is all to 
easy to look at Transnistria and the wider post-Soviet world with a smug sense of superiority, the 
irony is that they are not different from us — the 2008 financial crisis only reinforces the idea 
that political inputs are predetermined, and that the interests of capital will remain ascendant. 
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This smug sense of superiority at this visibly deficient polity that has pretenses to a state — 
gawking at how they govern themselves against their own interests — tends to overshadow any 
heuristic import the region might convey, the most important being that they in fact are no 
different from us.  
As the level of practice, while one can dismiss the PMR’s use of referenda as a stage-
managed tool of elites seeking a political mandate for statehood, referenda remain an 
increasingly important means to exercise agency in the political process in the European Union 
and in the United States. More important, however, is the potential referenda hold for pulling 
back the elaborately cultivated facade of reality that dictates the norms and forms of political 
practice. This is increasingly relevant as economic malaise envelopes the traditional Euro-
Atlantic engines of capitalism. It is somewhat ironic that Greece’s threat to hold a referendum in 
November 2011 on a European Union bailout shocked Europe and the financial markets. Given 
the fact that Greece’s call for a referendum on an important national issue created significant 
turmoil in markets (which had, it must be noted, already severely constrained Greece’s ability to 
govern as well and exercise its sovereignty), it behooves us as scholars to interrogate popular 
sovereignty in all its forms, particularly from the periphery. While referenda in a very 
fundamental sense constitute and formalize political practice in the PMR, their operation in other 
settings offers a useful basis for comparison.  
 
Sovereignty or State Formation? 
 
Absent from the theoretical discussion above is the issue of state formation and the 
anthropology of the state. As the curious entity that serves as the “master noun of political 
discourse” (Geertz 1980: 121), the state is both a thing and a process, something that exists but 
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which is constantly reworked by individuals, institutions, and discourses. Anthropological 
research has revealed that state institutions are often fractured, reconfigured, and in conflict with 
one another.71 Instead of searching for a hidden or overreaching source of authority, this project 
also looks at power in the “everyday forms of state formation” described by Joseph and Nugent 
(1994). While much of this dissertation concerns the formal performances and proclamations of 
sovereignty by PMR state officials, the informal realm of practice and everyday life remain 
important venues in which the PMR state maintains and projects a presence. From own twice 
weekly experiences at the passport office of the PMR Migration service, I am keenly aware of 
the fact that waiting to be processed and recognized by state institutions and bureaucracies helps 
to create to state for its constituents. The absence of the Moldovan only lessens its importance 
for residents. 
While performative sovereignty remains the larger context in which the PMR state seeks 
international recognition, state formation occurs in the mundane moments of everyday life. As a 
polity that both is and is not a state, is useful to think of the state as a process, not an object, 
given that it is constantly being created. This creation requires movement and participation — 
refusing to speak of the PMR as a state, refusing to use its money, and ignoring its symbolic and 
actual power would severely undermine its claims over its territory and its constituents. Given 
the fact that the PMR state is not an ex nihilo state project but an ad hoc polity that emerged out 
of a concern with maintaining continuity with Soviet practices (as opposed to national ones), it 
remains far easier to create connections that build upon identifications and affective ties that 
existed in the Soviet period. For comparative purposes, the idea of tearing down the state 
institutions that emerged under Soviet tutelage and rebuilding (as is ongoing in other non-Russia 
                                                
71 Abrams and Foucault deny the unity of the state and suggest a focus on the mundane routines through which 
bureaucrats assert state power (Abrams 1988; Foucault 1991). For a collection of classic and more recent essays on 
 48 
areas of the Soviet periphery like Georgia, Moldova, and the Bălțic states) is not an option. The 
idea of the PMR as a state remains the primary means of harmonizing sentiments between how 
things were and how they ought to be.  
State formation places a stress on continuity in order to highlight how political authority 
in the PMR is derived from maintaining fidelity (i.e., to Soviet practices, documents, passports, 
and state symbols, among other things) or equivalency with Russia as the legitimate successor to 
the Soviet state. In this context, the act of engaging with a state institution — enrolling in school, 
receiving medical care, obtaining a document, registering a marriage, transferring property, 
receiving any sort of benefit — creates the state both in the abstract and concretely for residents 
themselves. But given that PMR issued documents are not recognized internationally, the state 
fails in many ways. Being forced to carry the PMR’s useless passport along with another 
passport is a reminder of this failure. One’s required international visibility is precisely lacking 
insofar as PMR documents are not viewed outside of the PMR as valid forms of identification.72 
Interactions with the state are both situational and interactional, recreating the state-citizen nexus 
that tends to be lost in any discussion of the PMR’s legitimacy due to its unrecognized status. 
The contradictions of the PMR’s international situation are embodied and lived through 
by residents who have no qualms about doing one thing but professing another. For residents, the 
contradictions in daily life are overshadowed by contradictions of the international system that 
they see as duplicitous but which, paradoxically, gives residents hope that the PMR might be 
recognized. Residents remain astutely aware of the vested interests at work in determining who 
and what can be recognized as sovereign. Examples like Kosovo are particularly important in the 
                                                                                                                                                       
the anthropology of the state, see Sharma and Gupta 2006. 
72 Here I am reminded of one of Caroline Humphrey’s anecdotes (2002: 26): “without papers, you are a tiny bug, but 
with papers you are a person.” Her informant was remarking on the need to have a complete set of documents to 
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local political cosmology because it proves the duplicity of the West and validates their existence 
outside of the international system of sovereign states which PMR leaders profess to wish to join.  
The larger paradox at work in this dissertation concerns the fact that PMR statehood itself 
is largely performative (ritual) yet it constantly in process (state formation); its durability only 
adds a sheen of permanence to these performances. Sometimes these performances are 
successful, and sometimes they are not. Both as an idea and as a set of institutions the state is in 
flux, but the conceptual terms that remain available to describe the situation are nouns: the state 
and sovereignty.  As this dissertation shows, performative sovereignty captures how the state is 
never a thing but rather an emergent and never-complete process.  
State formation has a vector-like feel; one gets the sense that it is going in a definite 
direction and seeks to achieve certain (definitive) results. With the PMR, however, upon closer 
inspection of the actual operation of the economy and the state one gets the sense that there is a 
cadre of individuals who need the PMR to exist in this perpetual state of liminality. Motion in 
necessary, but the motion need not necessarily be forward or even progress. A certain segment of 
the population accustomed to Soviet practices are content to let the nostalgic, time-warp aspect 
of the PMR as the Soviet Union write small continue ad infinitum. For those that profess to seek 
recognition (and legitimacy in the eyes of the international community) for the PMR, it is more 
important that spectators both inside and outside of the region believe that something worthwhile 
is happening in the region. That is, by nature of the fact that politics occurs with some degree of 
participation, and that one can at least observe the outlines of a polity that contains the 
institutions and forms of statehood, the PMR deserves to be seen as a state despite its liminal 
existence. Liminality is beneficial to turning profits, but state building requires, at least 
                                                                                                                                                       
exist to the state: birth certificate, internal passport, workbook, registration [propiska], etc. The loss of one of these 
documents threatens to unravel the whole edifice of the state and its associated entitlements. 
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rhetorically, some sort of Hegelian progression to the revealed, recognized ideal form of 
statehood.  
 
Fieldwork and the Ethnographic Encounter 
I conducted eighteen months of field research in Moldova and Transnistria. As a 
foreigner required to register each time I crossed the borders of the PMR (typically twice a week 
due to frequent trips to Chișinău), my fieldwork was very much about remaining visible to this 
unrecognized polity and attempting to follow its often contradictory laws and norms. In addition 
to registration at the border, a PMR citizen with a Tiraspol propiska (registration) had to register 
me as a guest in his place of residence. During preliminary fieldwork in 2006, foreigners who 
stayed in the PMR for more than twelve hours were required to have an invitation letter 
[priglashenie] approved by the Interior Ministry before being able to enter the PMR.   
My original plan was to study the interaction between sovereignty and economic 
processes in the PMR (globalization, the informal economy, patronage networks and rent). 
Specifically, I was interested in how informal, unregulated economic processes undermine 
Moldova’s de jure sovereignty but enhance the PMR’s de facto sovereignty. I had high hopes of 
following shuttle traders [chelnoki] on their trips to Odessa and beyond, but this line of inquiry 
disintegrated as it became clear that a single economic conglomerate had monopolized the 
region’s informal economy. I found that the best way to study political authority and sovereignty 
was not by asking about it as such but seeing how the state projected its influence and operated 
in a variety of settings. Over research, I found sovereignty was not limited to the realms of 
political authority and material processes. Instead, I encountered the PMR state in a variety of 
settings and sentiments. Not wanting to be the foreigner who pressed politics into every 
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discussion (though my presence was perceived as reflecting a political agenda), I conducted 
myself as any good ethnographer would and never refused an invitation.   
As I looked at the origins of the PMR and its contemporary effects as a de facto 
sovereign state, I found this question of the political authority to related to perceived differences 
between left and right-bank Moldova. Over more than one hundred ethnographic interviews, 
unanticipated interactions, and chance encounters, I came to be seen less as a foreigner and more 
as a regular participant in the social and political life of Tiraspol. Though I was dogged by 
accusations of espionage (in part because my grant program was associated with the US State 
Department), I was never harassed, though my mobile phone was tapped and I was shadowed on 
public holidays when I gathered publicly with friends. On a few occasions, plainclothes state 
security officers photographed me on the streets.  
Logistically, I lived with two local families during fieldwork, and regularly supplemented 
my time in the PMR with trips in Chișinău. In Tiraspol, the first household I boarded with was 
composed of a middle-aged couple with two resident children who often travelled abroad or to 
Chișinău for work. This was perhaps the most appropriate environment for an unmarried male in 
the region. The second household consisted of an elderly grandmother who had three generations 
of relatives in Tiraspol and southern Ukraine. My acquaintances with relatives from both 
families constituted important steppingstones in my field research.  
The field of ethnographic research in the PMR was diverse, and included Kremlin-
sponsored youth movements, NGOs, first generation political activists, political technologists 
and image makers, local intellectuals (professors and graduate students), and bureaucrats; I did 
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not want to position myself solely within a single organization for fear of inviting reprisals on 
locals due to their association with a foreigner without a reason for being in the region.73 
 
Dissertation Arc 
This dissertation mirrors the arc of the 20th century by viewing its subject matter through 
the lens of the Soviet project from which the PMR emerged. It begins with the collapse of a 
quintessentially modernist political project in 1991 and ends with the rise of a largely self-
referential polity in which the referents are of secondary importance to the form and performance 
of the messages themselves. What began as an idealistic project — think of the PMR as a kind of 
socialist realist fantasy without the coercion — ended up as a postmodern dystopia in which a 
constant stream of images occupy a structural niche similar to advertising in our modern 
consumer culture now determine the contours of social reality in the region. These images gloss 
over a post-Soviet period marked by decline.  
To understand Transnistria as a political entity separate from Moldova, one must 
understand the institution of the referendum and the potential it holds for creating, harnessing, 
and channeling emotions into a political language with real effects. Referenda are a means of 
social control and, eventually, profits; they order society. Given the then-unsettled context of a 
potential independent Moldova, referendums held in left-bank Moldova formalized 
Transnistria’s distinctiveness vis-à-vis Moldova. These referenda highlighted an already-existing 
linguistic and ethnic tension in the MSSR, which contributed to the outbreak of armed conflict in 
1992. This conflict subsequently became a defining aspect of the PMR statehood insofar it was 
the inchoate PMR state, with the assistance of the former 14th Soviet Army, that protected the 
                                                
73 Allegations of spying were common. It should be noted that I always presented myself as a researcher and never 
as a representative of any group, organization, or government. 
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region and its multi-ethnic inhabitants from violence and, according to PMR historiography, 
genocide. Given the ideological centrality of armed struggle, memorializing this conflict in both 
public and private venues (photographs, memory books, public memorials, public spectacles) 
became a means of distancing residents from the Moldovan state.  
 By creating a distinct teleology in which recognition dominates, elites profit and 
differentiate themselves from the masses and are masked by the rhetoric of independence and 
international recognition. Once de facto separation from Moldova was achieved and PMR 
statehood was tentatively established (i.e., it had created the functioning organs of governance), 
over the course of two decades, the state became a conduit for illicit capital accumulation. After 
PMR leaders had secured the long-term support of Russia as a patron, profit and rent seeking 
entered the picture, as the region became an area where, for connected individuals, profits could 
be realized on an outsized scale. In comparison, the majority of residents characterize the post-
Soviet period as one of impoverishment and permanent instability at the personal level. These 
obvious class differences remain of secondary importance given the significant resources and 
rhetoric devoted to the idea of multi-nationalism in the PMR.   
The Transnistrian conflict has expanded far beyond its brief temporality as an event. Over 
the course of two decades, the conflict has shifted from one measured in tanks, bodies, mortars, 
and damages to one that today is largely media-driven. Many residents, particularly younger 
ones, have no memories of armed conflict and instead rely on images and narratives generated by 
the media and a local PMR historiography that mythologizes the 1992 conflict.74 ⁠ This turn to 
marketing and public relations illustrates how the battle for public opinion serves the same 
strategic purpose that mines, barbed wire, and tanks once did — it serves to maintain separation. 
 54 
This battle for public opinion constitutes an important front in an ongoing “information war” 
between Transnistria and Moldova.75⁠ As I show in chapter five through my case study on the 
PMR social movement and political party Proryv, geopolitical uncertainties and regional events 
like Ukraine’s Orange revolution have real effects in an area whose leadership is above all 
concerned not with managing the affairs of state but instead remains preoccupied with 
perceptions. State leaders must reiterate the PMR’s pretensions to statehood through 
performance in order to maintain an active presence for the PMR state for residents and 
outsiders. This managed yet participatory political engagement offers residents a means of 
partaking in political life while denying them agency in the process.   
 
Themes and Structure of the Dissertation 
Each of the following chapters is rooted in a particular concept or field as articulated 
through an assemblage of ideas, individuals, and objects. While some chapters are abstract 
(chapters two and three), others deal with more substantive issues (chapters one and four), and 
some are solely the result of participant observation and ethnography (chapter five). My purpose 
was not to selectively pick and choose certain elements of everyday life, but to build upon 
locally resonant symbols, practices, and beliefs to illustrate the underlying concepts, practices, 
and beliefs that allowed the PMR to emerge as a de facto sovereign polity and to projects its 
authority for more than two decades. Field research entailed studying the PMR as a system along 
with its mise-en-scène. This enabled me to look beyond the facts of PMR’s emergence as a polity 
and to explore the myriad of ways residents and state officials told its story and to engage its 
constituents, the residents who rehearse and co-perform as the ostensible holders of sovereignty.   
                                                                                                                                                       
74 Chapters three and five give the reader a sense of the roles played images and information locally. Chapter five in 
particular chronicles how new bodies of knowledge and marketing practices have permeated the region. 
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In this dissertation I discuss sovereignty both as a fundamental concept of politics and as 
a representative performance designed to achieve certain goals. Beginning with the region’s 
earliest efforts to oppose Moldovan nationalism in the late 1980s, the story of sovereignty in the 
PMR begins with creating a constituent people [narod] and the expression of their collective 
voice through referendums. As a result of these referendums, the Transnistrian narod emerged as 
a political actor but were subsequently co-opted by elites. These elites, both state officials and 
corporate structures, realized their own economic ambitions at the people’s expense. The people 
were left with empty promises and a vague hope that international recognition would solve ease 
their otherwise difficult situation. In reality, it is the situation and its vested interests that make 
resolution difficult.  
The chronology of this dissertation covers the lifespan of the PMR. It begins in the late 
1980s as the effects of perestroika come to be felt in the MSSR and ends in 2010 as the PMR 
celebrates its twentieth anniversary. This dissertation begins with the sudden end of a modernist 
project, the Soviet Union, and ends with the emergence of a virtual, postmodern state. With the 
former, I look at how Soviet institutions and knowledge were reconstituted to create a non-
national state. I tell the story of how a group of people who lacked a well-defined position in the 
Moldovan national state created a place for themselves in a rapidly changing post-Soviet world. 
With the latter, I look at the shifting sands of identity and community in the post-Soviet period, 
in particular how left-bank residents’ struggles against Moldovan nationalism became a stage-
managed affair in which the appearance of democracy, competitive elections, and civil society 
must be maintained at all costs to sustain the predatory economic practices that sustain the state.  
My dissertation shows how sovereignty is enabled by cultural, experiential (trauma, 
stories of loss and violence), geopolitical (financial support from the Russian Federation), and 
                                                                                                                                                       
75 I adopt the term in response to its use by my interlocutors in the region. 
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historical factors (nostalgia and the narration of a an ideology that forecloses rapprochement). 
Economic processes have “commercialized” Transnistria’s tenuous sovereignty by using the 
region as a conduit for capital accumulation, with the state abrogating its obligations to its 
citizens.    
Chapter one offers a historical background of the Transnistria. It is designed to give the 
unfamiliar reader background for the chapters that follow. Beginning with an overview of the 
region in the late Soviet period, it looks at how cultural and linguistic issues became contentious 
issues in Soviet Moldova in the late 1980s. Eventually, Transnistria separated from Moldova in 
1990 and fought a brief war with Moldova in 1992. In this chapter I highlight the role played by 
Soviet knowledge and categories in Transnistria’s self-image and on the practical role played by 
the 14th Soviet Army in the conflict. 
My second chapter (“Creating a People: Referendums, Nostalgia, and Subjectivity”) 
looks at the emergence of the Transnistrian people as a collective actor and object of knowledge. 
This chapter looks at how the preconditions for a sovereign political authority were created 
through referendums. Referendums offered a means to invoke and help create the constituent 
unit of popular sovereignty, the people (narod). The Transnistrian peopled emerged from a 
combination of a unique Transnistrian narrative that weds Soviet forms of knowledge with local 
participation in political processes during a time of heightened uncertainty and insecurity. Both 
at the level of ideas (ideology) and practice, pro-PMR activists translated anxiety about the 
demise of the Soviet Union into a coherent ideology and sense of belonging for a community that 
transcends the national but strives for the same goals that nations do.   
Chapter three (“Bespredel and Belonging: Bodies, Politics, Publics”) illustrates how the 
PMR state has produced a community of affect through visual means by reproducing and 
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dissemination photographs of bystanders and combatants killed during armed conflict with 
Moldova. In the context of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and a generalized sense of 
disorder [bespredel], I argue that these narratives of victimization and aggression afford 
individuals a means of making sense of experiences while also creating an inchoate community 
of belonging – They did this to us. More broadly, this narrative establishes who “they” are and 
the “us” referred to. These images of death served as a common anchor for residents of the 
region. These images and their emergence within a genre of memorial books serve as an 
experiential and ideological foundation for the unrecognized state. 
Chapter four (“The Economics of Separatism: Fiefdoms, Subsidies, and the Virtual”) 
illustrates how local and international economic processes have forced the PMR into a state of 
dependency whereby the region remains economically dependent upon Russian support and its 
subsidized natural gas. Just as sovereignty in the PMR is performed and as a result generates real 
effects, the PMR’s economy is similarly based on a subjective component in which images, 
representations, and the productivity of the Soviet past conspire to mask a predatory system in 
which the people become fodder for an economic system that ceaselessly realizes a profit. To 
maintain this facade of productivity PMR authorities selectively highlight a few visible subsidies 
and contrast the region’s past and future growth to neighboring Moldova, Europe’s poorest 
country. The bulk of this chapter is devoted to exploring how a local holding company, Sheriff, 
has monopolized the bulk of the PMR economy.  
Chapter five, “Che Guevara in Tiraspol: Geopolitics, Knowledge, and Spectacle,” 
explores political spectacle in the PMR. The ethnographic subject is a local youth movement, 
Proryv (Breakthrough). Formed in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Proryv 
was financed as part of an initial anti-Orange movement by the Kremlin to diminish the threat of 
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colored revolutions. As a political movement, Proryv utilizes the form of pro-democratic 
movements as a vehicle for pro-Russian geopolitical goals. Weaving together the local, the 
geopolitical, and the idea of an ongoing “information war,” this chapter investigates how, in the 
context of non-recognition, political technology becomes a means of creating the identifications, 
brands, and the vocabulary required by democracy. This chapter pays particular attention to how 
western knowledge and marketing terminology has migrated to new contexts and practical 
domains in Transnistria.    
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CHAPTER ONE 
TRANSNISTRIA IN THE (POST-)SOVIET PERIOD 
  
Introduction 
Moldova experienced a brief but bloody conflict in 1992 over a strip of land located east 
of the Dniester River. Inhabits of this strip of land first declared their independence from 
Moldova in the form of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (PMSSR), a 
territory that residents hoped would remain in the Soviet Union when it became clear that 
Moldova would become independent.76 With the demise of the Soviet Union in 1990, the 
PMSSR would become the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), also known as 
Transnistria. More than two decades later, the PMR is an international orphan, unrecognized as a 
state and sustained largely by economic and political support from the Russian Federation. 
Transnistrian separatism relates to geopolitical issues described alternately as “post-
communist transitions,” “democratization,” “ethnic conflict,” or simply “transition.” This 
dissertation tells a story of a peripheral region’s rebellion against the collapse of certainties that 
arose as a result of the material, social, and cultural effects of Soviet state.77 Soviet development 
transformed a war-torn region that had undergone a brutal Romanian occupation during the 
Second World War into an area brimming with productive factories and collective farms. The 
region had a significant multi-ethnic population that predated the region’s incorporation into 
Imperial Russia in the early 19th century. Economic productivity and a strong identification with 
the Soviet state differentiated Transnistria from the rest of Moldova, though both were part of the 
                                                
76 The first declaration occurred in 1990 in the context of the Soviet Union. The Pridnestrovian Moldavian Soviet 
Socialist Republic (PMSSR) was originally conceived of as new Soviet republic separate from the Moldovan Soviet 
Socialist Republic (MSSR). 
77 For a discussion of a similar situation in the Russian Caucasus, see Derluguian 1999 and 2005. 
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same titular republic.78 As Soviet power faded in the late 1980s, residents organized in 
opposition to Moldovan nationalism. These actions, and authorities’ responses to them, nudged 
the region down a path of separation and war. This chapter serves as a historical overview 
necessary to understand the emergence of the PMR as a polity in 1990.  
The Soviet state was central to life in the region, and residents believed in its ideals. As 
an economically prosperous, multi-ethnic region, Transnistria’s prospects in an independent 
Moldova remained uncertain. Moldova’s rapprochement with Romania and fears of Moldova’s 
liquidation as an independent state (an unification of Greater Romania)79 only raised the stakes. 
This led to a situation in which residents found themselves at the mercy of geopolitical forces.80 
The Russian Federation supports Transnistria and maintains peacekeeping forces in the region. 
While these peacekeeping forces monitor the conflict settlement, they offer Russia a means of 
direct influence in Moldova and in the larger Black Sea region.81  
Local and foreign capital have benefitted from the PMR’s unsettled political situation. A 
single local economic entity, Sheriff, holds a monopoly position in the PMR economy, and 
Russian and Ukrainian capital profitably exploits the PMR’s murky regulatory environment. 
Above all, the Transnistrian state building project is marked by incompleteness: of a revolution 
unfulfilled, of prosperity lost, and sovereignty unrecognized. This incompleteness creates the 
                                                
78 This identification with the Soviet project was expressed primarily as a support for internationalism and through 
Soviet economic development in which the industrial workplace was central to social life. 
79 Moldova was part of greater Romania from 1918 until 1940. The Romanian wartime general Ion Antonescu led a 
brutal campaign and used left-bank Moldova as killing field for Jews and other undesirables from Moldova and 
southern Ukraine. His use of Transnistria was justified by pointing to how it was not part of historic Romanian 
lands. For more on this, see Solonari 2009 and King 2011, particularly chapter 9, "The Fields of Transnistria." 
80 Residents see themselves as living on a strategically important piece of land that, by the fact that it exists within a 
perceived geopolitical fault line between Russia and the West. Today, this importance is framed as a struggle 
between Russia, on the one hand, and NATO and the EU on the other. 
81 The 1992 cease-fire agreement that ended armed conflict in the region stipulated the creation of a tripartite 
peacekeeping force comprised of Moldovan, Russian, and Transnistrian units. Ukraine has military observers. 
Originally, Russia had 2,000 peacekeepers in addition to a few thousand other military personnel in the region. 
Currently, Russian has 1,500 peacekeeping soldiers, supplemental Russian forces in the region now number around 
two hundred. 
 61 
conditions whereby Soviet experiences, knowledge, and categories are reassembled according to 
contemporary demands.82 As a state-building project the PMR builds upon Soviet knowledge 
and categories that offered a means of subsuming one’s nationality [national’nost’] to Soviet 
internationalism. In the PMR, the factory was the crucible of identity formation, with a 
Russophone workplace fostering the emergence of a Soviet identity. Transnistria’s significant 
population of Soviet migrants created a situation in which no single nationality was dominant.  
 
Nationality and the Soviet State  
 In the Soviet Union, nationhood and nationality were distinct from statehood and 
citizenship; each individual had a nationality and resided in a national republic, yet each was a 
citizen of the Soviet Union. Nationality was a both a means of social classification and a 
territorial imperative.83 Soviet nationality policy attempted to bridge the gap between nations as 
the constituent political units of the Soviet state and nationality as an ascriptive element of one’s 
identity. Ethnic and national categories were not congruent with political territories.84 The Soviet 
Union was divided into union republics that were sovereign. Each nominally had the power to 
secede, enter into foreign relations, and administer their territory, though in reality these powers 
were more virtual than real.85  
                                                
82 This is the process of bricolage described by Levi-Strauss in The Savage Mind. 
83 For more on Soviet nationality policy, see Hirsch 2005, Martin 2001, Slezkine 1994. Hirsch’s Empire of Nations 
focuses on how Imperial ethnographers and local elites utilized ethnographic knowledge as a basis for the Soviet 
state. Martin’s Affirmative Action Empire chronicles how Soviet authorities sought to undermine "negative" aspects 
of nationalism or ethnic particularism by promoting other "positive" aspects of the same phenomenon. 
84 E.g., having a Ukrainian nationality did not confer the right to reside and work in the Ukrainian SSR. 
85 As a system of social classification, ethnic nationality was a “principle of vision and division” of the social world 
operated at different levels (Bourdieu 1990: 134). Natsional’nost’ constituted a means of social accounting, an 
interpretive grid for public discussions, a set of boundary-markers, and a legitimate vehicle for public and private 
identities. More importantly, it provided a “ready-made template for claims to sovereignty” when political space 
expanded under glasnost (Brubaker 1996: 24). 
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The Soviet Union’s constituent (and later, successor) states existed as quasi-nation-states 
with fixed territories, administrations, elites, and the constitutionally enshrined right to secession 
(Brubaker 1996: 41). These republics resembled nation-states insofar as they served as vehicles 
for national self-determination. Nations were gifts to the USSR’s constituent peoples, gifts that 
would only later be inherited.86 Bolshevik attempts to build socialism in former imperial 
territories took place against the backdrop of the Paris Peace Conference’s exaltation of the 
“national idea” (Hirsch 2005: 5). To reconcile their anti-imperialist position with their desire to 
retain the territories of Imperial Russia, the Soviet state deliberately constructed republics as 
polities belonging to the nationalities whose names they bore but limited the domains in which 
they were autonomous. This desire to cast themselves in the roles of liberators and nation 
builders forced the Bolsheviks to borrow ideas and practices from the West. Not content to 
control, they sought to secure the loyalties of local elites and introduced administrative structures 
that encouraged or demanded mass participation (Hirsch 2005: 5).   
 
 
 Fig 3. Romanian Lands before 1812 (King 2000: xxx) 
                                                
86 This builds upon a historic engagement of the Imperial Russian state with peripheral territories and peoples: 
civilization was a gift. See Grant 2009. 
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Fig 4. Greater Romania, Soviet Moldova: 1918 to Present (King 2000: xxxi) 
 
The formation of the MASSR in 1924 was a political move by Stalin to assert a separate 
Moldovan language and ethnicity that would bring Romania under Soviet influence. Soviet 
hopes for westward expansion rested upon the belief that cross-border ethnic ties could be 
exploited to project Soviet influence.87 Soviet Moldova (the MSSR, formed in 1940) united two 
territories never jointly administered under any political authority: the eastern part of the 
MASSR (including Transnistria) and the imperial province of Bessarabia, part of Greater 
Romania from 1918 until 1940. The Soviet Union never recognized the Romanian annexation of 
Bessarabia88 in 1918. The MASSR was created “due to Moldavia’s future political perspective” 
– the eventual incorporation of Bessarabia to the USSR (Martin 2001: 275). In 1940, Transnistria 
                                                
87 This Piedmont Principle sought to exploit a means of influencing the internal affairs of neighboring countries and 
was the basis for the formation of the MASSR (Martin 2001: 274). 
88 Bessarabia remained a part of Romania from 1918 until 1940. Bessarabia was bordered into the West by the Prut 
River (currently the border between Romanian and the Republic of Moldova) and into the East by the Dniester River 
(currently the border between the PMR and Moldova). 
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became part of Soviet Moldova, though it had been a part of the USSR since the end of the 
Russian Civil war.   
Soviet support for a Moldovan cultural awakening was intended to prevent the 
disloyalty89 on the western periphery by denying similarities to the Romanian nation-state that 
existed just beyond its borders.90 With the creation of the MASSR in 1924, Soviet authorities 
began creating a new Moldovan people and language in earnest. Soviet authorities hailed the 
appearance of Moldovan histories, textbooks, grammars, and newspapers as hallmarks of a 
Moldovan national awakening. Liberated from their bourgeois Romanian oppressors, the 
Moldovan people and state were indebted to a Soviet state that had allowed for their 
reemergence as a separate people and state.91 Individuals who identified as Romanian suddenly 
became Moldovan, and Soviet propagandists agitated for the unification of all Moldovans, the 
majority of whom lived in Bessarabia.  
Both the Soviet Union and Romania viewed a Moldovan identity as a malleable construct 
that could be suited to their respective political agendas.92 Stalin’s efforts to bring Moldova into 
the Soviet Union sought to fix an identity that had vacillated throughout the 19th and 20th 
centuries. The fact Moldova was intermittently under Russian and Romanian rule contributed to 
                                                
89 For more on the dynamics of the dynamics that informed Soviet policies on the western frontier, see Weiner 2006 
90 Of particular importance for this dissertation is the historical demarcation of Romanian lands. Historic Romanian 
lands largely coincided with the ancient Dacian state and were delimited by three major rivers, Tisza, Dniester and 
the Danube, and the Black Sea, while the Carpathian Mountains are seen as the backbone of the Romanian national 
homeland, its defining element. To this day, Romanians refer to the opening verse of the Romanian poet Mihai 
Eminescu’s Doina, “From Tisa to the Nistru's tide.” Romanian lands thus include Moldova, but exclude 
Transnistria. 
91 The issue of whether Moldovans and Romanians constitute separate peoples is complex and remains controversial 
today. 
92 Romania’s unification with Moldova occurred amidst a time of geopolitical uncertainty. After the October 
Revolution in 1917 and the Ukrainian proclamation of independence, Bessarabia (Moldova) found itself isolated and 
circumstances dictated the proclamation of a state. The short-lived Democratic Republic of Moldova (DRM) was 
formed on January 24th, 1918. This polity barely survived for two months. On March 27th, its assembly voted, by 
roughly two thirds, for unification with Romania. Unification was not driven by national feelings; Moldova’s 
liquidation as a state was a result of fears about being incorporated into Ukraine and the threat of a resurgent Russia. 
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a situation whereby Moldova lacked a stable national idea.93 Even today, many prominent 
politicians and nationalists in Moldova cannot agree as to whether Moldova should be an 
independent country or should be part of Romania. Attempts to fix this identity waxed and 
waned throughout the Soviet period.  
Moldovan distinctiveness was threatened, paradoxically, by its exit from the Soviet 
Union. In the 1980s, Moldovan intellectuals were fervently pan-Romanian (Unionist) and 
unification seemed inevitable, though ultimately Moldova became a sovereign state. This brief 
flirtation with Romanian unification is a political mantra in Transnistria. The idea of a distinct 
Moldovan people under the threat of Romanian annexation structures a set of distinctions that 
allow for the PMR to present itself as the protector of the Moldovan language (written in 
Cyrillic, not Latin) and people. These linguistic and orthographic distinctions are based on the 
Soviet Union’s efforts to create a separate Moldovan identity. While the PMR state project 
claims to protect the Moldovan identity and language, what they are protecting are Soviet 
conceptions of Moldovans and of the Moldovan language.94 This is often at odds with how 
Moldovans in the PMR see themselves. Protecting Soviet knowledge and beliefs together 
constitute another unreciprocated gift that takes on a life of its own in the post-Soviet context.95  
With the onset of glasnost’ in the 1980s, Moldova’s unresolved questions once again 
came to the fore. In the March 1990 elections in the MSSR, the Popular Front of Moldova (FPM) 
won in a landslide. The FPM saw their main goal as a transitory one that mirrored Moldova’s 
                                                                                                                                                       
Perhaps fittingly, the Romanian Army was already stationed in Bessarabia and the Romanian prime minister 
anxiously awaited a positive decision in the foyer (King 2000: 35). 
93 Moldova was a part of Imperial Russia during the formative moments of Romanian nation building in the late 
19th and early 20th century. 
94 Often Russian-speaking residents of Transnistria would make claims about the separateness of Moldovan and 
Romanian, and about how Moldovan was should intended to be written within Cyrillic, not with Latin characters. In 
almost all of these cases, interlocutors knew only a few words and lack any understanding of its grammar and 
structure. 
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1918 unification with Romania. The FPM’s political victory culminated on May 6th, 1990 with 
the “bridge of flowers” that joined both sides the Prut River, the border between Romania and 
Soviet Moldova. This event involved more than a million people meeting at border crossings 
after a half-century of separation. Soviet authorities were forced to open borders that had been 
closed for decades despite obvious cultural and kinship connections. Moldovans and Romanians 
with Unionist tendencies compare this moment with the fall of the Berlin wall.96  
 
Anxiety and Belonging in Post-Soviet Transnistria 
 After World War II Transnistria was a central component of the Soviet defense industry. 
Demographic changes occurred alongside industrialization as Soviet migrants arrived to work in 
regional enterprises. In 1936, Russians constituted 14 percent of the region’s population, but by 
1989 Russians made up nearly a quarter of the Transnistrian population, with Ukrainians making 
up 28 percent (King 2000: 183). Though Moldovans formed a plurality in 1989 (39%), they 
represented only a quarter of urban dwellers. To a certain degree the labels of Russian, 
Moldovan, and Ukrainian obscure how quintessentially Soviet the region was. Ethnic differences 
operated in the context of an urban-rural dichotomy in which urban centers were Russian 
speaking with Moldovan the language of the countryside. 
                                                                                                                                                       
95 For an interesting discussion of language, interethnic relations, and hospitality as a model for ethnic relations in 
right-bank Moldova, see Cash 2004. 
96 Subsequent attempts to project Romanian influence into Moldova have played out in the realm of citizenship (in 
2007 Romania became a member of the European Union). More than a few fervent Moldovan Unionists have made 
political careers in Romania, and many high-ranking Moldovan officials have Romanian citizenship. At the nadir of 
Romanian-Moldovan relations in 2008, the Romanian President Traian Basescu announced that Romania had 
received, over the past few years, more than 800,000 request for regaining Romanian citizenship, many of which 
were submitted by families. With Moldova’s population on hovering around 3.6 million, the fact that nearly a 
million have applied for Romanian citizenship undermines its sovereignty. The issue of dual citizenship with 
Romania is a challenge to Moldovan sovereignty because Romania has yet to recognize Moldova’s borders and 
members of the political establishment openly voice irredentist sentiments during national campaigns. Yet 
Romania’s challenge to Moldovan sovereignty pales in comparison to the de facto sovereign polity within its 
borders. 
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In the postwar period, Transnistria came to play an outsized role in residents’ biographies 
insofar as their careers, livelihoods, and identities were tied to the region. Left-bank residents 
stressed their commonalities with the Soviet project. Transnistria was a favored retirement area 
for career military personnel [voennye], privileged citizens who had served faithfully and 
accrued certain benefits vis-à-vis the non-military population. Many retired in Transnistria due to 
its mild climate and proximity to the Black Sea.97 Despite the short distance between Chișinău 
and Tiraspol (76 kilometers), there were significant differences in how left and right-bank 
populations viewed cultural and economic changes of glasnost’ and perestroika.98 
The Soviet state rooted left-bank residents in a particular space for a socially worthwhile 
productive endeavor. Many residents I interviewed told of family who settled in the aftermath of 
World War II. They repopulated the region, rebuilt it, and worked in its factories and collective 
farms. The centrally planned Soviet economy gave residents a sense of purpose and provided for 
them. It is worth noting Marx’s belief that humans are inherently productive beings. When this 
productivity was threatened, residents’ terms of existence both as political subjects and citizens 
of a socialist state were forever altered. The undoing of the socialist project thrust a fundamental 
question into the public sphere: what would happen as Moldova transformed itself into a nation-
state? Uncertainty created the opportunity to build a polity where none existed. The Soviet Union 
was the state with a decades long tradition of sovereignty in left-bank Moldova; its demise 
unleashed a long-suppressed nationalism previous contained by the Soviet state. As nationalism 
engulfed Moldova and Romanian unification seemed possible, Transnistria would cling even 
harder to Soviet internationalism. 
                                                
97 “The primary loyalty of individuals in the region was not to Russia – even though most spoke Russian and had 
ties to the Russian republic – but to the Soviet Union” (King 2000: 184). 
98 Chișinău is the capital of the Republic of Moldova, and Tiraspol is the capital of the PMR. 
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Over the course of research, both PMR elites and ordinary citizens spoke of how the 
PMR was an idealistic project intended as a corrective to the Soviet state. Left-bank residents 
professed fidelity to Soviet ideals and believed in the idea of the Soviet [sovetskii narod].99 In a 
somewhat ironic manner, Transnistrians embodied the post-national stage of development 
posited by Lenin. The PMR became an umbrella for a host of informal groups that stood to lose 
in an independent Moldova. These included factory leaders and the economic intelligentsia of the 
region who would have lost control of the region’s rich industrial base; Soviet state security 
officers who have allegedly have used the PMR as a means of preserving enriching themselves; 
criminals and profiteers (the standard “dark forces” who profit from armed conflict); and the left-
bank residents who attempted to preserve the disappearing Soviet state.100 
As a region permeated by the symbolic, ideological, and material effects of Soviet 
modernity, the PMR offers a unique perspective on how institutions, economies, individuals, 
knowledge, and practices are reworked in the absence of any legally recognized authority. As 
Soviet society was exposed to market forces and competitive politics, a relatively stable semiotic 
environment was replaced by one in which performances and the citation of Soviet knowledge 
offered a means of creating identifications and a polity (Yurchak 2005); these processes were 
never fully discursive or semiotic.  
 
 
 
                                                
99 This was the case even among the first post-Soviet generation that had little experiences with the Soviet state. 
100 One retired Moldovan diplomat told me of a discussion he had with Anatoly Sobchak in the 1990s. Sobchak was 
at the time mayor of St. Petersburg (and mentor of both Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev). Sobchak informed 
him that the idea for Transnistria was born in a KGB policy institute. It was part of a contingency plan to create 
artificial territorial conflicts across the Soviet Union to preserve and protect their interests. With the PMR, there are 
numerous politicians and state officials (most notably, the Minister of State Security, Vladimir Antuifeev) who 
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Language, Demography, and the 1989 Language Law 
Moldova’s shift from a Soviet republic to a nation-state was modeled on the Bălțic 
independence movements. Like the Baltics, Moldova was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 
1940 under the auspices of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Similarly, its industry was Russophone 
and staffed by individuals, typically Russians, who self-identified as Soviet. Linguistic 
grievances fueled political movements for sovereignty outside of the centralized Soviet state. In 
Moldova, the issue of language and their respective ideologies — Russian as the cosmopolitan, 
internationalist language and Moldovan as the language of a suppressed national culture — 
offered radically different visions for the future and intimated a reversal of longstanding practice. 
By using the familiar language of Soviet internationalism, left-bank activists positioned 
themselves as defenders of Soviet values. Creating a movement on the basis of Soviet categories 
allowed them to build upon a set of social and cultural symbols that appealed to residents who 
saw nationalism as an existential threat.  
The Moldovan national movement sought to reverse more than four decades of Russian 
cultural dominance at the expense of Moldovan language and culture. The issues of Russian 
immigration, linguistic discrimination, and the denial of obvious commonalities with Romania 
were condensed in the late 1980s under the rubric of the “language question.” For a political 
establishment seeking to constitute itself on a national basis, the use of the Cyrillic alphabet 
symbolized the dominance of Soviet rule. Due to large numbers of non-Moldovan speakers, it 
                                                                                                                                                       
spontaneously came to the region as the conflict was developing. Antuifeev came to the region on an assumed name 
after being accused of "crimes against the state" by the Latvian government. 
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often was not possible to use Romanian in public.101 By 1989, the national question had become 
the singular concern of the Moldovan political establishment.102 
On August 31, 1989, the Moldovan Supreme Soviet in Chișinău adopted a series of laws 
that (1) declared Moldovan the state language of the republic; (2) mandated the transition to the 
Latin alphabet (the Cyrillic script was used in Soviet times); (3) recognized the unity of the 
Moldovan and Romanian languages; and (4) laid out a program for extending the use of 
Moldovan in government, education, and other related spheres (Ciscel 2007: 42; King 2000: 
120). These laws offered an initial means of difference around which a national community 
could coalesce and marked a decisive shift away from Soviet practice. Left-bank residents spoke 
of being marked insofar as they now found themselves speaking a foreign language in their own 
land. When viewed alongside this push for centralization by Chișinău, many left-bank residents 
saw these laws as a threat to their privileged position insofar as they marked a shift to the 
Moldovan majority and away from those who had long held power.103 Moldova’s emergence as 
an independent country was paradoxical insofar as its legislature quickly voted to adopt the 
Romanian flag, anthem, and state symbols.  
What was originally a linguistic dispute quickly infused other domains. In Transnistria, 
equality in linguistic and cultural realms was assured by the widespread use of Russian. As 
Soviet authority faltered and the Union fragmented along national lines, constituting a polity on 
                                                
101 Moldovan is one of the names of the Romanian language spoken in the Republic of Moldova. It is nearly 
identical to Romanian, save for a few minor orthographical changes. Moldovan is written in the Latin script in the 
Republic in Moldova, while it is written in Cyrillic in the PMR. 
102 In Moldova, the national question remains unsettled. While in the Republic of Moldova citizenship is explicitly 
non-national (all residents of the territory of the former MSSR have the right to citizenship), the question of a 
Moldovan nationality remains open. Unlike other titular republics that became independent on the basis of asserting 
their nationality, Moldovans became independent by denying the linguistic and cultural distinctions that 
underpinned the MSSR as a polity. The Romance language spoken in Moldova is, alternately, either Romanian, 
Moldovan, or the state language [limba de stat]. 
103 Compared to right-bank Moldova, Transnistria had been collectivized and under Soviet rule since the revolution 
and underwent collectivization.  Cadres from Transnistria dominated the Communist Party of Moldova.  They were 
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national or linguistic grounds simply was not possible due to the region’s multi-ethnic 
population. Given the absence of a titular nationality, Transnistria’ economic independence came 
to be seen as the guarantor of the "rights and dignity of the peoples of Transnistria, and a basis 
for creating an independent state."104 Labor collectives organized under the auspices of the 
United Work Collective Council (OSTK) formed a local power base that became the core of the 
PMR state that exists to this day. 
Left-bank residents believed that nationalists would dominate the region and 
disenfranchise non-Moldovans. Themselves conscious of how industry served as a source of 
local identity, activists sought to prevent any such economic takeover that could potentially have 
threatened their economic well-being and their multiethnic, Soviet-era identity.105 The fears of 
non-Moldovan residents — the threat of dismissal and unemployment, the closing of enterprises, 
ethnic quotas, and a disruption of the centrally-planned Soviet economy that allowed Transnistria 
to initially prosper — touched upon a deep-rooted anxiety over the region’s future that 
nationalism brought to light.106 Despite being framed by the PMR elite as a fight against ethnic 
chauvinism, the conflict was never about protecting linguistic rights.107 Today, Chișinău boasts 
                                                                                                                                                       
seen as more politically loyal than those from Bessarabia, having been educated and socialized longer in the Soviet 
Union. See King 2000: 182-183. 
104 Information from the website of the PMR Supreme Soviet, http://www.vspmr.org. Accessed March 2, 2010. 
105 It is a stretch to say that this identity was Transnistrian. Residents today, especially those who lived through the 
1980s and the 1992 conflict with Moldova, tend to remark that both the region and its inhabitants were always 
different from Moldova. These exact sentiments are also voiced in right-bank Moldova by ethnic Moldovans vis-à-
vis left-bank Moldova. 
106 The still-uncertain teleology of Moldovan nationalism -- to this day left-bank residents still question whether its 
ultimate goal is unification with Romania -- resulted in an initial declaration of independence from Moldova in 
1990. This 1990 declaration formalized Transnistria's desire to form an autonomous republic in the context of the 
MSSR. Essentially, it sought to differentiate the region from the MSSR but to remain in the Soviet Union. 
107 Though some Moldovan residents complain that the Moldovan language is marginalized in the region, 
particularly at Moldovan language schools and in the university, many prominent Moldovans actively took part in 
early state-building efforts. The PMR’s official historiography stresses that Moldovans, as well as Russians and 
Ukrainians, were victims of Moldovan/Romanian aggression. 
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more Russian speakers than all of Transnistria.108 The conflict lies at the level of elite politics 
over how to divide the material inheritance of the Soviet state.109 
Elites on both sides conjured up constituencies to increase their own power. Left-bank 
elites gained by promoting separatism, for if they submitted to the language law they could have 
lost their jobs, influence, and perquisites. Instead of refusing to adopt certain provisions of the 
law, city councils in left-bank Moldova voted to defy the law in full. This logic of rejection and 
their steadfast refusal to compromise raised the stakes of the dispute (Kaufman 2001). In 
Transnistria, strikes were organized throughout the region’s factories. When workers refused to 
strike, they were forced to do so through lockouts. Strikes offered not only a means of political 
participation, but also access to material and symbolic benefits. It was not uncommon to hear of 
participants and organizers receiving televisions, pensions, and even apartments for their 
participation along with various medals and commendations. The poisonous media environment 
further polarized the situation, as the left-bank press stoked a siege mentality and inclinations 
toward a violent response from Moldova. Each side exacerbated the deteriorating security 
situation: Transnistria provoked the volatile nationalist movement into overreacting and used this 
overreaction to justify their subsequent steps toward secession.110 
 
Internationalist Nationalism?  
Throughout the following discussion I resist using the concept of nationalism to describe 
the PMR state-building project. This emerged partially out of fidelity to my informants who 
                                                
108 Personal interview with Moldovan Deputy Minister of Reintegration Ion Stavila, June 2009. 
109 “The reaction to the national movement was not a revolt by minorities, but a revolt by a displaced elite against 
those who threatened to unseat them” (King 2000: 187). 
110 The Transnistrian revolution did not so much break Moldova’s monopoly of power (since it was never fully 
established in the context of the fall of the Soviet Union) as subtract enough territory to hastily erect a counter-state 
which, over time, eroded Moldova’s possession of force. One should note the parallel with Anderson’s (2010) 
thoughts on the Chinese Revolution. 
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would to preface any discussion that touched upon the issues of nationality/ethnicity by 
highlighting the PMR’s internationalism and its explicitly anti-national ethos. Despite such 
proclamations, one cannot help but to see the creation of a Transnistrian historiography and its 
associated symbolic accoutrements of statehood as anything but nationalism. Yet this raises an 
interesting set of questions: can a non-titular movement defined in opposition to nationalism be 
seen as nationalist? More generally, what occurs to those individuals and communities who place 
themselves outside of the nation but who are, legally speaking, part of it?   
Much of the PMR’s durability in the eyes of residents emerges from its channeling Soviet 
internationalism as an antidote to nationalism. The classic methods of nation-building — 
creating a history, a people, a common nostalgia for a shared history and feelings of belonging 
— can be seen as pro forma requirements of the late 20th century, for in the post-socialist age in 
which multi-national states and empires are few and far between, states are equated with nations. 
In PMR, the state building project reflects their particular way of fitting the forms, categories, 
and identities of the Soviet period into a normative frame. Previously, the Soviet Union, and 
today in the PMR, one’s nationality is enshrined in one’s passport. In conversation, people 
describe themselves in ethnic or linguistic terms, but when the conversation turns to the PMR as 
a state and as a collective amalgamation of residents, one’s individual nationality disappears. 
There is no hyphenated existence (e.g., Ukrainian-Transnistrian). As a community that has 
sought to remain both faithful to the Soviet melting pot, it is no surprise that the national does 
not supersede everything else. Ethnic labels, like any categories or modes of classifying one’s 
existence as a political subject, are deployed differentially in different social situations.  
Transnistrians have been more successful at foisting this nationalist label (and all of its 
unsavory associations) on Moldova. Engaging nationalism in the PMR despite its professed 
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antipathy towards it will help us better understand the constant performance of the state and to 
view state formation and performative sovereignty as analogous to the production of the nation. 
Many of the characters described in this dissertation could be seen as ardent nationalists, yet they 
remain critical of the national state in which they reside. To this end the PMR reproduces, on its 
own term, a thinly disguised discourse of nationalism masked as internationalism. This brings up 
the question as to whether internationalism can be the basis for a national project. In the late 
1980s and early 1990s, residents became aware that they were not in control of the nation in 
which they resided. This dissolution of a unitary state into a series of independent nations of 
often-unsettled geopolitical provenance illustrates what happens when national forms are 
unleashed from their stable existence within a centrally controlled Soviet political project. As a 
state that is not quite a state, and a nation that masquerades as a collection of many, Transnistria 
offers a unique addendum to a discussion of nationalism in the post-1991 period.  
Nationalism in Transnistria is not ethnically based. It is better viewed as a type of kinship 
writ large, an extended Soviet family that banded together in spite of its dissolution. This 
extended family metaphor is used to stress that its national ties are, like extended families today 
often are, created rather than simply extant — biology is not the sole determinant of kinship.  
While the issue of ethno-nationalism versus the (I hesitate to introduce another 
hyphenated term) state-nationalism might be seen by some as nationalism, I resist calling it 
nationalism simply because my informants have ever so effectively eluded and disarmed 
nationalism by eliminating it from their political lexicon. This "nationalism without nationalism" 
is only possible because of the Soviet state — residents know what ethno-nationalism is and can 
identify these terms because of the Soviet Union. Similarly, they know they are Romanian, 
Moldovan, Ukrainian, Russian, Bulgarian, or Jewish because of the Soviets too. They also owe 
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their current identity as Transnistrians to their experiences in the Soviet state. Given the fact that 
the PMR resides within the borders of a country that has failed as a nation but remains a success 
as a state, Transnistria can be seen as a unique mix of national and internationalist elements 
within an ambiguous country. Given this situation, the PMR deserves to be recognized in all of 
its peculiarity as an attempt to create a nation without an ethno-national base.  
 
The Birth of the PMR 
PMR elites began creating parallel state structures after the passage of the Moldovan 
language laws in 1989.111 On September 2, 1990, an extraordinary session of deputies from left-
bank Moldova proclaimed the existence of the PMSSR as a separate republic of the Soviet 
Union.112 In addition to being Independence Day, “Day of the Republic,” September 2nd marks 
the beginning of the PMR’s self-referentiality, as its declaration was recognized neither by 
Moldovan authorities nor by Moscow. Seeking quickly to retain control of the region’s industry, 
officials announced that all property in the region had passed into possession of the PMSSR. 
Moldovan authorities proclaimed this declaration null and void, since it was unconstitutional and 
violated Moldova’s territorial integrity. Until this point, separation had taken the form of strikes, 
blockades, referendums, and proclamations; blood had not been spilled, though conflict 
loomed.113 In response to this declaration, the Moldovan Interior Ministry formed a special 
police corps of 10,000 that would eventually become the principal force to oppose separatism 
                                                
111 The earliest political organizing in the region focused on the idea of local autonomy. Neither autonomy nor the 
details of it were discussed by a wide public. Discussions occurred exclusively inside the work collectives and 
among the regional political elite. For more on this see Zabarah 2011: 151-152. 
112 PMSSR is the acronym of the Transnistrian Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic. 
113 Curiously, as if to signal its tacit support, Moscow did not react to this initial declaration of independence and 
took no action to recognize the region or deny it recognition (Ozhiganov 1997: 162). 
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(Ozhiganov 1997: 163). Though these declarations and demands were not acknowledged, their 
effects were already felt in Chișinău and beyond. 
It is crucial to note that Transnistria’s tentative steps toward separation occurred in the 
context of the Soviet Union. Located on the Soviet Union’s western border, all Moldovan 
infrastructure (highways, railways, electricity) transited the PMR. The fact that Transnistria 
could paralyze the Moldovan economy reinforced a sense of destiny that infused the strike 
movement. In Transnistria, factories became the initial nodes of authority in an informal network 
that culminated with a series of strikes in August and September of 1989 that crippled Moldova. 
Workplace organizing centered on Work Council Collectives, STKs [sovety trudovyx 
kollektivov], an organizational form that emerged from the 1987 “Law on State Enterprises” as a 
part of perestroika reforms. Originally intended to foster democratization in the workplace and 
increase efficiency, they became part of a wave of strikes that shut down production in over 200 
enterprises. At its peak over 100,000 workers participated in the strikes, though their actions 
ultimately could not negate the half million demonstrators in right-bank Moldova who demanded 
passage of the language law. Despite their inability to claim success, being able to recall these 
events is a reminder of the power these memories hold and their collective and individual 
reluctance to dismiss them along with the PMR. The power structures created during the initial 
moments of Transnistria’s separation remain to this day.114 The cumulative effects of Soviet 
development transformed a material assemblage (factories, the workplace) into a source of 
political authority. These institutions successfully elaborated a sense of difference vis-à-vis 
Moldova that could later be supplemented by other forms of authority; it is this sense of 
difference vis-à-vis Moldova authorizes the polity. 
                                                
114 Igor Smirnov, the former leader of the OSTK strike movement, has been president of the PMR since 1990. 
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As the Soviet state faltered, left-bank residents began to organize themselves (Mason 
2009). With a population that self-identified as Soviet, residents took up the cause of the Russian 
language and demonstrated against “Romanianization” and unification with Romania. With the 
onset of competitive elections, Russian-language parties were formed in Transnistria and in other 
industrialized urban centers in right-bank Moldova. The former PMR Foreign Minister Valery 
Litskai (2000-2008) recalled Transnistria’s reaction to these events.  
We already knew what to expect from the example of the Bălțic States and tried to fight 
through political methods by creating Russian-language parties, but we were few and our 
voices in parliament did not have any influence on the adoption of laws.115 
 
This lack of recourse forced left-bank activists to seek other sources of legitimacy and authority. 
Unable to participate fully in politics as the MSSR as it constituted itself on a national basis, they 
looked to the region’s industrial base for legitimation.116 Events in Transnistria were not unique 
in the context of national movements in other titular republics in which elites utilized nationalism 
to assert control over resources previously controlled by Moscow.117 
By 1989, two opposed publics had formed in the MSSR. As right-bank Moldova 
nationalized, non-Moldovans were marginalized and occasionally subject to violence. Though 
relatively few incidents occurred, the images of people beaten solely because they refused (or 
were unable) to communicate in Moldovan spread through the media and to this day remain 
etched in the collective consciousness of left-bank residents.118 Slogans like “Suitcase, train 
station, to Russia” and “Russians beyond the Dniester, Jews in the Dniester” indexed the 
                                                
115 Personal interview with former PMR Foreign Minister Valery Litskai, February 19, 2009. 
116 For more on how economic and cultural fields can also generate nationalism, see Verdery 1993. 
117 While central elites in the capitals were arguing for greater control over local resources and the revival of 
indigenous languages, they were also initiating a policy of centralization within their own republics, attempting to 
gain control over local party and state institutions that might see Moscow – rather than the republican capitals – as 
the legitimate locus of authority.  These centralization policies prompted their own movements for autonomy and 
independence within the republics. (King 2000: 185). 
118 Even among informants who held little respect for the PMR as a state were revolted by the mob violence against 
non-Moldovan speakers in the early 1990s. 
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potentially destructive violence of nationhood unmoored from its Soviet foundation. These 
slogans called for the expulsion of occupiers (Soviet officials, equated with Russians) and non-
titular nationals (Jews and other minorities). Indirectly, they alluded to Romanian ethnic 
cleansing in left-bank Moldova during World War II.119  
Far from welcoming (or even acknowledging) Moldova’s diversity, public discourse 
tended to extremes, shifting from a forced internationalism under the Soviet state to a virulent 
and occasionally violent nationalism. The tension generated by the undoing of Soviet nationality 
policy permeated the political spaces opened up by glasnost’.  
After 1989, strikes were organized, all of the big factories of Transnistria held a meeting. 
They were joined by other large factories in Chișinău and Bălți. All of these strikes 
lasted six weeks. The strikes did not change anything, but there appeared a new organ: 
the United Council of Labor Collectives (OSTK). It recalled the collectives that existed 
in 1905 before the communist dictatorship. These were the types of organs of authority. 
In Chișinău, the Communist Party crushed them, and in Transnistria Communist Party 
had no such power, so OSTK retained their influence. It included the directors and 
managers of the industrial sector, which led their workers.120 
 
This organizational form had its greatest success where the reach of the Moldovan state was 
weakest: left-bank Moldova. By transforming the internationalist ethos of Soviet industrial 
culture into a generative foundation, STKs and later the OSTK121 were able to throw the 
Communist Party out of power through a strike campaign and local elections. The OSTK 
claimed an authenticity that the privilege-laden Communist Party could not. By invoking the 
1905 workers’ collectives, they constructed a genealogy in which they could claim kinship with 
earlier, purer forms of working class activism. Though they utilized the language and symbols of 
                                                
119 For an overview of Romanian actions in Transnistria during World War II, see Solonari 2009. 
120 Personal interview with former PMR Foreign Minister Valery Litskai, February 19, 2009. 
121 The OSTK decision-making processes mirrored the hierarchical structure common in most Soviet enterprises. 
These decision-making processes were characterized by the prevalence of coordinated discussions, where crucial 
decisions were made at the top management level and then communicated to the lower hierarchy. (Zabarah 2011: 
156). 
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Soviet internationalism, they positioned the movement as a corrective to the nepotism and 
privileges of the Communist party. 
At this point it is useful to look at Transnistria and Moldova in the context of a faltering 
Soviet state. In the late 1980s, political disputes on the Soviet periphery took their cues from 
disputes in Moscow. The idea that events in Moscow determined the course of local events was 
invoked to explain why and how things ended up as they did. The genre of the lament (Ries 
1997: 83-125) evacuates all agency from the local context and displaces it other distant centers 
of power. One elderly activist spoke of the failures (to achieve recognition) as resulting from the 
inability of the center to recognize the dynamics of the situation on the ground. In his narrative, if 
only Gorbachev had recognized that Moldova was conducting genocide against Transnistrians 
and as a result Russia would have recognized the PMSSR, then everything would have been 
better. Such a discourse locates agency outside of the polity itself, and allows for contextual 
circumstances to be viewed as determinant.  
In the late 1980s, the Moldovan Communist party was dependent upon pacifying two 
constituencies: the masses in Chișinău and their supporters in Moscow. Nationalism was as a 
means of preserving power. 
There [in the Soviet Union] everybody was equal. [Among Communist party members] 
there was no idea of the nation, they fulfilled the orders of Gorbachev, and Gorbachev led 
a policy of rapprochement with the Popular Front for the power struggle against 
Legachev and other conservatives of the Communist Party. He [Gorbachev] supported 
the popular fronts in the Bălțic states, in Moldova, and in Georgia. Here Luchinschi 
[former first secretary of the Communist Party of Moldova] carried out his instructions, 
and we were against it. There were two powers: the Communist Party and OSTK, each 
with their own power. Here [in left-bank Moldova] the Communist Party lost badly back 
in 1990 [the first free elections]. OSTK concentrated power in their hands and the 
communists did not have any power, and could not use the army.122  
 
                                                
122 Personal interview with former PMR Foreign Minister Valery Litskai, February 19, 2009. 
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Political struggle was between a protected, insulated elite and the people as elaborated by the 
OSTK. The former required support from the center, while the latter tapped the productive power 
of Soviet modernity. By utilizing the basis of material production, and, by extension, belonging, 
OSTK created a power base to rival to the Communist Party. The means of production literally 
became factories of authority. 
 
Violence and Sovereignty 
 The progression of the armed conflict in Transnistria relates directly to the ongoing crisis 
in the Soviet Union’s power structure. After the unsuccessful Moscow coup of August 19, 1991, 
Moldovan authorities began to assert control over administrative buildings and other 
infrastructure in left-bank Moldova and arrested separatist leaders for supporting the coup.123 
The coup’s failure precipitated the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and barely a week later, on 
August 27, 1991, Moldova declared its independence. In response, Transnistrian deputies met 
and proclaimed that they did not recognize this declaration and affirmed their allegiance to the 
Soviet Union. Seeking to elaborate a symbolic repertoire worthy of a sovereign state, the PMR 
adopted the flag and coat of arms of Soviet Moldova as their own and demanded the release of 
strike leaders arrested by Moldova.124  
Geographically, Transnistria is relatively narrow but “tall” and boast several hubs along a 
north-south axis centered on the Dniester River that contains transportation infrastructure, 
industry, and population centers. The PMR capital of Tiraspol was secure from incursion, but the 
northern regions of Transnistria were vulnerable and contained much strategic infrastructure: 
                                                
123 The congratulatory telegrams sent by the strike leaders were cited as evidence of their support for the putchists, 
and for this they were to face charges in Chișinău. 
124 At this time Moldova adopted the Romanian flag and anthem, and even adopted the names and logos of 
Romanian state institutions. See Ivanel 2010. 
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Rîbnița housed an important steel factory, and Dubăsari boasted a large reservoir and 
hydroelectric power plant. These cities would be the first sites of armed conflict. On November 
2, 1990, under orders from the Moldovan Prime Minister, militia units and volunteer 
detachments moved into Bender and Rîbnița to establish government control. The resulting 
clashes killed three and left nine wounded. Transnistria quickly moved to defend itself, and 
armed volunteers massed in cities of Dubăsari and Grigoriopol. Moldovan forces retreated at this 
show of strength, and both sides began stockpiling weapons (Ozhiganov 1997: 163-4). 
The armed phase of the conflict offered competing forms of institutionalized violence. 
The conflict took the form of an “undeclared war” between, on the one hand, police forces and 
volunteer detachments from Moldova facing off against Transnistrian self-defense groups 
supplemented by the former 14th Army. Each of these forces indexed very different means of 
institutionalized violence. Moldovan police forces were an already constituted power: their 
actions took place in the context of enforcement, the internal maintenance of established, 
recognized order and its boundaries. From Transnistria, the image of a people’s militia opens up 
a political topography in which violence becomes a way of constituting authority or defending 
against an unjust one. The military might of the Soviet Union supplements and allows for a 
nascent Transnistrian authority to be realized. As a constituting power, the military typically 
defends a state’s external borders and has the potential to create states, constitutions, and 
borders. In the PMR, the intervention of the former Soviet 14th army guaranteed the PMR’s de 
facto sovereignty and limits its sovereign competition. 
 While Russia supports (but refuses to formally recognize) PMR sovereignty, in the realm 
of charity and foreign aid Russian is the largest provider of aid to the PMR. During recent floods, 
drought, and an economic blockade, local authorities appealed to Russia for humanitarian aid. In 
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the case of the 2006 economic blockade (described in chapter four), the arrival of an aid convoy 
from Russia was a very visible manifestation of public diplomacy. The fact that any and all 
visible aid comes from Russia must be seen within the larger context in which Russia guarantees 
the PMR’s de facto sovereignty by limiting potential competitors and their competing claims to 
sovereignty. The pursuit and defense of a yet-unrecognized sovereignty becomes the basis for a 
host of other exchange processes (humanitarian aid, charity, cultural diplomacy) that strengthen 
the idea of Transnistrians as a people under threat. After all, if Transnistria was not threatened 
and under a blockade, why would Russia send such visible support? Threats to Transnistria can 
also be ideological (new knowledge or ideas that threaten to upend the status quo) or simply be 
acts of nature that the PMR and its inhabitants must endure.    
The PMR’s uncertain and supplemented sovereignty resulted in a visible tension between 
the constituting and constituted sovereign powers. As a newly independent state Moldova could 
not monopolize force within its borders, and PMR activists and state-builders seized upon these 
circumstances to consolidate their control in the region. Gradually, in left-bank Moldova, the 
existing patchwork of sovereignties was consolidated, though irregularities remained. Certain 
municipalities remained under PMR control, and law-enforcement agencies under Moldovan 
jurisdiction. This led to clashes in which villagers faced off against neighbors over what 
authority to recognize. In this increasingly polarized environment, both sides undertook 
measures to stabilize the situation: Moldova freed the strike leaders, and both sides withdrew 
their forces. 
 
The 14th Soviet Army 
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The existence of the PMR as an unrecognized state must be seen in the context of the 
unique role played by Soviet armed forces and their uncertain role in the aftermath of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. In January 1992, Soviet armed forces were facing the most 
severe crisis since the Russian Civil War and the Nazi invasion. The country they had sworn to 
protect had collapsed and was being replaced by an ill-defined Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS). The withdrawal of thirty-four divisions and over a million military personnel and 
their families was under way; successor states started to nationalize the forces that remained on 
their territory (Ozhiganov 1997: 179). For officers stationed outside Russia, uncertainty reigned 
both within the military establishment and on the home front.   
Initially 14th Army personnel were deployed across a wide swath of Moldova, not only in 
Transnistria.125 As a result of demobilization, what remained of the 14th Army was concentrated 
in Tiraspol. As the political uncertainty vis-à-vis Moldova increased, servicemen were less 
willing to turn over weapons to a political authority they viewed as threatening. Both the 
Republic of Moldova and the PMR laid claims to the 14th army’s equipment. While containing 
only a single division, the 14th Army controlled the region’s enormous Soviet arms depots. 
Nearly 80% of its personnel came from Transnistria, including 51% of its officers and 79% of its 
draftees; most were locals of Ukrainian and Russian nationality (Ozhiganov 1997: 179). Though 
the 14th Army metonymically stands for Russian interference in Moldovan affairs and is cited by 
Moldovans as evidence of Russian support for separatism, such a view underestimates the threat 
that Soviet weapons would fall into the hands of irregulars, criminals, or terrorists. As the 
conflict escalated, Transnistrians armed themselves with the 14th army’s weapons (Ozhiganov 
1997: 175).  
                                                
125 Commonly, the 14th Soviet army is equated with left-bank Moldova when in fact it was dispersed across the 
territory of the MSSR. 
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The 14th Army was central to this conflict because of its technological superiority and 
unchallenged position in the region. Its uncertain status and operational mandate in the post-
Soviet period conflicted with the local ties of its personnel.126 While Moldova attempted to 
create a national army, Transnistrian authorities passed laws that provided protection and offered 
financial inducements for units stationed in left-bank Moldova. These laws provided guarantees 
that units stationed in the region would be financed by the PMR and retain their former 
operational structures.127 Publicly, military officials did not respond to these declarations, though 
individual solders were induced to switch allegiance. The Russian Federation’s involvement in 
post-1992 peacekeeping operations was focused on preventing the materiel of the 14th Army 
from falling into the hands of PMR forces or criminal elements.128  
In Moldova, as was the case across the USSR, the weapons and military technology of 
the Soviet Army became the property of its successor states (in Moldova, the Moldovan army). 
Logistically this posed a problem, since the equipment was located in Transnistria. Securing 
these stores was tricky, since each side assumed that any weapons transferred might later be used 
on them. Given this uncertainty and the need of Moldova to assert its sovereignty within its de 
jure territory, Romania provided military and logistical support. Moldovan police brigades and 
volunteer units were supplied with small arms, mortars, and armored personnel carriers by 
Romania. Today, the weapons and the identity documents of Romanian military advisors are 
displayed in a museum commemorating the “Bender tragedy,” the seminal battle of 
Transnistria’s “Great Patriotic War.” From the perspective of the PMR, these objects validate 
                                                
126 Initially the 14th Army was under CIS control, then subsequently Russian jurisdiction. 
127 For more on these laws (“On the Defense of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic,” “On the Armed Forces,” and 
“On Obligatory National Service in the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic”), see Ozhiganov 1997. 
128 Military institutions played a key role in money laundering operations. Unauthorized transfers of arms and 
equipment also occurred, though information is second-hand. For more on money laundering and illicit economic 
practices, see chapter 4, particularly the section that looks at the exchange of old Soviet rubles at the Military Field 
Bank of the 14th Army. 
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their belief that unification with Romania was imminent. These objects constitute material proof 
of irredentism and validate their struggle against nationalism.129  
One finds an interesting paradox when looking at the issues of sovereignty, territory, and 
recognition within the conflict. Moldova’s attempts to assert control over the rebellious left-bank 
region must be viewed in the context of the breakup of the Soviet Union. Moldova viewed 
Transnistria’s 1990 declaration of independence strictly within the context of the Soviet Union 
insofar as the PMSSR was intended to become a constituent republic of the Soviet Union. When 
the Soviet Union ceased to exist, Moldova sought to assert control over a region formally within 
its recognized borders. Transnistrians refused to recognize these claims, given that, save the 
Soviet state, the region had never been administered by any authority since the early 20th 
century. The fact that Moldova could not control this region encouraged the abstract mass of 
individuals — a people under threat — to create the means to defend themselves as well as the 
practical appendages of the state and its associated political assemblage: elections, a history, and 
the people as the constituent holders of sovereignty. Though a collection of individuals, this mass 
is manifested through authority figure who, speaking in their name so as to make them a 
people.130 In the absence of any durable or stable political frame, representatives of the newly 
independent Republic of Moldova and the PMR both acted as if they were the rightful sovereigns 
despite their competing claims.  
 
                                                
129 The conflict between Transnistria and Moldova coincided with a revival of the Cossack movement. During a 
December, 1991 meeting of atamans conducted under the auspices of the Union of Cossacks, the plight of 
Transnistrians was explicitly discussed and a statement issued that addressed the “brutal violation of the rights and 
freedoms of the peoples of Transdniester.” (Ozhiganov 1997: 175). This declaration and the arrival of hundreds of 
Cossack volunteers raised the symbolic profile of the region by highlighting the moral and ethical basis of 
“defending Russians abroad.” Today, Cossacks groups operate militarily under the auspices of the Defense Ministry 
and run profitable retail businesses in the region. 
130 For the first two decades of PMR statehood, this figure who claimed to speak for the people was Igor Smirnov, 
active both in the initial strike movements and later as President. 
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From Conflict to War 
In December 1991, clashes between Moldovan police and armed volunteer detachments 
from Transnistria were centered on the cities of Bender (located in the right-bank but controlled 
by PMR authorities) and Dubăsari. After a period of mounting tension, March 1992 marked the 
conflict’s escalation and the formation of a militarized front. Until this point casualties were low 
(less than one hundred overall). Despite this, informants in Tiraspol would tell me that genocide 
had occurred. Curiously, as if to confirm their fears, the Moldovan President Snegur stated on 
television in March 1992 that Moldova would not allow the genocide of the Transnistrian 
population.131  
With Moldova’s independence threatened by the seizure of its transportation, economic, 
and communications infrastructure, President Snegur declared a state of emergency and 
introduced direct presidential rule. Moldovan forces attempted to seize Transnistria’s lines of 
communication and isolate the strategically important cities of Tiraspol, Dubăsari, and Rîbnița. 
Fighting continued on a front that stretched along the Dniester River. The bloodiest battle 
occurred in June 1992 when Moldovan armed forces, supported by police and volunteer 
detachments, advanced on the city of Bender with tanks and armored personnel carriers. 
These few short days of fighting in Bender resulted in the bulk of casualties for the 1992 
conflict. Exact numbers are hard to come by, but the “Battle of Bender” saw over 500 killed, 
1,500 wounded, and nearly 80,000 displaced people (OSCE 2002).132 Moldovan forces 
bombarded the city with artillery, howitzers, MiG-29 aircraft, helicopters, tanks, mortars, and 
grenade launchers. The damage to the city and its infrastructure was immense. This battle 
                                                
131 This address was broadcast on March 5th, 1992. 
132 Estimates of those killed during the conflict vary widely. As OSCE background paper, “The Transdniestrian 
Conflict in Moldova: Origins and Main Issues” estimates that the fighting caused several hundreds of deaths and 
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became the anchor of an ideology that positions the PMR as the force that, along with the help of 
the 14th Army, stopped an impending genocide. Bender subsequently became the central 
component of an ideological frame that forces the one to acknowledge Moldovan aggression and 
destruction.133 Because of its central role in the PMR state-building project, the scars of the battle 
remain visible throughout the city to this day. The bullet-ridden city hall in Bender is a reminder 
of what happened nearly two decades ago. It is not uncommon to find small memorial plaques 
commemorating innocent victims or heroic defenders scattered through the city on pockmarked 
walls, courtyard gates, or other mundane spaces.134  
At some point during the fighting near Bender, the 14th Army’s barracks came under fire. 
Until this point, the 14th Army had maintained an official position of neutrality. After coming 
under attack, they became involved in order to repel a Moldovan advance on Tiraspol. Their 
involvement must be seen in the context of the aforementioned jurisdictional uncertainties that 
arose as a result of confusion in Moscow. Many officers came from the region, and non-locals 
came to regard the region as home. Their feelings of affinity were only heightened when the 
Soviet Union ceased to exist and Moldovan nationalist forces home besieged their adopted. 
Militarily, the lack of a clear legal basis for dividing its weapons and property led to a chaotic 
situation in which weapons were transferred, illegally traded, or seized outright. This was not 
only the case in Moldova, but across the Soviet Union. Though this military intervention played 
a key role in allowing the PMR to emerge as a de facto sovereign polity, maintaining a facade of 
sovereignty and democracy requires performance in order to be successful. What follows in 
subsequent chapters trace the practices that undergird the PMR’s performative sovereignty.  
                                                                                                                                                       
some 100,000 refugees. “Transdniestrian Conflict: Origins and Issues,” http://www.osce.org/moldova/42308 
Accessed October 10, 2010.  
133 For more on this death and the creation of affect for political purposes, see chapter 3 on bodies. 
134 There is a small memorial museum attached to a local historical museum. 
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It is worth noting that the remnants of the 14th army constituted another sovereign 
competitor. Before his political career in Russia, General Alexander Lebed, former commander 
of the 14th Army, was known a peacemaker in the PMR. Lebed was sent by Yeltsin’s Defense 
Minister Pavel Grachev to the PMR in June 1992 to make peace and secure the arms of the 14th 
Army.135 Lebed quickly gained the confidence of residents who saw him as an authority figure. 
His fight against crime and corruption in Transnistria brought him into direct conflict with PMR 
authorities. Though he refused to shed the role of the soldier-peacemaker, Lebed’s command 
over the 14th Army and his assertiveness toward a PMR leadership that he saw as fully under the 
control of criminal elements leads one to believe that, had he chosen so, he could have asserted a 
more active role in PMR politics. As an unrecognized state, the PMR attracted (and continues to 
attract) dubious figures with questionable democratic credentials that have come to occupy 
various posts in the PMR government. The arrival of these questionable individuals led Lebed 
into open conflict with the ruling PMR elite.   
Lebed’s tenure in Transnistria marks the beginning of his transformation from soldier to 
populist politician.136 Even today, Lebed remains a popular figure in the region despite the fact 
that his presence has been erased from official histories of the region.137 Lebed’s image as a 
                                                
135 Grachev gained notoriety primarily because of his military incompetence and longstanding allegations of 
corruption. In the PMR, he was alleged to be involved in a scheme that used the military-field bank of the 14th 
Army to exchange then-worthless Soviet rubles for Russian rubles. During fieldwork, informants described 
suitcases, automobiles, and trains full of old Soviet rubles that were converted. Allegedly, Alexander Lebed and 
Mikhail Bergman (the former commander of the Tiraspol garrison of the 14th Army) tried to halt this illicit scheme 
but were personally rebuked by Grachev. 
136 For more on Lebed’s political career and how his military experienced influenced his politics, see Benjamin 
Lambeth, The Warrior Who Would Rule Russia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1996); Lyndon Allin n.d., 
‘Before the Fall: Aleksandr Lebed’s Life and Times Through June 1995’; Harold Elletson, The General Against the 
Kremlin: Alexander Lebed, Power and Illusion (London: Little Brown, 1999), and Alexander Lebed, My Life and 
My Country (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1997). 
137 Lebed has no memorial in the PMR despite being responsible for bringing peace to the region. Given the PMR 
authorities penchant for monuments and commemorative plaques, Lebed’s absence is telling. In October, 2010, 
PMR President Igor Smirnov unveiled a memorial plaque honoring Karl Friedrich Hieronymus, Freiherr von 
Münchhausen. The plaque was unveiled in the Turkish fortress located in the PMR city of Bender. 
http://www.nr2.ru/pmr/303869.html 
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strongman in Russia was premised on the idea that he was the only individual capable of 
stamping out corruption and imposing order in Russia during the chaotic 1990s.138 Lebed was 
elected to the PMR Supreme Soviet (legislature) in 1993, and he resigned a month later when his 
attempts to investigate the participation of PMR military forces in the 1993 constitutional crisis 
were thwarted.139 After leaving Tiraspol, Lebed was appointed by Boris Yeltsin as Secretary of 
the Security Council of the Russian Federation. Lebed was integral in ending the First Chechen 
War in August of 1996, yet Yeltsin promptly fired him in October 1996 for criticizing the 
Russian army’s tactics in the conflict. Lebed subsequently placed third in the 1996 Russian 
Presidential elections with nearly 15% of the vote, and in 1998 he became governor of the 
mineral-rich Krasnoyarsk region. He died in a helicopter crash in 2002.  
Armed conflict with Moldova (the “undeclared war”) allowed the PMR elite to 
consolidate their position in the region. Subsequently, idea of the PMR state as the protector of 
the people became the central tenet in the political discourse of an increasingly militarized 
society. Even today, contradictory positions are equated with being a traitor to those who had 
shed their blood. The PMR’s status as an unrecognized state (and its detachment from the 
international community) allowed for the emergence of a siege mentality and enabled the ruling 
political elite to build up a clear-cut concept of the enemy (Schmitt 2007). By creating the image 
of a region besieged by hostile forces, elites were able to strengthen an already existing local 
identity as Transnistrians separate and distinct from Moldova. After armed conflict, living 
together in a single state was seen as impossible. The PMR elite has, through referendums, a 
national narrative of victimization, a cult of those killed, created a system in which 
                                                
138 One of Lebed’s 1996 campaign posters directly references his tenure in the PMR: “I have already stopped one 
war.” 
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disengagement from Moldova became the basis for a separate political system and economy that 
has developed its own dynamics after twenty years of separation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
139 Lebed was investigating the use of PMR forces to support the coup attempt against Boris Yeltsin. Parliament had 
voted to impeach Yeltsin and install then Vice President Alexander Rutskoy as President. Rutskoy is a frequent 
visitor to the PMR and guest of former President Smirnov. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CREATING A PEOPLE: REFERENDA, NOSTALGIA, AND SUBJECTIVITY  
 
 
 
 
 The word referendum denotes the process of subjecting an important political question to 
a decision of the people through a vote (Oxford English Dictionary). Its Latin etymology, “that 
which must be referred,” or literally, “thing brought back,” alludes to its predetermined contours 
and its constructed nature. In the PMR, the issues subjected to referendum date to the Soviet 
period with the creation of the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) in 
1924.140 To create the MSSR, a Moldovan people and culture needed to be conjured up.141 
Convincing Moldovans that they constituted a separate people from Romanians required creating 
the requisite accoutrements of a national culture. This national culture that created a nation in the 
context of the Soviet state became contested in the late 1980s as questions emerged about what 
constituted the borders, legitimate or not, of the peoples and languages of the MSSR.     
 Referenda address issues requiring a decision of the electorate, with their subject matter 
divided into categories such as constitutional issues (especially after a revolution or territorial 
breakup); territorial issues (issues of secession or federation); moral issues (abortion, divorce, 
drug policy, etc.) and local, parochial issues (e.g., school funding or bond issues) (Magleby 
                                                
140 The initial issues were cultural, and included deciding whether Moldovan should be written in Cyrillic, and 
whether to accept the state symbols of Moldova, at the time identical to Romania. 
141 Hirsch (2005: 224) describes the difficult Soviet ethnographers had when working on a small exhibit on Soviet 
Moldavia in 1932/1933: “The department’s ethnographers debated, without total resolution, how best to depict the 
Soviet Moldavians versus the Romanian Bessarabians.  These peoples derived from the same ethnic group; but 
while the Romanian Bessarabians had attained nationhood under capitalism, the Soviet Moldavians had attained 
nationhood under socialism.”  Taking a more geopolitical tack, Martin (2001: 274-275) sees the Piedmont principle 
– exploiting cross-border ethnic ties to project Soviet influence into neighboring states – as being the determining 
factor in the formation of the MSSR.  “In one exceptional case, the Piedmont Principle was even the primary 
motivation for the formation of a national republic: the Moldavian ASSR.  The Soviet Union never recognized 
Romania’s annexation of the Tsarist province of Bessarabia.”
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2001). Often the right to referenda is enshrined in the constitution, as is the case in Switzerland, 
where citizens can call for a referendum on constitutional amendments and on laws passed by the 
legislature. Similarly, in California, the signatures of 5% (for a statute) or 8% (for a 
constitutional amendment) of the electorate are required for a statewide referendum.   
 Typically, referenda are held by existing political entities to make collective decisions 
about the management of their affairs. Despite its portrayal as a “totalitarian” state, the Soviet 
Union centralized citizens’ participation in governance. Article 48 of the 1977 Soviet 
constitution enshrined the right of citizens to take part in the management of the state: 
Article 48. Citizens of the USSR have the right to take part in the management and 
administration of state and public affairs and in the discussion and adoption of laws and 
measures of All-Union and local significance.  
 
This right is ensured by the opportunity to vote and to be elected to Soviets of People's 
Deputies and other elective state bodies, to take part in nationwide discussions and 
referenda, in people's control, in the work of state bodies, public organizations, and local 
community groups, and in meetings at places of work or residence.142  
 
Though the right to hold referenda was guaranteed by the Soviet constitution, with the exception 
of the March 1991 referendum that marked its demise no others were ever held in the Soviet 
Union. The USSR’s first and last referendum posed a question that reverberates to this day:  
Do you consider necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as 
a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics in which the rights and freedom of an 
individual of any nationality will be fully guaranteed? 
 
Despite being boycotted in Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova, at least 
70% voted “yes” in participating republics.143 The referendum took place in Transnistria, where 
a majority voted to preserve the USSR. Curiously, the 1991 Soviet referendum was not 
                                                
142 "Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," adopted at the Seventh (Special) Session of the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR, October 7, 1977. http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/77cons02.html 
Accessed September 20, 2011. 
143 In Georgia, the referendum took placed and passed in the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 
Moldova, the referendum overwhelmingly passed in Transnistria and Gagauzia. 
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Transnistria’s first. Left-bank residents had previously voted, in a series of referenda, to create 
their own Soviet republic outside of the MSSR, the PMSSR.144  
 The PMR’s referenda occurred as the once powerful Soviet state dissolved and was 
replaced with national states, some of which were of unsettled geopolitical provenance. The 
events in the PMR raise the question of exactly who has the right to initiate a referendum. Is 
simply organizing a referendum a sufficient basis for it to be deemed valid? Can referenda be 
legitimately used to replace the authority of one state (albeit a disintegrating one) with an 
unrecognized polity one? Finally, what productive “work” can referenda perform in the context 
of non-recognition?   
 The fact that left-bank residents utilized an amendment from the Soviet constitution 
shortly before its demise remains a deft act of political subterfuge. These initial referenda 
transformed an object that only existed in a virtual form (in the sense that it never had a 
complement in reality) into tangible form. Having taken an amendment enshrined in Soviet law 
but never utilized, left-bank activists took a wedge issue common in many republics (language 
and cultural rights), welded it to the very real issues of political and economic security, and 
subjected it to the will of the people. Once embossed with the patina of democracy, the results 
become unimpeachable insofar as the people had spoken “democratically.” These actions 
constitute the core of a democratic mythologem that can be opposed to any number of conflicting 
discourses.  
 The origin of political authority in the PMR begins with the creation a constituent people 
legitimated through referenda. In Transnistria, the plebiscite is an act around which other issues 
cluster. Referenda offered a means to invoke the constituent unit of popular sovereignty, the 
                                                
144 The Pridnestrovian Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (PMSSR) was originally conceived of as new Soviet 
republic separate from the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic. 
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people [narod]. Building upon the idea that sovereignty and political authority are the products 
of human creation, I argue in this chapter that referenda perform two vital functions for the PMR 
state: (1) referenda productively create and materialize the will of the people as the constituent 
holders of sovereignty and (2) perform important representative functions at the level of 
spectacle. In the PMR, the referendum is an institution that, along with the 1992 conflict, 
constitutes the primary means of creating a political authority authorized by its constituents and 
residents. In the context of Transnistria’s liminality-at-large, referenda are a means of mediation, 
a way of linking different temporalities, communities, and experiences. As part of a local 
political cosmology, referenda function as messages both to local constituencies and to the 
outside world. Referenda embody a more pervasive “social relationship between people that is 
mediated by images” (Debord 1994: 12). Agamben (2011) discusses the ceremonial aspects of 
governance that lie at the heart of democracy.   
Contemporary democracy is a democracy that is entirely founded upon glory, that is, on 
the efficacy of acclamation, multiplied and disseminated by the media beyond all 
imagination. (That the Greek term for glory — doxa — is the same term that today 
designates public opinion is, from this standpoint, something more than a coincidence). 
As had always been the case in profane and ecclesiastical liturgies, this supposedly 
“originary democratic phenomenon” is once again caught, oriented, and manipulated in 
the forms and according to the strategies of spectacular power (Agamben 2011: 256). 
 
When faced with the void left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, left-bank residents sought a 
means to legitimize the PMR as a polity. This idea of the PMR as a separate polity was initially 
the idea of a devoted few who had much to lose in an independent Moldova. Legitimacy required 
not only creating the institutional components of a state, but also their representative and 
ideological forms. Given the PMR’s lack of recognition, local elites have legitimized the PMR 
state through referenda, which are locally seen as a purer form of democracy (i.e., more direct in 
comparison to the United States and Europe). 
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Referenda, Simulation, and Virtuality 
 As Transnistria moved to secede from Soviet Moldova (MSSR) after the passage of 1989 
language law, left-bank soviets (councils) sought a popular mandate for their actions. Left-bank 
political structures145 claimed a mandate through a referendum campaign. From late 1989 to 
early 1990, a series of local referenda were held on the creation of a separate state in left-bank 
Moldova; whether to use the Cyrillic or Latin script for the Moldovan language; and whether or 
not to accept the new Moldovan flag and state symbols. These symbolic and orthographic 
distinctions created disagreement at practical and perceptual levels that remain to this day. 
Referenda offer a means of differentiation: residents cite the fact that issues decided by 
legislative fiat in right-bank Moldova were subject to a referendum in Transnistria. In this logic 
one can notice the contours of a polity authorized by constituents. This line of thinking is vital to 
the official narrative of the PMR as a state worthy of recognition: the people spoke 
democratically, Moldova attacked us — the bodies prove this — and the will of the people 
confirmed our decision to separate. 
 In the context of the late 1980s, referenda constituted acts of defiance in and of 
themselves insofar as authorities in Chișinău declared them illegal and nullified the results.146 
This lack of acknowledgement did not discourage left-bank residents. Once a referendum 
occurred, its results became objective facts and the embodiment of the will of the people. The 
initial referendum campaign in left-bank Moldova conflated linguistic issues (whether Moldovan 
and Romanian constituted separate languages), orthographic issues (Cyrillic or Latin) and 
                                                
145 In Transnistria, the most active were city and raion soviets. The term “Soviet” referred to local governmental 
bodies, the English equivalent being city or regional councils. 
146 Lieven (1998: 248-249) writes that the bases for Transnistrian secession were laid while the USSR still existed, 
with officials in Moscow having direct points of bureaucratic contact with and even control over local officials and 
managers by means of (power of patronage and reward).  Furthermore, since it began in Soviet times, it was 
protected from police and military retaliation by the Moldovan government, which only belatedly realized its threat 
and potential for disrupting the establishment of Moldovan sovereignty. 
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political issues (whether or not to form their own state to protect their rights) into a participatory 
ritual that came to embody the will of the people. This initial referendum and subsequent 
referenda constitute, along with the 1992 war, an experiential foundation for the PMR as a polity.   
 The initial referenda took a series of geopolitical issues and used them as a means of 
cleaving off a political community. The issue of whether or not the borders of the Republic of 
Moldova encompassed the Moldovan people, the Romanian people, or all individuals residing 
there became a means of creating a political community in which left-bank residents would 
explicitly belong. In the process of affirming their differences, left-bank residents would, in 
addition to their ascribed nationalities as Moldovans, Russians, or Ukrainians, become 
Transnistrians, a multi-national narod147 created through the cumulative effects of Soviet power 
(Mason 2009). By translating a series of collective decisions into an explicitly political language, 
referenda created the preconditions for belonging and became the basis for a state. Through 
participation and the subsequent elaboration of a Transnistrian political narrative, referenda 
create meaningful subject positions and points of identification for individuals who, left with the 
material and symbolic forms of the Soviet Union, faced an uncertain future.  
 Alongside referenda, one finds the development of a distinct PMR political lexicon based 
around the ideas of direct democracy and grassroots participation that adds to the idea of the 
region and its inhabitants as separate from Moldova. Historical ambiguity and subjective 
interpretations became, via referenda, the undisputable will of the Transnistrian narod. Insofar as 
their results become contested objects in ongoing political rituals between the PMR and 
Moldova, referenda enjoy unparalleled support within the PMR. Referenda index Transnistrian 
                                                
147 The term narod can mean people, folk, or nation (in the sense of a unit of legitimate sovereignty), thought it 
typically implies a connection to the people that is lacking in more technical terms like natsiia or ethnos.  I leave it 
untranslated throughout the work. In Transnistria, the term is typically used to describe the constituent holders of 
sovereignty, the “people” - it is typically devoid of any ethnic component. 
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citizens as the constituent elements of a legitimate popular sovereignty. Having affirmed their 
right to separate, residents could now begin to form a political structure to defend themselves. 
The bloodshed of 1992 further implicates residents in the state-building process, for it was the 
region’s residents, citizens, and soldiers who died defending the PMR. To concede and endorse 
Moldovan "nationalism" and “chauvinism” would negate sacrifices measured in blood and 
forsake the ideals of the Soviet Union.    
 Referenda function as a stabilizing force in the face of an uncertain political future. The 
changing topics of referenda and of democracy remind me of Evans-Pritchard’s dictum that 
“new situations demand new magic" (1937: 513). When confronted with an uncertain 
geopolitical context, referenda create experientially valid and accessible means of ordering and 
making sense of reality. Referenda are part of a distinctly Slavic genealogy of democracy that 
does not bind them to any normative, Western constraints. 
 Referenda constituted a means of engaging themselves politically while disengaging from 
Moldova. During an interview with the PMR foreign minister Vladimir Yastrebchak in 2009, I 
asked him to describe Transnistria to someone previously unaware of what Transnistria is.148 His 
answer alludes to the circularity of the PMR’s existence as a polity. 
Transnistria is a narrow strip of land on which live people who have showed a 
remarkable ability for self-organization. Having rose up to defend their rights, they were 
able to assert/defend them.  And this is enough so that other peoples also respect the 
rights of Transnistrians.149 
 
Yastrebchak’s description highlights Transnistria’s capacity of self-organization and defense: the 
people living on this particular piece of land have a remarkable ability for self-organization, 
which they exercised by defending their rights, and this in and of itself should be sufficient for 
                                                
148 My exact question asked him to explain what Pridnestrove was. This Russian term is slightly different from 
Transnistria. See my discussion of this in the introduction, footnote 1. 
149 Interview with PMR Foreign Minister Vladimir Ystrebchak, July 2009. 
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others to respect their rights. His words illustrate how referenda offer residents a means of 
participating and reflecting on the events that led to the creation of the PMR. Imparting this to 
others is a strategic goal, for while residents know what the PMR is, the world remains willfully 
ignorant of the reality of PMR statehood.   
 As a developmental state, the Soviet Union was organized around production and 
redistribution (Verdery 1996, Kornai 1992). With the PMR, production (along with consumption 
and distribution) has shifted from the material plane to an abstract one in which images and 
sentiments of harmony and plenitude dominate. In the PMR, political life is based on the logic of 
simulation. Unlike production, which operates within finite realms and constraints, simulations 
can be indefinitely replayed.150 Referenda and other sovereign performances can be reiterated 
and replayed in numerous contexts, subject as they are to a “social demand” (Baudrillard 1994: 
26). Referenda are a calculated means of measuring and codifying the will of the people, which 
in turn became the basis for a movement that grew into a state with real effects, institutions, and 
power. Despite its non-recognition, PMR performances of sovereignty generate a sense of 
belonging as well as a nascent platform for power and authority. This idea of sovereignty as a 
performance is a distinctly modern phenomenon, since before the onset of modernity sovereigns 
did not necessarily need a people, since the King enjoyed sovereignty by the grace of God alone.  
 Whether one speaks of the narod who emerged through action direct action or of the 
PMR’s democratic origins, what was essentially a performance for its own purposes became a 
meaningful experiential and phenomenological frame for residents. Though a single event, a 
referendum is capable of generating effects well in the future. As if to prove its lasting effects, a 
                                                
150 A simulation […] can go on indefinitely, since - unlike ‘true’ power which is, or was, a structure, a strategy, a 
relation of force, a stake - this is nothing but the object of a social demand, and hence subject to the law of supply 
and demand, rather than to violence and death.  Completely expunged from the political dimension, it is dependent, 
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few informants spontaneously produce their old Soviet passports and showed me the stamp 
indicating that they had voted in a referendum — participation physically inscribes one’s 
participation in political life.  
 
 
The Local Genealogy of Referenda 
 
Democracy is a concept that does not disappear from the field of vision of the media, of scientists 
or of politicians. It would be nice, of course, to avoid its disappearance from the actual practice 
of public administration, and most importantly, from the minds of the citizens themselves, since 
democracy remains an empty phrase without mass support, without becoming a perceived need 
of man and citizen. … The institutions of democracy are diverse, and include participation in 
elections, participation in the discussion of important bills, and participation in referenda. 
 
Anna Volkova 
 
 According to official PMR historiography, the region’s current state of affairs is the result 
of processes that date back thousands of years.151 These longue durée processes, coupled with 
the region’s existence on the borders of competing religions, empires, and “civilizations” only 
adds to the its unique genealogy.152 The idea of the PMR as a place that defies precedent and 
eludes easy characterization is ceaselessly reiterated by individuals and in local media. The wider 
context in which referenda take place is the result of a selective reading of events and not the 
result of world-historic forces that created the sovereign Transnistrian narod.   
 In the introduction to her book Referenda in the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (1989-
2003), Anna Volkova locates a historical analogue of the referendum in the medieval Slavic 
                                                                                                                                                       
like any other commodity, on production and mass consumption.  Its spark has disappeared – only the fiction of a 
political universe is saved. (Baudrillard 1994: 46). 
151 For more on the notion of the Transnistrian people as the result of a creative endeavor in historiography, see 
Solonari 2003. 
152 This “civilizations” argument is based on the idea that Transnistria has historically been a border between 
competing empires, nations, and civilizations. This stretches back into antiquity, when the region was a borderland 
between Dacia and Scythia. In the 13th century, the region was briefly under Mongol control and subsequently part 
of the Crimean Khanate. It was alternately part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Ottoman Empire, and 
later Imperial Russia. 
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world.153 The numerous referenda in the PMR are the modern forms of medieval institutions like 
the veche, a popular assembly that took root in Slavic lands from 10th to the 15th century 
(Volkova 2005: 5). Rooted in the Slavic gatherings, the veche was where important questions 
were discussed, where issues of war and peace were settled, and leaders were chosen.154 Despite 
its disappearance, the spirit of the veche survived in the form of village gatherings that allowed 
for “freedom-loving Slavic souls remained unshaken” (Volkova 2005: 5). These gatherings 
survived the Russian civil war and endured in the Soviet period, where they existed without 
control “from above.” And just as an institution like the veche can prosper without control “from 
above,” referenda can too. 
 In the PMR, referenda are constitutive and form the basis for the PMR. Volkova 
anticipates criticism of referenda as the basis for creating a political constituency. “Many experts 
have expressed the view that we can not allow a referendum to replace the institutions of 
political representation” (Volkova 2005: 7). She continues, 
[Such a view holds only if one] … considers the issue in terms of the stable existence of 
the state. And if the government collapses, and citizens are forced to take the initiative 
just to maintain a stable existence for their families, to protect the basic rights and 
freedoms? Does the priority of a referendum in the face of inaction by "people's 
representatives" who do not want to fulfill the will of their voters? Such referenda are the 
greatest acts of civic responsibility, a testimony to the direct participation of citizens in 
the affairs of government, direct democracy. Such referenda, the initiative for which was 
truly popular, led to the formation of Transnistrian Moldovan Republic. The actuality of 
the referenda in the PMR is not in doubt. The fifteen-year history of our state is 
connected with referenda – they have become integral part of public life in Transnistria 
(Volkova 2005: 7).  
 
                                                
153 The author, Anna Volkova, has been a trusted advisor of PMR President Igor Smirnov since the early 1990s. 
Before getting involved in politics, she was trained as a historian. 
154 The veche and the institutions of a proto-Slavic democracy could not continue unabated. The veche was 
liquidated when Novgorod and Pskov joined together to form the Grand Duchy of Moscow in the 15th century. In 
other medieval regions, the sovereign co-opted such legislative institutions as their own subservient parliaments as 
they were often framed as given to the people by the king. What is given can be taken away, particularly in light of 
the sovereign as the giver. 
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State collapse, “people’s representatives” who do not fulfill their constituents’ will, and a desire 
for stability required action. The difficulties experienced by left-bank residents do not allow for 
referenda as supplement to an existing polity. For the PMR, the referenda are democracy and 
form the legal, historical, and experiential basis for the PMR as a state.    
 The need to hold referenda emerged in response to the lack of a titular nationality in the 
region.155 One PMR historian, after speaking in generalities about Transnistria as a border 
between civilizations, highlighted the uniqueness of the region. Transnistria, he intoned, is a 
region where three Orthodox peoples (Moldovan, Ukrainian, Russian) coexist without ethnic 
conflict.156 Autochthony is not a question of singularities, but of a mix of peoples who have lived 
on the land for centuries – “we, the masters of this land, indigenous.” His use of the first person 
plural form was never followed by a specific nationality but by “we, Transnistrians” [my 
pridnestrovtsy]. This elevation of the first person plural effaces the role of the PMR elite in 
directing the state-building process and develops the idea of Transnistrian as a nascent (non-
)national identity. 
 Left-bank residents cite Moldova’s lack of even a single referendum as a way of 
positioning Moldova as a state that thwarts the will of its people. One left-bank resident recalled 
an incident in which he was told by a Moldovan official in 1989 that the “people should work in 
the fields, and the intelligentsia [should] make laws.” Such a statement allows for a comparison: 
Transnistria practiced democracy without control, while Moldovan democracy was directed 
“from above.” The fact that Moldova never had a single referendum becomes, retroactively, an 
                                                
155 This idea of fundamental differences between left-bank Moldova and right-bank Moldova transcended ethnic or 
national grounds. Moldovans make up the largest minority group in the PMR today, and many Moldovans died 
fighting forces loyal to the Republic of Moldova in 1992. 
156 Interestingly enough, he later revised his “no conflict” thesis and told me that it was quiet only up until the 
Russian civil war. 
 102 
indication of guilt. Holding a referendum could have averted conflict: they (Chișinău) should 
have “asked the people” when deciding important national issues.  
 The failure to hold a referendum in Moldova was not lost on its own leaders.157 During an 
interview with former Prime Minister (2001-2008) Vasile Tarlev, he spoke at length of missteps 
that occurred as Moldova awkwardly realized its independence 
The political forces that came to power in Moldova did not know how to properly handle 
the situation. I have many friends, colleagues, and relatives from Dubăsari [a city in the 
PMR], from the Transnistria region. Nobody taught them to make this conflict. It started 
from these language problems. Honestly, the language question still has not been solved. 
The younger generation speaks Romanian, bureaucrats speak the state language [limba de 
stat], and the older generation speaks Moldovan. They need to have a referendum, to get 
the opinion of the people ... that is democracy.158  
 
While there is some posturing in his statement, he echoes the sentiments of many in left-bank 
Moldova. Aware of the confluence of material interests and knowledge production, Tarlev ended 
the exchange by noting, “scientists say different things depending on who pays them.” 
 
Topics of Referenda  
 In the PMR, the topics of referenda directly relate to the region’s still unresolved status. 
Since 1989, there have been seven referenda in the PMR. The first three referenda directly 
addressed the question of the region’s political status in the context of the demise of the USSR. 
The first referendum on the formation of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic 
(PMSSR) was actually a series of referenda that took place in left-bank Moldova from December 
1989 through November 1990. Turnout was 79%, with nearly 96% voting in favor of the 
                                                
157 All of Moldova’s presidents, with the exception of the current acting-president Mihai Gimpu, were once 
members of the Central Committee of the Communist party.  Unlike Transnistria, where party bureaucrats and 
politicians were largely discredited and lost power, in Moldova there was no rejection of the party, which initially 
attempted to use nationalism to extend its rule. 
158 Interview with Vasile Tarlev, May 11, 2009. Tarlev’s political party, the Centrist Union of Moldova, had 
received only 2.75% of votes in the April 5, 2009 parliamentary elections.  Despite not being a member of the Party 
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creation of the PMSSR as a constituent republic of the Soviet Union. The second referendum 
(March 1991) asked about the retention of the Soviet Union in a reformed form. Boycotted in 
right-bank Moldova, left-bank residents overwhelmingly supported the retention of a renewed 
USSR. The third referendum (December 1, 1991) affirmed the formal independence of the now-
renamed Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) outside the Soviet Union (voter turnout was 
78%, and nearly 98% voted in favor of full independence).  
 Having affirmed its right to exist as a polity, the next three referendums addressed 
internal concerns. The fourth referendum (March 26, 1995) asked about maintaining the 
permanence presence of the remaining troops from the former 14th Russian Army. More than 
90% supported the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria.159 Though non-binding, this 
success of this referendum provided a pretext for the PMR and the Russian Federation to insist 
on an ongoing military presence in the region. The fifth referendum (December 24, 1995) dealt 
with the approval of the PMR’s 1995 Constitution and with accession to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS); 81.8% approved the new constitution, and nearly 91% voted in favor 
of requesting entry to the CIS. As an organization consisting of the recognized successor states 
of the Soviet Union, the PMR had little chance of joining the CIS. The sixth (April 6, 2003) 
referendum on private land ownership was invalid, as voter turnout was less than the 50% 
required by law.  
 The seventh and most recent referendum  — dubbed the “second independence 
referendum” — was held on September 17, 2006 to great fanfare. Voter turnout was 79%, and 
the referendum asked two questions:  
                                                                                                                                                       
of Communists of the Republic of Moldova, Tarlev served under the administration of Vladimir Voronin, who was 
both President of the Republic of Moldova and the party’s leader. 
159 As I argue throughout this dissertation, the presence of Russian troops in left-bank Moldova forecloses any other 
sovereign competition. 
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(1): Do you support the course towards the independence of the PMR and the subsequent 
free association with the Russian Federation?  [Yes: 97.2%, No: 1.9%, Invalid/undecided: 
0.9%] 
 
 (2): Do you consider it possible to renounce the independence of the PMR and 
subsequently become part of the Republic of Moldova? [Yes: 3.3%, No: 94.9%, 
Invalid/undecided: 1.8%]160 
 
The PMR’s official press agency published the findings of a team of international observers who 
declared the referendum occurred according to European standards.161 The first question 
affirmed the independence of the PMR along with the subsequent “free association” with Russia 
while the second asked about renouncing the independence of the PMR (itself the subject of the 
first question) and becoming a part of Moldova.  
 The first and most recent referenda were preceded by large public information campaigns 
to raise awareness among the electorate. As the first referendum (1989-1990) came closer to 
being realized, its topics were discussed in the local media. The preliminary draft published in a 
the local newspaper asked residents four questions: (1) about creating an autonomous republic 
within the MSSR; (2) about creating a bicameral legislative system in the Supreme Soviet of the 
MSSR; (3) about the equality of the Moldovan and Russian languages; and (4) about the 
transition to the Latin script (Volkova 2005: 27-28). The last question about the Latin script was 
to be the concern of only citizens of the Moldovan nationality, not all residents.162 The broad 
concerns of the referendum – autonomy, legislative power, language equality, and orthography – 
all but assured support. For some, the referendum is about control of resources while for others it 
                                                
160 Olvia Press, September 26, 2006. “ЦЕНТРИЗБИРКОМ ПМР ОБНАРОДОВАЛ ОКОНЧАТЕЛЬНЫЕ ИТОГИ 
РЕФЕРЕНДУМА” (Central Election Committee of the PMR issued the final results of the referendum). 
http://www.olvia.idknet.com/ol225-09-06.htm Accessed July 5, 2010. 
161 Olvia Press, September 18, 2006.  «ТО, ЧТО МЫ УВИДЕЛИ В ПРИДНЕСТРОВЬЕ, СООТВЕТСТВУЕТ 
САМЫМ ВЫСОКИМ СТАНДАРТАМ ЕВРОПЫ» – ГРУППА МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ НАБЛЮДАТЕЛЕЙ  
(“What we saw in Transnistria met the highest standards of Europe” – Group of International Observers). 
http://www.olvia.idknet.com/ol162-09-06.htm Accessed July 5, 2010. 
162 This question of orthography has expanded and now occupies a central place in PMR political discourse insofar 
as Moldova as a nation and a culture is imminently threatened by Romanian annexation and cultural domination. 
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is about who has the power to make laws. Some are concerned about the loss of Russian as the 
official language of the MSSR, while others are concerned with orthography. Each issue had its 
own devoted constituency.163 Each question built upon an expansive internationalist label that 
could be opposed to nationalism. Above all, the internationalist platform united a diverse group 
that sought to preserve the economic gains of the USSR (Mason 2009: 165).   
 The idea of creating a separate republic on the left-bank can be traced back to the 1924 
founding of the MASSR. With the formation of the MSSR in 1940, the “state autonomy” of the 
MASSR was liquidated (Volkova 2005: 28). The restoration of this sovereignty is central to the 
PMR’s raison d'être. The MASSR was created for propaganda purposes, to spread the revolution 
to neighboring Romania (Martin 2001: 36). With its capital Chișinău “temporarily-occupied,” 
Tiraspol became the MASSR’s provisional capital pending the liberation of Bessarabia. Officials 
in the MASSR even left the streetlights on in Tiraspol day and night to showcase the luminous 
brilliance of the Soviet project.164  
 The genealogical linkage of the PMR to the MASSR is contrasted to the MSSR in which 
Moldovans were the titular nationality. An article from a local newspaper, Dnestrovskaya 
Pravda adds the weight of history to this opposition.165 
 
 
                                                
163 Curiously, those who did not speak Moldovan tended to play up the language issue, vigorously defending a 
language foreign to them. 
164 King, The Moldovans, 55-56. In a similar vein, Figes (1996: 42-45) uses the experiences of the governor of 
Bessarabia, Sergei Urusov, who was appointed in 1903, to show the dynamics of peripheral rule in Imperial Russia. 
Upon arriving at first major town, Bender (located in the PMR), the Governor was greated on the platform with a 
full orchestra. The Vice-Governor came bearing bread and salt, and he was later drawn through Chișinău (Kishinev) 
in an open carriage by six white horses, with some in the crowd going down on their knees. Yet down the hill from 
his official residence, he encountered shanty towns, pigs and cows grazing in the unpaved alleys, and open sewers 
and piles of garbage. Cholera epidemics occurred every three years. “These were the two faces of every Russian 
city: the one of imperial power and European civilization, the other of poverty and squalor of Asiatic proportions” 
(Figes 1996: 43). Tellingly, the subheading for this section is entitled “The Thin Veneer of Civilization.” 
165 Dnestrovskaya Pravda v. 122, October 12, 1989. 
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The political rationale for the establishment of the Transnistrian Moldavian Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic in part reads as follows: As part of the autonomous republic 
from 1924 to 1940, the Transnistrian region formed their own traditions in political, 
economic and social life. The republic was called Moldavian [MASSR]. This was a 
tribute to the Moldovan people, who at the time did not have their own national-territorial 
entity on the territory of the USSR, although the size of the Moldovan population, either 
now or then, did not exceed 30 percent. Fate decreed that in 1940, as a result the 
reunification of Bessarabia with the Soviet Union, the Moldovan Soviet Socialist 
Republic was formed. It its composition entered the territory of the autonomous republic, 
whose state independence was not preserved in the MSSR … on the territory of the 
former autonomous republic an international community of people now lives, whose 
outstanding feature is many mixed marriages. Census data on ethnic grounds here has 
long been conditional. That is, it must be concluded that a defined nation consisting of 
various different ethnic communities was founded, with a large stratum superficially 
divided along ethnic grounds. This explains one of our demands, namely to write in our 
passports, in the fifth column [where one's nationality was written], citizen of the USSR 
(Volkova 2005: 28). 
 
The titular nation of the PMR is the multiethnic Soviet nation, the cumulative product of "mixed 
marriages" and internationalist sentiment. Their statehood liquidated in 1940, this "international" 
community attempts to organize an autonomous Soviet republic. In the original Russian text, the 
newspaper uses the calque “international” instead of its more literal form, mezhdunarodnyi. This 
use of the calque suggests that that even at this early stage the norms of international relations 
had permeated the PMR’s self-presentation: now largely unburdened by Soviet communism and 
the constraints of socialism, elites could gradually co-opt its socialist vocabulary for their own 
nefarious purposes. This proposed republic, unlike the original 1924 republic named to honor the 
Moldovan people, would be created on the basis of geography and for the "international 
community" it encompassed. Its struggle for recognition is rooted in history, experience, and 
anxieties that emerged as the Soviet Union dissolved. The cumulative effects of Soviet 
development are effaced as the narod become active historical agents.  
 Referenda present abstract concerns in comprehensible forms. By crafting a political 
lexicon in which opponents are seen as chauvinists at best, fascists at worst, the organizers 
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controlled the terms of the debate. Volkova chronicles an exchange that took place during a 
roundtable discussion in Tiraspol (October 15, 1989) with local residents, journalists, and 
intellectuals from Moldovan Academy of Sciences in attendance. At this point the situation had 
reached "crisis" proportions, with seemingly no plausible alternatives to an autonomous republic 
(Volkova 2005: 30, 31). During the roundtable, a representative from the academy of sciences 
intoned that the idea of restoring autonomy was against the constitution of the MSSR, whose 
formation automatically liquidated all autonomous republics on its territory — Soviet law 
provided no basis for forming an autonomous republic. Volkova's narrative positions Soviet 
bureaucracy as thwarting their grassroots efforts and positions the PMR as a corrective. After 
citing arguments both for and against the idea of autonomy, Volkova adds that, "by the way, they 
did not invite opponents from the OSTK."166 Those who disagreed could not even participate.   
 Exclusion and marginalization remained powerful tropes for left-bank residents. A series 
of appeals printed in a local newspaper, Trudovoy Tiraspol, opposed the results of a local 
referendum to decisions made by the Moldovan Supreme Soviet in Chișinău.   
As is known, the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the republic did not meet our hopes.  
The Supreme Soviet not only did not listen to the opinion of 80,000 Tiraspol residents 
who expressed their opinion in a city-wide poll, but did not even deign to reflect in its 
decisions on the main provisions of the platform of the CPSU for nationality policy under 
the contemporary conditions. (cited in Volkova, 2005: 38-39).   
 
Far from discouraging left-bank residents, this lack of acknowledgment set in motion an 
agitation campaign that sought to rectify the concerns that the Supreme Soviet would not.  
 OSTK printed up 200,000 copies of a bulletin about the referendum and distributed them 
to regional work collectives and factories. The rise of the OSTK as a force in organizing 
referenda transformed the organization into a broad-based movement. As the referenda continued 
                                                
166 OSTK’s leader, Igor Smirnov became the president of the PMR, a position he held until December 2011. Anna 
Volkova was one of Smirnov’s closest advisors. 
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and Moldovan authorities ignored their results, the terms of the conflict shifted. "They [the 
referenda] demonstrated the willingness of the people to free expression, to the possibility of 
independently influencing state policy, and thus determining their own destiny and the destiny of 
their loved ones" (Volkova 2005: 45). It was no longer about making disagreement known. 
 For left-bank residents, referenda created a mandate to oppose moves taken by 
Chișinău.167 The subsequent strike campaign (August and September 1989) that crippled the 
MSSR (organized by OSTK) became the basis for the 1990 elections in the MSSR that further 
set Chișinău and Tiraspol in opposition (Mason 2009). With fears of Romanian reunification 
looming and the Transnistrian narod asserting itself democratically through referenda, the 
question of exactly who was separating from what became a matter of perspective.    
 Today, referenda are invoked as a means of expressing dissatisfaction with a stalled path 
for recognition. During an interview with an academic at a local university, we were discussing 
an ongoing (2009) conflict between the PMR legislature and its president. Many of the same 
organizations from 1989 had mobilized once again (though with significantly less support) for 
the purposes of defending Transnistria’s long-ruling president against a legislature composed 
largely of pro-business forces.168 These mobilizations included gathering signatures to dismiss 
the Supreme Soviet, organizing pickets (sparsely attended), and calling for a referendum on the 
future of the legislative body itself. My interlocutor spoke of how there is a selective 
politicization of politics insofar as certain decisions are not brought to a referendum.169 For some 
decisions, he explained, it is not necessary to ask the will of the people. These civil society 
                                                
167 Both in 1989 and today, left-bank residents associated the Romanian flag with the period of German fascist 
occupation.  The linkage between Romanian nationalism and German fascist should be seen both as a product of the 
Soviet cult of the Great Patriotic War and of contemporary re-signification for political purposes after 1989.  Despite 
apparent moves toward Romania, unification never enjoyed widespread popularity in Moldova (King 2000: 147). 
168 The Supreme Soviet is the highest legislative body in the PMR. 
169 He cited the current version of the constitution that, in his words, afforded the president the powers of a monarch. 
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activists [obshchvenniki] had made a farce of themselves and of politics. Their actions – parading 
around, holding pickets, and not even knowing what they were protesting – constituted the 
actions of unsophisticated individuals, of people doing the bidding of others. Then, in the early 
1990s, he stressed, the existence of the region as an independent polity was at stake. Today 
disputes centered on how to divide authority, rents, and the spoils of “independence.”  
 This particular dispute was about limiting the power of the president, the process for 
replacing ministers and clarifying the duties of the vice president. When I asked what they were 
protesting, one elderly man responded that they were against the Supreme Soviet, against 
oligarchs.   
We are against the Supreme Soviet, against oligarchs. You know what an oligarch is? 
The oligarchs are masked; we need to show who they really are. The Supreme Soviet is 
changing the will of the people by trying to change the constitution [limiting the 
president's powers]. But the constitution was adopted by the narod. Therefore, they 
needed to ask the narod from the beginning, and then adopt [the legislation]. 
 
Economic inequality — much of it a direct result of the president’s policy — is a secondary 
concern; their energy is focused on unmasking a hidden presence, oligarchs, who, in addition to 
not revealing “who they really are” are attempting to change the constitution without consulting 
those that adopted it in the first place. Politics create a means to control and order society - the 
spectacle of referenda and its associated rituals gloss over and sanctify a very real inequality. 
Residents can participate in creating state power, but they lack a means to exercise it. This 
protester had internalized the logic of the referendum to the point where all significant political 
decisions must be subject to a referendum. As member of the intelligentsia, the professor quoted 
above was embarrassed; such behavior reflected the low level of cultural development in the 
region. The president’s close advisor, Anna Volkova, brought these protesters, mostly elderly 
activists of the OSTK, together. While some might argue that referenda do not constitute "world 
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historical events" like the revolutions Marx wrote about, the irony of Marx's maxim that events 
happen "first as tragedy, the second time as farce” was not lost on this professor. 
 
Referenda in Context: Then 
 Referenda crystallized a choice to be made between creating a state to save a people or 
embarking on an uncertain future. Left-bank residents believed they had the law on their side. 
“The complexity of the situation lay in the fact that Transnistrians, as supporters of preserving a 
single state - the USSR, had to demonstrate their commitment to the laws of the union level, and 
to act not in an anarchic manner, but rather within the legislative field of the USSR” (Volkova 
2005: 48). The idea of the birth of the PMR as a democratic movement that had challenged the 
ossified structure of the communist party proved durable. One PMR official’s words illustrate 
how referenda functioned as a critique of Soviet power.  
The referendum is just one of the components of politics. This is reflected in the 
Constitutions of the USSR and MSSR. The question then arises: why does the Supreme 
Soviet of the republic not want to take advantage of this right … they are afraid to know 
the truth about the legality of their own decisions. What kind of government fears its own 
narod and isolates them through its criminal shield? This happened ... in the 1930s. One 
may object by saying that all decisions are taken by deputies acting on the behalf of their 
constituents. But show me a people's deputy who could personally say how many voters 
supported him on this or that issue? We only now learned that the people have a right not 
only to work honestly, but also have their own opinion. A referendum will fix the true 
opinion of voters (Volkova 2005: 56).   
 
These words allude to the show trials of the 1930s and posit the referendum as a corrective to 
unresponsive elected officials. More importantly, they offer explanations that evacuate 
complexity and embody a folk psychology in which a mass of people can oppose any decision or 
rescind the institutional credibility of any political representative. This logic of polling the people 
can come to cloud almost any political decision. The liminality of one’s everyday existence is of 
secondary concern to political performances that gloss over an otherwise complicated reality.  
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 Accountability was balanced by a call to not upset existing norms, as evidenced by the 
testimony of an unnamed Moldovan woman below. 
I am a Moldovan. Why do they deprive me of my nationality and want me to quarrel with 
my neighbors and friends? The decision of the Supreme Soviet of the republic [on the 
changing of state symbols] is a gradual accession of Romania. No one will ask whether 
we like it or not. ... How many conversations [must we have] about the national revival, 
but I think that now it is from these "regenerators" that we need to defend the honor and 
dignity of the nation, national pride and culture (Volkova 2005: 63). 
 
For her, the issue is not solely about whether rapprochement with Romania will result in the 
deprivation of one’s nationality, but about accepting decisions made elsewhere. Her opposition is 
an attempt to resist efforts to define the boundaries of an already existing political community 
from beyond. Romania is distant and foreign, while the Soviet categories remain familiar. Why, 
she implicitly asks, must this harmony be upset? Left-bank residents, through periodic 
participation in performances of sovereignty centered around the institution of the referendum, 
actively create a sense of belonging that, though oppositional, remains the primary point of 
identification with the PMR state. 
 
 
Referenda in Context: Now 
 
We need a visible past, a visible continuum, a visible myth of origin to reassure us as to our 
ends, since ultimately we have never believed in them  
 
Jean Baudrillard    
 
 
 
 In response to a question about whether the fact that there had been only one president in 
the PMR since its founding in 1990 hurt or helped its quest for recognition, a deputy from the 
PMR Supreme Soviet responded to the critique of Transnistrian democracy he saw the question 
as alluding to. “I believe that there is more democracy in Transnistria than in America. How 
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many referenda have occurred in the United States?” People, he explained, had approved the 
extension of the president’s term in office.170 “This is democracy,” he said, referring to the act of 
people having a say in the affairs of government, “not like in Congress, where two or three 
hundred decide for the whole country that it will be like this? Where is the democracy — who 
really controls the country, the narod or the three hundred members of Congress?"  
 Referenda create comprehensible means of comparison, in this case the idea that our 
democracy is more direct than yours. Besides highlighting the uniqueness and singularity to the 
region, referenda are communicative salvos directed toward ending the region’s liminality-at-
large. This seemingly infinite deferral – referenda as the basis for an as yet finalized statehood – 
allows for the creation and perpetuation of a political vocabulary for residents. Referenda make 
the abstract concrete insofar as they create active memories and evidence of participation. Their 
results ceaselessly circulate through local media and become the basis of a political vocabulary 
in which the people affirm an independence that does not yet exist. Through participation, 
residents see themselves as taking part in and, to a lesser extent, harnessing these forces that led 
to the creation of “their” republic. 
 Referenda also serve as a platform for local PMR politics. The 2006 referendum became 
a platform for regional political competition as lampposts, walls, and benches as local political 
parties jockeyed to have their symbols and logos placed alongside calls to the referendum. One 
local city council deputy angrily recalled to me how during the 2006 referendum another 
political party had plastered over her banners with their own. She was upset because, in her 
words, she had run around “24 hours a day” putting up flyers for the referendum while a 
younger, upstart political party had simply put their posters up over hers. The 2006 referendum 
                                                
170 Curiously, he used the Russian word for a mass of individuals, lyudy, and not the collective form of the people, 
narod. 
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opened up a space to expend resources in the hopes of attracting voters. Fidelity to the 
referendum as event allows for political subjects who exist in the interstices of the international 
system to be called forth through participation in this performance.171 As a collective political 
body, individuals subjects can only be recognized component of the by professing fidelity and 
performatively affirming PMR statehood - it is a revolutionary act of faith. A referendum is a 
truth event and subsequent political action inspired by it is a kind of “allegiance” to this event.   
 Fidelity to referenda equals to fidelity to the PMR state. One local youth organization had 
trouble receiving permission to hold a political rally in the capital in December 2008. They were 
denied permission because they did not submit the required paperwork within the required 
timeframe of thirty days. Previously, they received permission two or three days before their 
actions. Their press release implicitly conveys this notion of fidelity and the capital it should 
generate in the PMR:  
 Previously, we always easily obtained permission to all of our actions. Sometimes, the 
administration was coming towards us and betrayed them within 2-3 days after 
application. This is understandable, because "Proryv!" is always at the peak of political 
activity and reacts faster than other organizations to events inside and outside the PMR. 
This was the case during the time of the blockade, referendum, different elections, and the 
tragic events in S. Ossetia. When they gave their application for permission to hold the 
march the city administration personally gave their understanding that there wouldn’t be 
any problems with permission and that they could prepare for the event (Proryv press 
release, March 25, 2009). 
 
A roundtable discussion I attended in May 2009 stressed the importance of the referenda in the 
PMR. The roundtable featured delegates from Ukrainian NGOs, United Russia's youth 
organization, and from various PMR political parties and organizations. One deputy in 
attendance, the representative of a party reputed to be under the control of the ministry of state 
                                                
171 Here I am leaning heavily on Badiou’s reading of Paul. “Truth is diagonal relative to every communitarian 
subset; it neither claims authority from, nor (this is obviously the most delicate point) constitutes any identity.” 
(Badiou 2003: 14). 
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security (MGB), spoke of the importance of getting youth involved in politics.172 He spoke about 
how the youth had taken an active role in organizing the referendum in 2006; he remarked that 
just as a party without the support of youth has grim electoral prospects, a state that cannot 
provide for its youth has a dim future. The elder generation, he stressed, had to "work actively" 
to instill patriotism, a thankless task in a region plagued by out-migration and a growing 
population of pensioners. Though the referendum happened nearly three years ago, it was 
invoked as a call to get involved and as a reminder of work to be done.   
 The 2006 referendum offered material benefits and rewards. One student told of how 
activists from a local political party offered students ten dollars to put up posters before the 
referendum. She stressed that for poor students, this was a powerful motivating factor. 
Performing and participating in PMR sovereignty can be carried out by both interested and 
disinterested individuals each to their own benefit. For some, participation fulfills an ideological 
or patriotic purpose, ultimately reinforcing an increasingly difficult subject position in a state of 
non-recognition, while for others it is simply a matter of money.   
 Other visible manifestations of civil society in the PMR are organized through similar 
cash transactions. While there may be a core of interested people who willingly participate, it 
was not abnormal to encounter blank stares when I asked participants about the goals of a 
particular event. Besides being met with confused looks, I was once questioned about when 
participants would receive payment or food.173 In the PMR and in the wide post-Soviet world, 
politics as image has replaced the stable ideological environment of the Soviet period. Gone is 
                                                
172 This particular party, Narodnaya Volya, The People’s Will, takes its name from a left-wing radical organization 
that successfully assassinated Tsar Alexander II in 1881. The party is the vehicle of a single person, a former KGB 
agent who came to Transnistria in August 1992 as a volunteer and subsequently became involved in state security 
and helped to found the official press agency of the PMR, Olvia Press. He served as a deputy in the PMR Supreme 
Soviet for more than a decade, and is a graduate of the KGB leadership school. 
173 In the PMR, the minimum “benefit” for political rallies is usually transportation, food, and a small participation 
fee. 
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the task of building socialism and strengthening the friendship of the peoples. The world of press 
releases and a carefully crafted montage of images depicting a vibrant political community can 
be created on the basis of material gain. These manifestations offer insight on what 
representational forms and practices arise when there is no clear legal or sovereign jurisdiction.  
 During exchanges with foreign journalists, diplomats, or researchers, referenda become 
obstacles to any lasting settlement, since any agreement must take their results into account. One 
article from the Moldovan news agency Infotag offers an example of this phenomenon. A 225-
word news item headlined "Transnistria Not Going to Become Part of Moldova," describes a 
meeting between the Deputy Foreign Minister of the PMR, Sergei Simonenko, with a group of 
Finnish journalists.174 After a cursory discussion of the "fairly complicated" relationship between 
Tirasol and Chișinău, Simonenko mentions the PMR's external priorities, namely “further 
strengthening of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic's independence and development of 
relations with Russia, which was approved by 97% participants in the 2006 referendum.” This 
periodic recitation illustrates how the PMR state is dependent upon referenda and on the 
participation of the narod. The 2006 referendum is the most recent performative manifestation of 
the PMR’s longstanding struggle for independence and its desire for closer relations with Russia.  
 The 2006 referendum provided both an opportunity to participate in politics and a means 
of showing outsiders that, contrary to popular belief, there is a Transnistrian narod and they 
freely take part in the affairs of state; the results of their participation constitute PMR foreign 
policy. The holders of sovereignty in the PMR, having declared independence in 1990, are still 
trying to clarify it to themselves and to the outside world two decades later.  
                                                
174 “Transnistria not going to become part of Moldova,” Infotag News Agency, February 11, 2009. 
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 The wording of the 2006 referendum points to the fundamental contradiction at the heart 
of the PMR.175 Does the PMR truly desire independence and recognition, or is the whole state 
project a charade in which PMR authorities pretend to be a state for the sake of appearances? If 
people stopped believing (and participating) in the PMR, what effects would it have? The first 
question on the referendum affirmed the independence of the PMR and asked about a subsequent 
“free association” with Russia, while the second asked residents whether they wished to 
renounce the independence of the PMR (the subject of the first question) and become part of 
Moldova. In essence, voters were asked to confirm two separate things: the independence of the 
PMR (already an reality for residents in the region) and a free association with the Russian 
Federation. The first part of the question, the independence of the PMR, was achieved long 
ago.176 The second question, the “free association” with the Russian federation, is the 
culmination of a concerted effort to position the region and its residents in the Russian political 
topography. In the context of the conscious effort by elites and state institutions to adopt 
“Russian standards,” to accept Russian humanitarian aid on behalf of the region’s pensioners, to 
allow the stationing of Russian peacekeeping troops, and to accept (but not pay for) subsidized 
natural gas from Russia, the referendum’s positioning of Russia as a possible confederation 
partner can be seen as wishful thinking. Having no basis in fact (and vehemently denied by the 
Russian Foreign Ministry and President Medvedev), this expression is the cumulative result of 
institutions and ideologies that cultivate paints Transnistria and its residents as Russians in every 
way possible. This shift to a discourse dominated by all things Russian is akin to an acceptance 
of the lack of a valid subject position: they have a choice between subjection to Moldova or 
freedom with Russia. 
                                                
175 For a text of the referendum, see above. 
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 Residents have been conditioned to think of themselves as living on Russian land and as 
living in a state that exists thanks to the goodwill of Russia; the specter of Romanianization has 
foreclosed any developmental path that leads through Moldova and Europe. Likewise with 
Ukraine, which since the Orange revolution has been seen locally as a puppet regime of the 
United States. Unlike South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the PMR lacks contiguity with the Russian 
Federation. Instead, the PMR has made the case historically, legally, and rhetorically, that they 
belong within this reconstituted Russian sphere of influence. Lacking physically proximity to 
Russia, they are left to act “as if” they belong and hope that their message is received and 
reciprocated in Moscow and beyond. 
 
Marshaling the Virtual: Publics, Politics, and People 
 The events in Transnistria offer a unique perspective on how questions of loss and 
belonging can be transformed into a defiant "will of the people" via referenda and other political 
activities. That these events are unacknowledged outside the region is unproblematic for 
residents and only serves to reinforce the idea of Transnistrians as a narod constituted under 
pressure whose aspirations and desires lie outside of any Western paradigm of democracy or 
normative framework. The PMR’s unique history allows residents to view the PMR as a 
democratic state formed through the will of the people. 
 Today, historiography and referenda constitute nodal points that have, through self-
referentiality, heightened a sense of destiny that permeates the region. Undeterred by more than 
two decades of non-recognition, the struggles, blockades, and assertions of independence have 
only further refined the Transnistrian narod. Having domesticated Soviet internationalism, the 
                                                                                                                                                       
176 One regular informant told me that he tells foreigners who do not believe in the PMR to look at the border they 
just crossed; the borders of the PMR are an objective fact despite only having a de facto status. 
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PMR has transformed the region into a means of at least partially satisfying otherwise unfulfilled 
political wishes and desires. 
 PMR state officials give voice to the idea of a Transnistrians as a people forged under 
extreme external pressure. In response to a question posed by journalists from the BBC Russian 
Service on the subject of "What does it mean to be a Transnistrian," the vice-president of the 
PMR Alexander Korolev's response illustrates the principle by which tragedy and difficulties 
create the objective conditions for the realization of the Transnistrian narod.   
Over the past 18 years [since Transnistria has declared its independence of Moldova], 
they [Moldova] made a new people of us by means of various blockades and oppressions. 
Ethnically, we are Russians, Ukrainians, Moldovans. But by our essence, we are a 
different nation - with our own culture, a short but tragic history marked with bloodshed 
and confrontation. And we are the only territory where the Moldovan language has 
remained. It does not exist anywhere else. Besides, we are the only territory in the entire 
post-Soviet area where nation-wide referenda were held: we had 7 such polls (Infotag, 
February 16, 2009).  
 
Nationality is a component of a larger cultural assemblage and the distinctiveness that resulted 
from the blockades, oppression, bloodshed, and confrontation. Having held seven referenda, the 
PMR is a bastion of notion of democracy. Referenda are a foundational expression of the will of 
the people.  
 One article from the Russian newspaper Kommersant talks of a local television 
personality asking female students in the run up to the referendum whether they knew "that 
Russia is the only country that provided us with aid during the economic blockade177?" (Zygar 
and Solovyev 2006). Aid from the largely self-imposed (virtual) blockade is positioned in the 
public's consciousness as a reason to vote for the Russian option. 
                                                
177 The economic blockade is addressed in more detail in chapter four. Essentially, Moldova’s changing of the 
customs regime forced economic enterprises that exported through Ukraine to re-register in Chisinau to receive 
permission. This regulatory shift occurred in response to the demands of the European Union to regulate the 
Moldovan economy as a result of EU trade preferences for Moldovan goods. 
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 The referendum was a time for reflecting on the PMR’s founding from the perspective of 
its patron, Russia. Viktor Alksnis, a Duma deputy, spoke of the PMR as originating from 
geopolitical concerns that arose as the Soviet Union dissolved and not from the will of residents.   
It all started at the beginning of the 1990s with the so-called Lukyanov doctrine 
[Lukyanov was the last Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR], which was 
developed by a Union group of parliament members. I was one of the authors of the 
doctrine. In essence, it gave Russia the opportunity to maintain its influence throughout 
the former Soviet Union. That could be attained only be supporting separatist sentiments 
in former Soviet republics, thus creating so-called hot spots …  
 
How things have changed since we thought it up … I remember the beginning of the 
1990s. There was enthusiasm then. There was the feeling of revolution. The feeling of 
victory in war… Now, there is nothing left of that and things have changed a lot. Now 
money decides everything. It's too bad about the people. (Viktor Alksnis, quoted in Zygar 
and Solovyev 2006).   
 
In Alksnis' own words, the people are props. Far from characterizing the early 1990s as a 
harbinger of chaos, the crazy nineties [likhie devianostye], they were a time of enthusiasm. He 
speaks from a subject position that believes that if these revolutionary sentiments could only 
have gained traction, things could have been different. Idealism is a welcome repose from the 
logic of capital and money that now determine the contours of “everything.”178   
 In the months before the 2006 referendum, local economic enterprises privatized by 
Russian investors came together and founded a political organization called "For Unity with 
Russia," headed by the then-PMR foreign Minister Valery Litskai. During my interview with 
Litskai in 2009, he spoke of how the influx of Russian capital shapes and influences the specific 
forms “politics” takes. As he explained it, the plot makes for a second-rate political thriller 
without murder or sex. At some point before an election, money changes hands and a new 
“grassroots" organization emerges. Professional consultants — “political technologists" — arrive 
from Moscow, Kiev, or beyond. Professionally designed posters and paid canvassers appear. 
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Public rallies are organized, and television is suddenly inundated with stories of the upcoming 
election, preceded in this case by a referendum. Perhaps the town’s public address system is 
turned on, and a monotone voice exhorts people on the streets to decide their fate, to decide 
between a future with Russia or with Moldova.  
 In the run-up to the referendum, the streets were plastered with posters and people wore t-
shirts advertising the referendum. Cruising cars with booming loudspeakers exhorted residents to 
participate. But despite this over determination, confusion emerged as to whether or not the 
decision could actually be realized, for many details have not been finalized.  
Some think that we'll hold a referendum and tomorrow we will ask to become part of 
Russia … I explain that this can't be done now. We cannot issue any decrees about 
joining Russia! The experience of the European Union shows that 10-15 years are needed 
for integration processes and only then is it possible to join it. We are at the beginning of 
the road …  [responding to a question as to why the voters were not aware of the delay 
between the vote and joining Russia] … Nobody asked when we will unite. So there was 
no need to write that. If they had asked me, I would have told them. But they didn't ask. 
They go around me, whisper quietly and don't ask. Our party will explain it to people. We 
will answer for the pro-Russian position because immediately after the referendum we 
will start to talk about the time periods. We will write position pieces. There are no 
deadlines on the calendar. If we reach the Russian standard of living in half a year, those 
problems will be solved in that time. If we could bring a few tens of billions of dollars 
with us to Russia, they would take us instantly (Valery Litskai, quoted in Zygar and 
Solovyev 2006). 
 
Organized, directed, and executed by the same state institutions and individuals that benefit from 
the economic and political ties with Russia, the referendum was more about the PMR 
leadership’s need to proclaim its fealty to Russia than to assert its independence. Still, residents 
remain hopeful. Loyalty to Russia provides pensioners with an additional monthly pension 
supplement in addition to a sense of belonging that did not denigrate Soviet accomplishments. I 
am reminded of Philip K. Dick's quote that "reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, 
doesn't go away." While many know that the PMR will not join Russia, they still go and vote for 
                                                                                                                                                       
178 Here it is useful to recall the words of Prime Minister Tarlev: “scientists say different things depending on who 
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it. They know full well whether or not they vote for it the reality will not change — they know 
what they believe in is irrelevant: what matters is participation. 
 Occurring a few months before presidential elections in the PMR, the 2006 referendum 
gave incumbent president Smirnov a platform to show he was strengthening ties with Russia in 
order to obtain the recognition that has eluded the region since 1990. Oddly enough, the 
referendum raised a contradiction vis-à-vis the state itself. One can argue that the 2006 
referendum violates the PMR’s own laws, since the constitution proclaims (in the way that all 
foundational documents performatively do) that the PMR is a sovereign, independent state.179 
Pragmatic concerns trumped the cultivated façade of state seeking de jure sovereignty whose de 
facto status is, perhaps now, more vulnerable than ever. To prolong the incumbency of the 
PMR’s founding father, one of the foundational tenets of the PMR as a state — its independence 
— is first reconfirmed, reasserted, and now a visible fiction. And while Moldova is the loser in 
this referendum, the referendum clearly shows how much the PMR’s vanquished enemy remains 
the acknowledged object of its political affections.  
 Subsequent exchanges serve to extend this drama. A December 2009 meeting between 
Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin and his PMR counterpart Igor Smirnov was brief and 
unproductive.180 Voronin traveled to Tiraspol, where he presented Smirnov with Moldovan 
proposals for resuming negotiations, establishing spheres for expert groups, and creating the 
proper conditions for the free movement of people, goods, and capital. In response, Smirnov 
reminded Voronin that over the previous years of negotiations, numerous documents have been 
signed “but none of them has been fulfilled by the Moldovan side,” including agreements 
                                                                                                                                                       
pays them.” 
179 For more on the performativity of fundamental documents, see Jaques Derrida’s “Declarations of Independence” 
in Derrida 2002: 46-54. 
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stipulating that negotiations be held on equal-rights terms and without resorting to “an economic 
blockade.”181 In response to Voronin’s gift, Smirnov gave him the results of the 2006 
referendum.  
 Referenda are a means of creating and continuing politics as ritual, with the results serving 
as an object around which even more rituals and prolongations can be organized.182 In the 
context of the unresolved conflict, referenda are both a performance of sovereignty and a means 
of agreeing to disagree, with the logic being that we Transnistrians conducted referendums, the 
people spoke, and as their leader I must take this into account. It follows that since your country 
has not held a single referendum, you have no mandate. This ritual and ceremonial exchange of 
documents reinforces the community.  
 Much like the distinctive material processes of the Soviet Union created the base upon 
which the PMR would later emerged, performances like referenda make the abstract concrete 
insofar as they allow politics to be made visible. In the PMR, individuals socialized in the Soviet 
Union still operate under many of the same political constraints that existed in the late-Soviet 
period (Yurchak 2005) and remain receptive to its semiotic, symbolic, and practical forms.  
 For left-bank residents who experienced the “bloody summer” of 1992 (or who learned 
about it as part of a civic education), there is something vital at stake, the life of the narod (more 
on this biological existence in chapter four). Giving a speech to a largely empty exposition 
pavilion in Moscow for the opening of the PMR”s annual trade show and cultural exhibit, 
                                                                                                                                                       
180 Information about this event comes from both field notes and local (Moldovan and Transnistrian) media.  For a 
brief overview, see Infotag’s daily digest from December 24, 2008. 
181 “There really were a lot of variants. If we start recollecting all of them, there will be no use in holding 
negotiations. I don't believe you like you don't believe me. But being state officials, we must discuss the problem. I 
am accepting your documents and will pass them to the Supreme Soviet and public organizations for consideration,” 
(Igor Smirnov, quoted in Infotag, December 24, 2008). 
182 The Russian verb krutit’sia is perhaps an appropriate way to describe referenda, since the root krut- relates to 
situations of twisting, screwing, wringing things, money, satisfaction, or information out of people or a situation.  
For more, see Pesman 2000, chapter 9, "If you want to Live, You've Got to Krutit'sia: Crooked and Straight." 
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“Transnistrian Days in Moscow,” PMR President Smirnov declared to the more than seven 
hundred Transnistrians who travelled with the delegation from Tiraspol that “this is all necessary 
so that we remember that the Transdniestrian people cannot be killed. It has always been the case 
they we were in the edge of cultures, and now NATO's task is clear – to squeeze out our identity 
and show us how to live. But, in last autumn's referendum, our people said we want to develop 
along with Russia.” (Igor Smirnov, quoted in Solovyev 2007).183 This same threat of death, 
visualized through memorial books and photographs of the violated corpse, is reconstituted 
through referenda that show that the narod will not be cowed, killed, or otherwise forced to live 
in a particular way. 
 
                                                
183 The annual “Transnistrian Days in Moscow” is an annual event that is part cultural exposition, part 
trade/investment forum. Transnistria’s large delegation was largely met with stares and, it is intimated, 
embarrassment. Expecting to be received with open arms and important Moscow and Russian officials, they were 
largely ignored and relegated to a distant corner of the exposition pavilion. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
BESPREDEL AND BELONGING: BODIES, POLITICS, AND PUBLICS 
 
 
 
China is a civilization trying to be a state, Saudi Arabia is a family business disguised as a state, 
Israel is a faith inscribed in a state – and who knows what Moldova is? 
 
       Clifford Geertz, “Politics in Complicated Places”  
 
 
 
 
In a modern way of knowing, there have to be images for something to become “real.” … For a 
war, an atrocity, a pandemic … to become a subject of large concern, it has to reach people 
through the various systems (from television and the Internet to newspapers and magazines) that 
diffuse photographic images to millions. 
              
  Susan Sontag, “On Photography (the short course)” 
 
 
 
The whole question of politics – who gets to do what to whom?   
V. I. Lenin 
 
 
“When the war began, there arose the necessity for political activity,” Victor explained to 
me in his office, located in the same building that houses the Tiraspol office of the OSCE 
(Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), the international organization charged 
with monitoring the Transnistrian conflict. A former deputy minister in the PMR during the 
initial period after the war with Moldova, I knew Victor as someone who loved to tell stories, 
ones in which he usually emerged as the most intelligent, level-headed figure. This statement, 
coming from a fifty-something scientist cum politician cum businessman who was hounding me, 
the foreigner, for prospective business partners, struck me as odd. While he agreed to my 
interview request in the hopes of drumming up investors, he seemed intrigued by the chance to 
tell his story about his role in the development of the PMR. Our interview was long and ranged 
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from science and technology (he claimed to have patented a method for effortlessly removing the 
snow from Moscow streets in the winter) to his biography. He was originally from Siberia, from 
a family of voennye, military servicemen, who enjoyed a privileged position in the Soviet Union. 
After their service, voennye received perks that others waited decades for like apartments, 
durable goods, and land. People like Victor and their families made up a not insignificant portion 
of the Transnistrian population, Soviet loyalists who resettled in the region and worked in its 
booming postwar military-industrial complex.   
At first it was an engineering elite. This region was very developed. Here [in left-bank 
Moldova] many enterprises were located with a Union-wide significance. The industrial 
intelligentsia was very well developed, all of whom were very powerful leaders [in the 
Soviet sense of being able to marshal people, resources, and labor]. In that time nobody 
engaged in politics. It was impossible to engage in. There was one party, Marx, Lenin, 
forward! Nothing more. But when a fried rooster bites you in the ass,184 war began, and 
then we needed to do something, we had to protect ourselves. Should we pack our 
suitcase and leave? Why? Because somebody stupid comes and says I want to control 
everything, it is all mine. When the war began, there arose the necessity for political 
activity.   
 
These words only struck me later when I began thinking about how this question of violence 
figured into the origin of the PMR as a polity. This chapter focused on the bodies produced by 
the 1992 armed conflict with Moldova. Understanding the events of 1992 is vital to 
understanding the PMR’s relative success as a lasting, if unrecognized, polity, for while this 
“undeclared war” authorizes the political community, it is the practices and perceptions 
surrounding the images of those killed that afford it legitimacy in the eyes of residents. 
 A few weeks after my interview with Victor, I conducted an interview with an elderly 
man, Boris, who was involved in the initial strike movement that led to political disengagement 
                                                
184 The Russian idiom kogda zharenyi petukh v zhope kliunul (когда жареный петух в жопе клюнул) means 
experiencing something difficult or troublesome, or finding oneself in an extremely difficult situation. 
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with Moldova. As our conversation shifted from a discussion of his organization, OSTK185 to the 
current political situation, he began to speak animatedly about provocations from the Moldovan 
side. Even though we were discussing the present and the future, he remained fixated on the past. 
He mentioned anti-Russian actions and provocations organized by Moldovan authorities: 
deputies beaten on the streets in Chișinău and women dragged by their hair from government 
buildings.186 As he spoke of these events, his voice trailed off and, his train of thought was 
interrupted, as if he became momentarily distracted. Next, he calmly mentioned "one woman … 
in fact, I have photographs."  
At this point he opened up a drawer in his desk and took out some black-and-white 
photographs of dead bodies. The desk drawer contained hundreds of photographs, including 
duplicates. Why were these photographs sitting in the desk drawer? What purposes did they 
serve? As I looked at the pictures, I was disgusted yet fixated. The “one woman” he mentioned 
looked to be in her early 20s; she had her ears cut off, he calmly told me. Pregnant at the time of 
her attack, she was raped and murdered. Her husband, he continued, had his penis cut off. As he 
calmly handed me a picture of her husband, his eyes widened with emotion: “What could we 
do?” he repeated, shaking his head while at the same time looking for some sort of 
acknowledgment from me.  “Horrible,” I replied flatly, not wanting to appear stoic in the face of 
such horror. While the pictures themselves haunted me, what struck me was how they were used 
– they framed his reality. For Boris, these photographs were a reminder of what could occur if 
                                                
185 OSTK, the Russian acronym for the United Work Collective Council, was formed in response to the Moldovan 
language law in 1989. The organization led the political movement for the independence of Transnistria. 
186 For more on this violence, see ‘TRANSNISTRIA ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT: Transnistrian crisis: 
human dimension December 2008 – February 2009’  http://gppac.net/page.php?id=2294 Accessed October 22, 
2010. 
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one was not vigilant. They captured why left-bank residents responded the way they did, why 
they rose up and asserted their rights.187     
This chapter looks at bodies and the role they play in state-building practices in the PMR. 
Building on the idea that photographs offer a means of creating references for their audience, it 
looks at how warfare relates to the image. Since its inception, photography has been used to 
shape perceptions. From Mathew Brady’s staged civil war photographs to well known Soviet 
manipulation (Stalin would have enemies of the people excised from official photographs), the 
staging, manipulation, and outright removal of images is increasingly relevant in our hyper-
mediated world where a quick edit in Photoshop can create headlines across the world. The 
captions attributed to photographs play a key role in reception. For example, photographs of a 
1905 pogrom in Imperial Russia circulated in France under a caption attributing the scene to 
German atrocities (Macdonald 2007: 19). During the Russo-Finnish War, an unnamed editor 
wanted newsreel footage of the Soviets bombing the Finns; unable to find a single frame from 
Finland, he used footage from the Spanish Civil War and hoped nobody would notice the 
absence of snow (Macdonald 2007: 20). I do not argue that the images discussed in this chapter 
are false or staged. Rather, I look at images and their reception to explore how the bodies 
produced by this conflict are appropriated by the PMR state and disseminated to its political 
subjects in a variety of registers and genres.  
These narratives of victimization and aggression offer individuals a means of making 
sense of the region’s liminality-at-large and their still-unsettled experiences while at the same 
time creating an inchoate community of belonging – They did this to us. The photographs 
viscerally transpose and condense political issues into emotional ones: either you acknowledge 
this occurred or you do not. When these photos were pressed into my hand, I was struck by the 
                                                
187 I have attached some of these photographs in Appendix A along with translations. 
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role played by these images of death.188 Death, unflinchingly portrayed, served as a common 
anchor for residents of the region. Academics working under the auspices of the PMR state 
reproduced these images in a particular genre of memorial books both to publicize the conflict 
amongst other Russian-speaking populations and to instill a sense of belonging amongst 
residents.189 As a foreigner, I was pressed into acknowledging these images as truth and as 
reality, for only then could I begin to understand why the PMR existed. Time and time again I 
was told that only after acknowledging them could I begin to understand how and why the 
Transnistrian people rose up and formed a state to protect their rights.   
This genre of memorial books constitutes an important link in how statehood is 
performed locally. This became clear to me during a discussion with a student from the local 
university. A visiting political scientist asked her about recent stories intimating that the Russian 
President Medvedev was close to resolving the Transnistrian conflict. When he asked about the 
prospects for settlement, she calmly stated that these two states, Moldova and Transnistria, 
cannot unite for the simple reason that Moldova is a “state that kills women and children.” As I 
mentioned this to her later, she told me about the history books and the stories that were a part of 
her civic education. Despite the fact that she considered herself apolitical, her views were rooted 
emotionally in these pictures and the reality they portrayed. While she could and would speak 
about how corrupt the PMR political elite was, she did not have a vocabulary with which to 
                                                
188 At the time of the conflict the state produced numerous videos about the conflict.  One video, Chronicle of an 
Undeclared War, produced six months after the war, appears to be a Soviet-era documentary of the region.  Two 
minutes into the video, after introducing the region and showing its peaceful inhabitants voting in a referendum, 
there is a shot of a bullet-riddled window and ominous narration about the ‘first blood spilled.’ As the camera pans 
to the body, it zooms in and out on the wounds.  This technique is repeated with other bodies, even going so far as to 
show close-ups of maggots eating bodies dumped in shallow graves.  Twice during the film the cameraman 
approaches waiting refrigerated trucks containing bodies and calmly shows a man opening the trucks and displaying 
the haphazardly stacked bodies.  Viewing this film, one has the sense that whoever made it knew that the bodies 
were important at the moment of filming, and that their importance would only increase in the future. 
189 A similar book was published about the 2008 war in South Ossetia, documenting the Ossetian and Russian 
victims. 
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oppose these images of death. Vis-à-vis Moldova, which has largely not acknowledged the war, 
in the PMR the conflict and its dead are, in the words of one high-ranking bureaucrat, “cement” 
for the state. This use of a constructivist metaphor literally and figuratively stresses the 
importance of the conflict for the state project. Recognition from a state, even an unrecognized 
one, can be a powerful anchor of belonging, all the more so when loss remains the defining 
experience of the post-Soviet period.190 
 
Bespredel and Disorder: Death Porn in the post-Soviet media191 
One Russian word that I encountered throughout fieldwork was bespredel, a word that 
can simultaneously connote disorder, chaos, lack of restraint, or the absence of shared rules or 
laws. What many in the West saw as a "transition" from a planned economy to a capitalist one, 
the average post-Soviet citizen experienced as disorder. The dissolution of the pervasive Soviet 
state and its institutions, practices, and ideology were condensed into a trope of loss that 
continues to frame the post-Soviet experience (Oushakine 2009). With the emergence of 
“freedom” and “democracy” came the radical expansion of media, with television, newspapers, 
and consumerism filling the gaping void left by the communist ideology.  
Democracy and capitalism only seemed to amplify social problems that were kept in 
check under communism, as the widespread impoverishment of the Russian population 
coincided with a severe increase of mortality (Russia had the highest death rate in 2002, and its 
murder rate was third to South Africa and Colombia) (Popov 2007: 47). At the level of spectacle, 
                                                
190 Moldova’s veterans of the 1992 conflict receive measly pensions, if they are acknowledged by the state at all, 
while Transnistria actively supports veterans financially and socially. Transnistrian veterans are referred to as 
“Defenders of Transnistria.” 
191 Death porn has become a slang term for the material found on the internet that is intended to induce a titillating 
sense of revulsion among viewers, to “gross them out.” Pictures/videos of dead bodies, horrible accidents, or blood 
and guts can all be classified as death porn. Death porn can be politicized. In Russia, skinheads and Chechen 
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the press and television dwelled at length upon these and other visible indicators of decline. 
Uncertainty about the future led to a fixation on disorder — bespredel emerged as a standard 
journalistic trope in the post-Soviet space. While not directly related to the particulars of 
Transnistria and Moldova, death porn as a genre and the way its publicizes death plays a 
prominent role in how the post-Soviet subject relates to concepts of order and disorder and how 
individuals transposed these notions onto political domain.192 
Russian pop culture reflected this fixation on this violence through a specific genre of 
representation that ceaselessly depicts shocking and scandalous details of post-Soviet life 
without restrain. This excess of sex, violence and bodily functions was driven by anxiety about 
the state of the nation. Lacking any larger teleological narrative capable of orienting the senses 
away from the violence of everyday life, the negative is ceaselessly replayed: “Let us see once 
again what horrifies us every day” (Borenstein: 2008: 18). Previously, during Soviet times, crime 
reporting was censored to the point that it was largely non-existent. When the crime rate 
increased dramatically in the 1990s, fear of crime increased and the media responded in kind.  
Tabloid journalism was not limited to Russian-language media. One English-language 
weekly produced for expatriates in Moscow, the eXile, walked a fine line between legitimate 
investigative journalism and the more hilarious and shocking aspects of life in contemporary 
Russia.193 Each edition of the eXile featured a section called "Death Porn," which featured briefly 
                                                                                                                                                       
insurgents have taken to posting their ambushes and beheadings on the internet. A similar phenomenon happened 
during the wars in Yugoslavia. 
192 For example, one need only think about how the concepts of order/disorder are related to perceptions of Boris 
Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. The former was reviled for presiding over the rise of economic and demographic 
decline, while the latter enjoys immense popularity because of his clean-cut, orderly image. Though this is 
ultimately an artificially-created image, its ability to generate harness populist sentiment should not be 
underestimated. 
193 The eXile was shut down in 2008 for allegedly inciting ethnic hatred. Their covers featured absurd takes on 
Russian themes, such as depicting Putin as a goose-stepping midget in Third Reich regalia on the eve of his second 
term as president. In one notable prank they hired Gorbachev to be a perestroika coordinator for the New York Jets. 
Mark Ames, editor of the eXile, liked to point out that his publication would have been sued out of existence within 
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worded, humorous descriptions of murder, cannibalism, dismemberment, and abuse culled from 
the Russian press.194 "The coverage of violent crime in the Russian media is about far more than 
simply reporting the news: the grisly details, sexualized photographs (usually staged), and sheer 
repetitive content suggest the voyeuristic pleasure and the need for endless, minor variations on a 
limited number of acts that characterize pornography" (Borenstein 2008: 213).195 The population 
of death porn is a result of its capacity to generate pleasure in the reader. When I asked one 
informant about death porn, he replied that people like knowing that bad things happen to other 
people.196 And lest they forget, tabloids reminded ordinary Russians on a daily basis how 
dangerous their world had become.197 
Bespredel formed the social horizon for much of the nineties in the former Soviet Union. 
As a concept that lacks a clear beginning, middle, and end, bespredel offered a means of making 
sense of the profound transformations engulfing the former Soviet Union. Whether used to 
describe the politics of the Yeltsin era or provocations taken by the Moldovan side in the early 
1990s, bespredel remained an orienting frame of their experience. The unmaking of the Soviet 
                                                                                                                                                       
weeks of appearing in any Western democracy, but that the Russian elite was too busy stealing and killing to care 
about them. 
194 Each Death Porn story came affixed with little cartoon pictures, which told you what kind of story elements to 
expect in the tale you were reading: a Far-Side-ean screaming old woman to indicate "Cries for Help Ignored," a 
piece of Swiss cheese to indicate "Riddled With Bullets," a turkey for "Carved Up Like a Turkey." Worse still, the 
stories were narrated with an unabashed voyeuristic glee that even the most progressive of our readers couldn't 
endorse publicly. Whoever was writing this stuff clearly got off on what he was doing (Ames and Taibbi 2000: 71). 
195 I am reminded by Sebald’s description of the aerial bombing of Germany.  Sebald writes of survivors, for whom 
words could not represent the destruction they witnessed.  More tellingly, Sebald recalls a teacher  who as a boy 
often saw photographs of corpses from the firestorms lying in the street circulate behind the counter of a secondhand 
bookstore in Hamburg, “to be fingered and examined in a way usually reserved for pornography.” (Sebald 2003: 98) 
196 Tabloid journalism is often referred to by the term chernukha. Chernukha is a slang term that came into use in the 
late 1980s to describe an unrelenting negativity and pessimism in the arts and mass media in the Soviet Union. The 
word itself is based on the word for ‘black’ [cherny] and marks a rejection of the enforced optimism of the official 
Soviet ideology. In film and fiction, chernukha is a cross between pulp fiction and exploitation cinema. As a genre, 
it focuses one’s attention on bodily functions, sexuality, and sadistic violence. Human relations are reduced to 
questions of survival and domination. Eliot Borenstein, ‘Chernukha’ in Encyclopedia of Russian History, ed. James 
R. Millar (Farmington, MI: Thomson/Gale, 2004), 242. 
197 The daily reports of murders, rapes, and cannibalism constituted bespredel as an endless flow, a process 
consisting of infinite iterations of the same horrific acts. As a function of the daily crime chronicle, bespredel is 
 132 
world spelled the displacement of the Russophone elite in favor of Moldovans who had long 
viewed themselves as second-class citizens in their homeland.198 Despite its own lack of form, 
bespredel shaped this amorphous anxiety.  
The images that circulated in the hands of my informants and on the pages of state-
sponsored memorial books constituted an emerging form of sentiment, a way to harness affect 
and create a community based on a collective trauma. The repetition of this trauma only served 
to reopen the literal wounds on the collective political body and highlight the incapacity to 
respond to it. As both Victor and Boris intimated, only a state could properly respond to this. By 
ceaselessly replaying the 1992 conflict with Moldova as trauma, the PMR creates a political 
subject for whom the photographs, complemented by documentary films and other associated 
memorial literature, “prove” the state’s reason for existence. When seen in the context of the 
chronology of events that led to the outbreak of violence, photographs offer an unchallengeable 
record that serve as the basis for belonging.199 When visually confronted with the death, 
brutality, and disorder they unleashed upon us, the question of politics and protection answers 
itself. In Boris’ words, "what can protect our rights, the rights of us as citizens – what is capable 
of protecting citizens' rights? Only a state can defend and protect these rights…" 
The bespredel and violence of the early nineties created the impetus to form a state to 
protect residents. After the violence had ended, those who would later come to head the PMR 
(and who would benefit immensely from its existence) required a reason for the state project to 
continue. After all, peace was secured in 1992, and there has been no subsequent bloodshed — 
                                                                                                                                                       
"without bounds" precisely because it lacks a beginning, middle, and end: all the stories run together into a single, 
nightmare narrative of a Russia that is out of control. (Borenstein 2008: 214). 
198 One memorial book, the White Book of Transnistria, writes about trolleybuses in Chișinău with posters declaring 
“We give you five years not in order to learn the language, but in order for you to leave here.”  On the Supreme 
Soviet in Chișinău anti-Russian and anti-Semitic phrases were written in meter-high Russian letters: “Russians 
beyond the Dnestr [the boundary between Moldovan and Transnistria], Jews into the Dnestr.” 
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the issue of protecting the population from further conflict is thus without merit. Given this lack 
of ongoing violence, it is all the more important that what violence occurred occupy a prominent 
role in the collective experience of the region and its inhabitants. Hence the appropriation and 
circulation of these images of death — if these bodies and their trauma cannot be symbolized, 
then the state becomes all the more important given this lack of resolution. At is clear in chapter 
four, this lack of resolution generates a variety of means of enrichment at the expense of 
residents. 
 
Bodies, Politics, Publics: The Politics of Dead Bodies 
Bodies have played a curious role in politics and sovereign power for centuries. From 
Bodin’s earliest formulations on sovereignty to Ernst Kantorowicz’s (1957) ideas about the 
king’s corpus naturale and the corpus mysticum, the body retains a central role in sovereignty, 
from sovereignty’s indivisible corporality in the form of an absolute monarch to the king’s 
mystical body that could not be destroyed, the body politic. Contemporary biopolitical theories 
(Agamben 1998) show how sovereignty, operating through the structure of the exception, takes 
the lives of citizens into the political realm.200  
Yet when one speaks of the state, corpses are not always what they seem, particularly 
with regard to the bodies of those that perish at the hands of the state. The state is a magical 
entity (Taussig 1997), a curious form that capable of endowing a once-living object with 
supernatural powers. Those who perished at the state’s hands were bestowed with certain 
powers: the corpse of the executed criminal was a “wondrous entity capable of restoring life and 
                                                                                                                                                       
199 Barthes (1981: 34) writes that photography cannot signify except by assuming a mask which, to paraphrase 
Calvino, is a mask which forms the face into the product of a society and of its history. 
200 “The original political relation is the ban (the state of exception as zone of indistinction between outside and 
inside, exclusion and inclusion)” (Agamben 1998: 181). 
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health in sick people” (Taussig 2003: 123). Executions were where the magic happened. The 
substances contained within the bodies of the condemned were capable of generating new 
biological and magical forms. The mandrake plant sprouted where the urine or semen of an 
executed man landed, hence its nickname “little gallows man” (121-122). Bodies and politics 
exist in a symbiotic relationship, with the political authority productively using them and their 
surplus of symbolic meaning (Stepputat 2007, Verdery 1999). 
In The Political Lies of Dead Bodies, Verdery asks, in response to the spate of reburials 
in the post-socialist world, what bodies can do, politically speaking. Her argument is that the 
dead body's importance lies in its materiality.201 In a time of media manipulation and free-
floating simulacra, to have the actual bones in hand is, at some level, comforting. Verdery argues 
that the spate of reburials after socialism is actually a fight over the terms of national identities, 
with bodies serving as physical and ideological weapons. By bringing home (and claiming) 
bodies as national objects, their re-internment as national subjects binds them to the nation in an 
orderly (national) universe. Bodies are also effective symbols for revising the past.202 Their 
movement and circulation in amidst political upheaval reflects anxieties about the magnitude of 
the change that first brought these corpses back to life.  
The different situations in which these photographs (and the memorial books they were 
reproduced in) were impressed upon me led me to reflect upon the conditions of production and 
the issue of audience – by whom and for what purpose did this genre emerge? The conditions 
surrounding my viewing of the photos were rather specific. I came across these books through a 
variety of informants – from professors, from left-bank residents, and from politicians who 
                                                
201 Other examples of note include Lenin’s body (Yurchak n.d.), Rasputin’s undead corpse, and the lost remains of 
the Romanovs.  Other contemporary examples concern the cellphone video of Saddam Hussein’s execution and 
Gaddafi’s last moments, each of which are perhaps as visceral as the photos of the Ceausescus’ last moments. 
 135 
offered them to me as gifts. When others noticed me leafing through these books, many became 
curious and often questioned me about them. Their interest was not feigned — on more than one 
occasion they borrowed them for their own close readings. Left-bank residents would likely 
encounter these photographs in a state-sponsored memorial book or as part of their civic 
education. One acquaintance that worked in a Chișinău museum marveled over the production 
quality and wondered where the money to produce them came from. Another informant, a 
student at a university in Chișinău, remarked that she envied people in Transnistria because they 
have a unitary history compared to a Moldovan historiography with its seemingly endless 
revisions.  
The books, described in detail below, also constituted a forbidden story that could 
potentially spell danger insofar as they showed what truly happened. When one elderly woman 
pressed one into my hands, she whispered that these books show the truth, and that I should be 
careful who I show them to “over there” and to be particularly careful when I cross the border, 
lest I put myself in any sort of danger. The implicit warnings of a kind-mannered elderly woman 
hint at the (actual or potential) political implications of these images. For Transnistrians, these 
books were part of a truth that remained unacknowledged by the world. As a foreigner, it was my 
job to speed these images out of the PMR and allow them to tell their story. I would be 
smuggling images, not contraband, out of Europe’s “black hole.” 
These images and their reproduction for political purposes raise the question of 
materiality and of utility – what can pictures of dead bodies productively do? While their 
productive life forces are gone, their role in sovereignty and the constitution of the polity 
remains. The images of these bodies are not the canvas upon which sovereignty visible makes its 
                                                                                                                                                       
202 Susan Gal’s (1991) analysis the return of Bela Bartok’s remains shows how reburial relates, in the Hungarian 
case, to the discourse about Europe and national identity in the context of late socialism in Hungary. 
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presence known, but actual proof, evidence of the need for a state. Their material physical 
remains — both the bodies themselves and their photographs) are proof of aggression. As images 
they are used in constructing the dominant narrative of PMR statehood, and they are 
appropriately celebrated as ritual objects. These bodies exemplify a particular form 
performativity that has to be re-stated over, and over, and over because it cannot be finalized 
and/or anchored in any institution. Individual bodies can be both the effects of disorder (i.e., as a 
result of crime, alcoholism, accidents) as well as evidence of the need for a state. As Russia and 
other Soviet successor states continue to experience a precipitous demographic decline 
(addressed in detail in chapter four), the symbolic and practical roles played by national bodies 
only increases.203 The dead, dismembered, violated corpses pictured in PMR-sponsored 
memorial books not only point to the loss and disorder, but also its transcendence in the form of 
the PMR.  
 
Picturing Death in the PMR 
An exhaustive discussion of the photographs contained in these memorial books is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. In this section, I look at the two books, Dubăsari: 
Krovotochaschaya Rana Pridnestrov'ya (Dubăsari: Bleeding Wound of Transnistria) (Babilunga 
and Bomeshko 1993a) and Bendery: Rasstrelynnye Nepokorennye (Bender: Shots Unbowed) 
(Babilunga and Bomeshko 1993b) to give the reader a sense of the content and imagery of this 
genre. Ultimately, what I hope to convey is the productive work these images perform in the 
context of the state. In terms of an abstract law or sense of justice, they serve as a means of 
legitimizing certain claims. At the level of emotion, they offer a way of harmonizing affective 
                                                
203 Adriana Petryna’s (2002) work in Ukraine on Chernobyl-related illnesses and national narratives of victimization 
explores how damaged life forms the basis for national sovereignty and citizenship in post-Soviet Ukraine. 
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regimes and sentiments for residents. At the metaphorical level, they create a passive symbolic 
world in which an imperative to recognize the victimization of left-bank residents is equated with 
a recognition of the PMR as a state. 
The selective discussion of photographs that follows is meant to give a sense of the 
imagery, positioning, and content of these memorial books. Typically, each book contains a 
historical overview of the events in question (the two books mentioned above deal with violent 
events in Dubăsari and Bender, two cities that experienced the heaviest fighting over the course 
of the conflict). Each book’s historical narrative contains no references and avoids mentioning 
any other interpretations of events. They are neither traditional history books intended for 
primary of secondary school nor photography books. Their purpose is neither academic nor 
educational, but rather ideological insofar as they produce an uninterrupted narrative on the 
events in question. This ideological thrust is made by taking the most salacious details of those 
killed and presenting them as clinically as possible. 
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Fig 5. Cover of the memorial book Dubăsari: Bleeding Wound of Transnistria (Babilunga and 
Bomeshko 1993a). 
 
 
 
Fig 6. Cover of the memorial book Bender: Shots Unbowed (Babilunga and Bomeshko 1993b) 
 
 
The cover of each book depicts some aspect of the armed conflict, including mass 
gatherings (funerals or protests) or images of physical destruction. In terms of the latter, a broken 
guitar lying on the windowsill of a demolished apartment symbolizes perhaps the impossibility 
or artistic expression in these troubling times. From this imagery and the accompanying 
narrative, it is clear that the events are traumatic and tragic. Indeed, one volume contains a 
citation from the April 22, 1993 edition of Pravda that calmly recites the collective body count 
unleashed by the demise of the Soviet Union:  
Since 1991 we have lost approximately 150,000 in wars on the territory of 
the former Soviet Union. This is eleven times greater, then [were lost] in 
ten years of war in Afghanistan — such is the scale of the new tragedy. 
(Babilunga and Bomeshko 1993b: 29).  
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The inclusion of the events of 1992 within the wider “Soviet tragedy” illustrates how both 
residents position the region within the wider post-Soviet context of loss. The back cover of 
Bendery: Rasstrelynnye Nepokorennye (Bender: Shots Unbowed) adds the PMR’s casualties to 
this wider tragedy that continues to day: “Results of armed aggression of Moldova against the 
PMR from March 1st to June 29th, 1992. Dead: 657, Wounded: more than 3,000, Missing: 14, 
Evacuated: 13,814, and Refugees: around 100,000." These casualty figures calmly spell out the 
region’s contribution to the “new tragedy.” 
 
 
Fig 7. Back cover of the memorial book Bender: Shots Unbowed (Babilunga and Bomeshko 
1993b).  
 
Only photographs follow each book’s outline of events, typically two to four to a page, 
with captions describing them. Some depict the bloated bodies of corpses in caskets, while others 
appear to be autopsy photographs or documentary evidence gathered after the fact. Each 
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photograph is oriented around a common set repertoire of themes: physical destruction, a dead 
body, innocent bystanders caught in dangerous situations, or those who heroically defended the 
PMR. Some photos appear to be skeletal remains that were unearthed, photographed, and then 
reburied. The exceptions to the images of the dead are photographs that depict the material decay 
of the war torn region: demolished houses, destroyed schools, and piles of rubble that are noted 
only by their street addresses. This simple caption of a street address next to a pile of ruble 
implicitly asks the local reader to compare the destruction to their pre-war images and memories. 
Photographs depicting bodies typically focuses on the victim’s face, the exceptions being 
skeletal remains or the bodies of those who were bound, burned, or otherwise tortured. In these 
cases, the prone, defenseless body serves as what Barthes calls the punctum, that which “pierces 
the viewer” (1981: 25).  
 
 
 
Fig 8. Page from the memorial book Dubăsari: Bleeding Wound of Transnistria (Babilunga and 
Bomeshko 1993a). 
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The photograph above has three captions (Fig. 7). The first is a picture of the “author and 
journalist of the Don Cossacks A. Berlizov, who died in the village of Coşniţa.” The second 
shows a funeral of the ataman (leader) of the Dubăsari Cossacks P. S. Sazonov, which took place 
at Victory Square in the city of Dubăsari.204 The third photograph shows a ten-year old girl, 
Tatiana Gatskan, who was raped and murdered in her basement. Her eyes and mouth are slightly 
open, as if the photograph captures her last moments among the living. The fact that the caption 
mentions her place of death implies that she was an innocent bystander seeking shelter. Those 
depicted in this book fall into a variety of categories: Cossack volunteers, innocent victims such 
as children and the elderly, people who were tortured, and those attending the funerals of 
volunteers and defenders. Occasionally, photographs will show a battle scene — one picture 
(figure 8) shows an elderly babushka crouching to protect two young girls while a Transnistrian 
soldier cautiously scans the distance; its caption ominously explains that somewhere a sniper “is 
working.” Another shows a group of children sitting cheerfully while their parents visibly fret 
while, it is implied, the “undeclared war” rages on. This image’s caption prioritizes events for the 
reader: “the main thing — save the children” (Babilunga and Bomeshko 1993a: 14).  
Often the photographs serve as a visual component of a story that has become a 
foundational theme of PMR history. One storyline elaborated by the PMR’s official state 
narrative holds that Moldovan MiG-29 fighters bombarded innocent schoolchildren as they 
gathered to celebrate the end of the school year. This photo sequence shows school graduates 
gathering for their annual end-of-the-year school dance. Three elderly residents crouching for 
cover follow this innocent scene of youth — “bombardment began suddenly.” The last picture 
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depicts a burned, mutilated body of uncertain provenance: another of the “nameless victims of 
the undeclared war” (Babilunga and Bomeshko 1993a: 19). The story told by these photographs 
is both simple and complex. As evidence of victimization, now they visually perform the PMR’s 
very raison d'être.  
 
 
 
Fig 9. Page from the memorial book Bender: Shots Unbowed. The captions for the pictures are, 
clockwise, “graduates preparing for their last prom, Friday June 19, 1992; bombardment 
suddenly began; and nameless victims of the undeclared war.” (Babilunga and Bomeshko 1993b: 
12) 
 
 
At the symbolic level these photographs are building blocks, connective tissues, material-
cum-imaginary artifacts around which the PMR state, along with its residents, performs its 
sovereignty. The repetitive functions taken by these images during their circulation — as images 
                                                                                                                                                       
204 In the Transnistrian conflict, Cossacks are considered defenders of the region and today exist as a paramilitary 
force under the control of the PMR Ministry of Defense. The Moldovan government considers them to be mercenary 
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they are staged endlessly in a manner that forecloses any alternative interpretation — alludes to 
their performative function. While they constitute evidence, the manner in which I first 
encountered them, tucked away in a desk waiting for an audience, hints at their performative 
function and at the potential pleasure one might gain from viewing them. At the communicative 
or narrative level, these photographs tell a story that must be retold to outsiders. For individuals 
like Boris, they are reminders and exist as a fundamental component of a local political 
cosmology in which the state is the protector of the innocent. For others, the photographs allude 
to a more fundamental repetition that lies at the core of the PMR. Unable to reach a definitive, 
stable solution, these images must be repeatedly displayed both in public and in private insofar in 
order to embody successfully the experiences that led to the emergence of the PMR state.  
The authors of these books are a collective of academics and intellectuals from the local 
university in Tiraspol. All were educated in the Soviet Union, and in my interactions with them 
most saw their job not as propagandists but as documentarians. There was little reflexivity on 
their role as shapers of historical truth. This is likely because of their belief that history is largely 
an objective phenomenon with its own forces, which they, as historians, can only chronicle. The 
photographs themselves are of unknown origin, though I suspect that military officials or the 
actual combatants themselves took them.  
 
Narrating Loss and Belonging 
The instrumentalization of loss and disorder offers a potent tool for states. Writing about 
provincial Russia, Oushakine shows how a negative attachment to the state based around 
narratives of victimization and trauma, the “work of the negative” (Green 1999), can create new 
forms of collectivity and subjectivity (2009: 5). From these narratives of change, loss, disorder, 
                                                                                                                                                       
forces. 
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and violence, individuals offer both a general framework for making sense of their experiences 
while simultaneously creating a potential audience for them. These "communities of loss" served 
in the position of both the author and target audience of these narratives of suffering (Oushakine 
2009: 5).205 
In the context of the loss of the Soviet state and its social, economic, and linguistic 
guarantees, bespredel and the ambiguity of the time offered potent tools for those who could 
tame them. Those that came to power in Transnistria noticed early on that this disorder and its 
images could become a potent tool in the right hands. If they could successfully transform this 
disorder into belonging, they would have a natural basis for a state. In the service a higher state 
power, the bodies of those killed are more than mere bodies. As images, photographs offer a 
practical means of rallying the political community and performing PMR sovereignty. These 
performances complement the necessary Weberian monopoly on the legitimate use of force 
secured through the decisive intervention of the 14th Soviet Army.   
Boris offers an intriguing portrait of a Transnistrian patriot. Originally active in the early 
strike movement, his organization, OSTK, is now relegated to a small office in the local House 
of Soviets. Despite the central role his organization played in the formative period of PMR state 
formation, today the organization resembles a pensioners' club where people drop by, chat about 
politics, and trade conspiracy theories. In Boris' interview, he began by discussing the founding 
of the OSTK, the United Work Collective Council. OSTK led the political movement for the 
independence of Transnistria, and OSTK's leader, Igor Smirnov, has been president of 
Transnistria since its inception. OSTK was founded in 1989 in response to the proposed 
Moldovan language law, which mandated a switch from the Cyrillic to the Latin script. People 
                                                
205 "The patriotism of despair […] emerged as an emotionally charged set of symbolic practices called upon to 
mediate relations among individuals, nation, and state and thus to provide communities of loss with socially 
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like Boris equated the switch to the Latin script with a shift toward Romania, and the specifics of 
the language law with a liquidation of Moldova (at all levels – identity, statehood, language). As 
he told me this he spoke of the growth of Moldovan nationalism, how “they” wanted to (re)unify 
with Romania, like they had between the wars.206 He equated this orthographic with a denial of 
Moldovanness. As he said this he explained, in a didactic manner, that Moldovan and Romanian 
are different languages (despite the fact that he spoke neither).  
PMR’s right to exist as a state is, for residents, bound to the Soviet values that make the 
region distinct. To deny these differences between the Moldovan and Romanian languages was 
to challenge the Soviet knowledge that led to the creation of Moldova in the first place. 
Tellingly, after discussing the language issue, he immediately shifted to darker themes – the 
emergence of mass discontent and disorder. In response to this disorder, he spoke of how factory 
directors spontaneously formed a strike committee and “all enterprises stopped production and 
went on strike.” When Moldovan authorities arrested strike leaders, residents responded by 
blockading railroads and highways in a way that effectively shut down Moldova's economy.207 
For Boris, these actions were grassroots and anti-nationalist; he was quick to assert that he was 
personally against nationalism in all forms. As explained in chapter one, political organizing in 
the PMR attempted to activate a Soviet idea, which, at the time, residents believed could exist 
outside the context of the USSR.208 More than once, it was framed to me as the “Soviet way” 
without the party.   
                                                                                                                                                       
meaningful subject positions" (Oushakine 2009: 5). 
206 Not being Romanian territory, Transnistria was used as a killing field of extermination for Jews and non-
Romanians by the fascist regime of General Ion Antonescu. This bloody period was stressed by the Soviets as 
distinguishing Moldova from Romania. They symbolic linkage between death and Romania lingers in the popular 
imagination, especially among those fully socialized in the USSR. 
207 As a Soviet border state, Moldova had limited economic and social exchanges with Romania.  Infrastructure was 
oriented to the east. 
208 For more on how internationalist mobilization operated in the 1990 Moldova election, see Mason 2009. 
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Hostile forces besieged this internationalist ideal. In Boris' interview, he spoke of how 
Transnistria had even asked for help from Moldova. In the early 1990s, the material and 
symbolic lines of support from Moscow were cut, and times were hard.   
In the early 1990s when it [the Soviet Union] collapsed, there was no money and we 
asked for help from Moldova [Chișinău]. They already led an aggressive policy against 
us. [When we asked for help] they scoffed at us… 
 
It is at this point that he took out more photos. As he showed them to me, he asked, "What else 
we could have done?" He talked about how residents were outmanned and outgunned:  "they 
came with guns, we came simply with sticks … the whole of the people rose up." He chronicled 
the shootings and aggressions in various Transnistrian cities. In his narrative, there is never an 
end point or an agreed upon sequence of events – they did this, we tried to resolve it peacefully, 
and they reacted in a violent and barbaric manner. This pervasive form of bespredel can only be 
overcome with a structure that forecloses its possibility: the state. 
The opening passage of one memorial book, Dubăsari: Bleeding Wound of Transnistria, 
adds form to the bespredel that serves as the antithesis of the Transnistrian state.209 
In Transnistria blood is being spilled. The war continues in Transnistria. The war started 
by the ruling in Moldova clique, an ethno-bureaucratic regime of a national-socialist 
character. The absurd war goes on, crazy in its meaning, criminal, inhumane, barbaric in 
its form. And to recall the famous formulation of Clausewitz that war is the continuation 
of politics by other means, then you might say that the Transnistrian war became a logical 
consequence of that absurdity and craziness into which Moldova was plunged at the 
beginning of the 1990s. The Transnistrian war is a continuation of the criminal, 
inhumane, barbaric politics of the Chișinău regime (Babilunga and Bomeshko 1993a). 
 
Boris is not concerned with the origins of these clashes, nor with my specific questions about 
how these conflicts began (in reality, those who 'rose up' were attempting to take over police 
stations loyal to Chișinău). In his narrative, Transnistrians do everything possible to 
                                                
209 This particular book was written a professor of the history faculty at Transnistrian State University.  A Moldovan 
member of the academy of sciences during the Soviet period, he left his home in Moldova’s capital and moved to 
Transnistria when the bespredel began. 
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accommodate Moldova while they commit these crimes. As his voice quickened, he listed the 
compromises they were willing to make: the different levels of power within a unified state (a 
special economic zone, autonomy, a federation). As he trailed off, he indirectly addressed the 
late Soviet power dynamics through an explanation of how left-bank Moldova contributed 
disproportionately to the MSSR budget. Yet he never addresses the Russian subsidies that 
enabled the PMR to exist today. For Boris, productivity comes not from the Soviet center or 
from the Russian Federation, but from local forces. The inequalities of Soviet development that 
left the PMR was a disproportionate amount of the MSSR’s industry and the stakes of altering 
this balance of power are reflected in his narrative. As the author of this narrative on loss (of 
individual lives, more generally of stability and belonging), Boris simultaneously serves as both 
author and audience. It is not a question of interpretation - he was there, this happened in front of 
his eyes. As Boris continued to talk about further provocations, he showed me pictures of people 
shot in the head.210 He talked about an ambulance that was targeted, of women killed while 
trying to retrieve the bodies of the dead. After he trailed off (“that is who we had to deal with”), 
he carefully brought out me more pictures of dismembered, bullet-ridden bodies. He delicately 
fingered these black and white images before handing to me, furtively glancing at me for 
acknowledgement. He ended our conversation by stressing how they could not “talk” to them; 
bodies foreclosed rapprochement. 
Boris' logic is straightforward. Provocations continued, people were killed, and the 
pictures you hold in your hands prove this. Transnistrians needed to defend themselves, and only 
a state could defend its citizens. He talked about how OSTK sent letters to Gorbachev, which 
                                                
210 He neglected to use the appropriate death porn label for the headshot, control shot [kontrol'ny vystrel], control 
shot, the final headshot meant to guarantee death after an initial ambush. 
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told of the genocide that was going on here, but their decision was made – they (Gorbachev, 
Shevardnadze) dissolved the USSR. 
Non-Moldovan speakers had everything to lose in an independent Moldova since the 
emergence of Moldova as a national state would likely shift power away from non-titular 
minorities who prospered during Soviet times. Boris seamlessly shifted from questions of 
geopolitical significance (to preserve or dissolve the Soviet Union, the world's largest country) to 
the workplace. As is clear from Boris' own recollection of the events that led to the creation of 
OSTK, language played a large role, but in retrospect he sees language as secondary to more 
material concerns like feeding one's family. Boris told me about a cousin who was dismissed 
from the local agricultural institute because of his nationality. A Moldovan who “bought” his 
diploma replaced him.211 His cousin's boss understood his situation and was sympathetic, but the 
need to develop the capacity of national cadres prevailed and he was fired. This Soviet 
"affirmation action" would be replaced by a national-tinged one in which Moldovans would 
dominate state institutions. In his narrative, there exists a continuum that begins with the actual 
and real stakes of Moldovan domination – losing your job, your privileged position – and ends 
with something more sinister like having your pregnant wife raped and murdered, or your corpse 
dismembered and defaced.   
The crystallization of Transnistrians as a group or a people in need of protection 
exemplifies what Rogers Brubaker calls "groupness as event" (2004: 12). For Brubaker, seeing 
groups as variable and contingent rather than fixed allows one to account for their trials and 
tribulations, which can include their relatively cohesive moments of intensely felt collectivity (in 
this case, when confronted with a perceived external threat to vital interests such as survival) to 
                                                
211 Purchasing diplomas from institutes of higher education is common across the former Soviet Union. Often, 
middle-aged individuals purchase their diplomas to receive promotions. 
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times when the notion of groupness fails to crystallize. Photographs of the dead allow for a 
Transnistrian community to emerge: they are used to construct groups. They are used by the state 
to affirm a community that engages in politics only after its rights have been violated. It is only 
after the Transnistrian narod has been pushed, beaten, killed, and threatened with extermination 
that they responded as they needed to. Important when looking at these state narratives of 
victimization is how the ethnic framing (anti-Russian, pro-Romanian) masks the basic pursuit of 
a narrow group's interests. By successfully utilizing grassroots organizing techniques, mobilizing 
factory workers along existing Soviet lines of internationalist solidarity, and performing PMR 
sovereignty through the invocation of this and other narratives of victimization, a small cadre of 
PMR elites have profited immensely through the creation of a state structure that is seen as 
protecting the rights of its “citizens.” To invoke the classic distinction of Max Weber, they live 
off politics as well as for politics (Weber 1946). Similarly, Abrams’ notion of the state as “itself 
the mask that prevents our seeing political practice as it is” (1988: 58) retains a sense of the 
people being duped. Taussig goes even further with this idea of the state as a mask, implicating 
the State in the cultural construction of reality that is “inherently deceptive, real and unreal at one 
and the same time — in short, a thoroughly Nervous System” (1992: 113).   
 
Conclusion 
Statehood, sovereignty, and belonging are largely things taken for granted. To paraphrase 
Abrams (1988: 58), the state is not the reality that stands behind the mask of political practice; it 
is the mask that prevents us from seeing political practice as such. The unfinished teleology of 
the PMR (lacking recognition as a sovereign state) leads to an ideological overcompensation and 
fetishization of it. Its documents not recognized, its passports not accepted at any international 
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border, and its citizens paid in a currency whose value is largely a fiction, citizens are left to 
create a space for belonging amidst the symbolic detritus of the recently-departed Soviet Union 
and its contemporary multinational prosthesis, the Transnistrian Moldova Republic. The PMR 
recently had to extend the deadline for the exchange of Soviet-era identity documents because its 
aged population212 refuses to exchange them for Transnistrian ones. As one informant told me, 
"Who wants to exchange the documents from a superpower for a passport from a banana 
republic?"   
Despite the attempts described above, attachment to the state is waning. Fewer and fewer 
patriots rally around a polity that is increasingly unable to provide materially its citizens. This 
lack of interest in politics is largely seen by residents as a referendum (no pun intended) on the 
ruling authorities who have largely enriched themselves while the people suffer. Authorities have 
also failed to create a competitive political space that might at least attract people to the polls. 
The narratives of resistance and grassroots democracy have given way to a stagnation whereby 
Transnistria's incumbent President, Igor Smirnov (in power from 1991-2011), created a vertical 
power system of close associates and family members who have monopolized every profitable 
outlet in the country. 
As I ran out of questions and my Russian wore thin, I asked Boris what he thought of 
Sheriff, a local company covered in detail in chapter four. His eyes brightened, and he spoke of 
how when one goes shopping in a Sheriff supermarket you can feel like a civilized person, not 
having to ask the sales clerk for each and every item behind the glass display cases (this was the 
model for the typical Soviet supermarket). He talked about the charitable policies of Sheriff in 
the form of a seven percent discount for pensioners on the first thousand Transnistrian rubles 
(seven percent of the first $100) of purchases per month, which ensures that pensioners spend 
                                                
212 The PMR has nearly 150,000 pensioners. 
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nearly all of their meager pensions at Sheriff. He went on the describe the massive soccer 
complex outside town built for Sheriff's football squad, which plays in the Champions League 
under the Moldovan flag. "We support Smirnov because he gives back to us, because he does 
something." As I looked around the bare walls of the OSTK office, I reminded him that we were 
talking about Sheriff and not Smirnov. When I asked him whether they were one and the same he 
dismissed the question out of hand through the deft use of an old Russian proverb, which 
translates as “the dogs bark, but the caravan moves on." This was perhaps a fitting riposte to a 
foreigner questioning the workings of this murky state, his state.  
Based as they are in the realm of narrative, the origins and reality of this unrecognized 
state are powerful for some, ignored by others, and acknowledged at some level by most. 
Whether this acknowledgement takes place in the mandatory history courses in primary and 
secondary school, on Transnistria's borders, through the use of state documents, at a currency 
exchange booth, or through an ill-defined feeling of difference vis-à-vis Moldova, the PMR state 
exists, even if its presence is acknowledged only for the purposes of dismissing it. While one can 
deny its legitimacy, one cannot deny its effects.    
If the fictional reality of the state is socially powerful, then scholars must focus not only 
on those discourses and practices that produce this state form as real but also on the 
actual social and subjective life of this formation we call the state. If the state appears and 
acts as having a life of its own, then we are in the presence of a fetish and must ask for 
the powerful ways in which this fetish works. To look for state effects is also to follow 
the ways in which those identified as the state enact their fantasy vis-à-vis those others it 
considers its enemies (Aretxaga 2003: 401). 
 
Its enemies numerous and known, Transnistria has had more than 20 years during which to 
inscribe itself upon the body politic. The PMR’s most recent referendum affirmed its course of 
independence and free association with Russia. Voter turnout was 78.6% of the nearly 400,000 
registered voters. So while Geertz, interpretive anthropology's leading luminary, may have had 
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lingering questions about what Moldova is, surprisingly, Transnistrians themselves remain 
astutely aware of what Moldova remains capable of because they have the bodies to prove it. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
FIEFDOMS, SUBSIDIES, AND THE VIRTUAL 
 
 
Gregory Marakutsa [a Transnistrian politician instrumental in the region’s declaration of 
independence] said then [September 2nd, 1990]: We will build a little Switzerland. We did not 
have to build it, it had already been built. It was not a joke! Every working Transnistrian 
produced four times the average Soviet citizen. We had modern factories, power plants, irrigated 
lands, and large livestock and poultry facilities. Only don’t destroy it! … And our main assets - 
the intellectual potential of scientists, business leaders, and the professional level of workers, 
farmers. We had on our side the sympathy of the people of Great Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. 
We would know how to convince the majority of the residents of Moldova of our correctness. But 
everything happened exactly the opposite. Under the strict guidance of Igor Nikolayevich 
Smirnov everything was promptly destroyed, even that which seemed indestructible. They sold 
everything that could be sold for pennies. They long ago forgot where they spent the money.    
 
    Evgeni Nikitin, citing Gregory Marakutsa, September 2, 2010 
 
  
How does a region go from being a potential “little Switzerland” to the poorest region of 
the poorest country in Europe? On the surface, the story appears straightforward: those 
controlling the state institutions took the reigns of this “little Switzerland” and turned it into a 
fiefdom, in the process selling (privatizing) all they could. This is also a story of how an 
unrecognized state commercialized its newfound sovereignty. Gradually, over more than two 
decades, the people shifted from the initial holders of sovereignty to, in the words of one high 
ranking PMR bureaucrat, biomass [biomassa], the biological base of a profitable system. This 
metaphor, which I will return to at the end of this chapter, succinctly conveys the powerlessness 
of residents as a population yet simultaneously conveys their absolute importance for the 
political economy of the region. Transnistria constitutes a post-Soviet Matrix that people largely 
cannot escape because of poverty, visa requirements, and the nostalgic pull of homeland 
[rodina]. Much like Neo is offered a blue pill that would return him to his old life, or a red pill 
that would answer the question of what the Matrix is, the population is offered the blue pill in the 
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form of nostalgia and trope of an idyllic “little Switzerland,” while access to the red pill is 
strictly controlled: to acknowledge contradictions or shortcomings would negate sacrifices 
measured in blood. The PMR offers a story of economic failure that has, paradoxically, been a 
political success. Alongside the establishment of state institutions, the PMR has been successful 
in profitably restricting flows of capital, people, goods, and, perhaps most importantly, ideas. 
 
Biology and the Nation 
Equating the region’s population to biomass is a literal metaphor that captures their role 
as captive generative elements in the region’s economy. The term itself also reflects a wider 
return to bodily metaphors and biological determinism in the post-Soviet world is rooted in many 
of the unresolved demographic and political contradictions of the post-Soviet condition.213⁠ 
Demographically, the post-Soviet space is marked by a rapid decline in the population due to a 
large death rate and a declining birth rate. In Russia, these demographic trends are embodied in a 
graphic that shows a declining birth rate superimposed over an increasing death rate. This 
graphic is quickly dubbed the “Russian cross,” [russkii krest]. As Oushakine (2007: 175) shows, 
this obsession with biological decline and of the nation as organism reflects both material and 
philosophical unease with the post-Soviet condition; the “organism” of the Russian ethnos 
constitutes both material evidence of organic culture and simultaneously serves as the 
embodiment of the a teleological principle that determines directions of the nation’s development 
(emphasis in original). These discourses of decline and decay provide a means of understanding 
constructions of national belonging in which positive means of nation building (“inventing 
traditions,” “imagining communities”) are not available or have been discredited.  
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Such a linkage of the biological conditions of the nation (both abstracted and as a 
collection of individuals) is a fundamental concern of Giorgio Agamben. His concept of bare 
life, developed most notably in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998), holds that 
politics is founded upon that which it excludes from politics—the natural life that is 
simultaneously set outside the domain of the political but nevertheless implicated in it. This 
implication raises the question, then, of how life itself is politicized. Agamben sees this 
occurring through abandonment to an unconditional power of death, that is, to the power of 
sovereignty. It is in this abandonment of natural life to sovereign violence, to political life, that 
allows bare life to appear. Thus do modern political regimes constitute themselves through a 
discourse whereby “every people is doubled by a population; every democratic people is, at the 
same time, a demographic people (Agamben 1999: 84).  
 
State and Economy  
 This chapter traces economic practices in the region from the late Soviet times to the 
present. Because of its ill-defined political status, economic activity in the PMR has remained, 
for much of its existence, illicit and unregulated. Such economic activity is criminal from the 
perspective of the Moldovan state, profitable for well-connected investors from Russia or 
Ukraine, and simply a mundane phenomenon for residents. The region's economic flows have 
redirected by individuals occupying high positions within the state with political goals in 
mind.214 Though one can make the argument that redistribution is what states do, I will show 
how in the PMR the economy constitutes a vital component of its performances of sovereignty. 
Initially, in the early 1990s, PMR state institutions sheltered the region from privatization and 
                                                                                                                                                       
213 The embrace of biological determinism after nearly seven decades of nurture over nature should illustrate both 
the uncertainty over the state of the nation and its population in post-Soviet Russia. 
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shock therapy. This allowed residents to believe that the region was immune to the precipitous 
economic decline that characterized the post-Soviet space. The PMR’s booming economy, many 
residents believed, would help fulfill the region’s political desires. To secure the long-term 
support of the Russian Federation, PMR authorities facilitated investment in strategic 
infrastructure by Kremlin-connected oligarchs. Russian ownership in energy-intensive industries 
such as steel and power generation offered benefits for all parties. Direct economic subsidies and 
cheap gas offered PMR authorities a means to finance government expenditures (residents pay 
for natural gas but the PMR never pays Russia for it). Through their ownership of energy-
intensive industries, Russian oligarchs launder these subsidies through their holdings in the 
region. In terms of local capital accumulation, PMR authorities have allowed a monopoly 
holding company, Sheriff, to capture most if not all of the PMR economy. These material 
processes have generated practical and ideological effects. As a result of Ukrainian and Russian 
dominance of the economy (Ukraine is the source of most imports in the region and Russia the 
sole source of foreign aid), there now exists a body of knowledge that residents cite as a 
distinguishing feature of the region: the PMR operates on Russian standards, which are 
incompatible with Moldova's European ones.  
 Transnistria offers insights into sovereignty’s changing forms in a globalized world. The 
PMR has commercialized its de facto sovereignty (Palan 2002) and functions as a “courtesan” 
(Mittelman and Johnston 1999) for Russian economic interests. Similarly, tax havens 
commercialize their sovereignty by providing important legal platforms for global finance and 
other types of services. Tax havens constitute an increasingly important, yet unrecognized, 
component of the state system that feeds upon recognized states’ juridical and political 
infrastructure (Palan 2002: 172). These forms represent the two faces of globalization. 
                                                                                                                                                       
214 For more on how economic and cultural fields can also generate nationalism, see Verdery 1993. 
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“Courtesan” states provide for those who hold power but not for the citizenry at large; they 
remain beholden to interests that constrain them internationally, and occupy subordinate 
positions within the geopolitics of globalization.215   
 In both of these concepts one finds a conflict between economic liberalization and the 
state’s embeddedness in a situation capable of generating its own perversions. One needs only to 
look to Yugoslavia for an example of this. In its current form Bosnia is largely a result of the 
international community's insistence that it have a form of statehood that would enable 
international capital to flow freely (i.e., standard business regulations and tax regimes that allow 
companies to operate in Bosnia just as easily as in Singapore or Switzerland) (Hozic 2008). 
Economic interests, not Bosnians themselves, thus dictated Bosnia's form of statehood. Despite 
this professed openness, locals perpetuate internal barriers and legal idiosyncrasies to strengthen 
their own position. Similarly, in the PMR, Russia serves as the sole force capable of influencing 
the situation on the ground.216 As a result, the unsettled political situation (with peacekeeping 
and security guaranteed by the Russian Federation) has generated economic formations and 
entities that profit from the status quo. As such, PMR state institutions remain oriented not 
around the free flow of capital, but around controlled economic flows and rents generated by 
them. Material interests become parasitic upon the region’s cultivated uncertainty, and in turn 
political actors and elites became beholden to these emboldened economic interests. Before 
addressing the present situation, it use useful to have a brief overview of the region’s economic 
development in the modern era.   
 
                                                
215 "A state in its capacity as a courtesan is beholden to more powerful interests in the global political economy, 
submissive in its policies if not in rhetorical flourishes because choice is constrained, and engaged in illicit 
relationships (though the line between licit and illicit is increasingly faint)" (Mittelman and Johnston 1999: 117). 
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From Suvorov to the Soviets: Transnistria, 1792-1989 
 The Russian general Alexander Suvorov founded Tiraspol as a garrison in 1792.217 
During Soviet times the city was a factory town, with heavy industry developing during the 
postwar period. The city boasted factories of union-wide significance that specialized in food 
production, light industry, textiles, furniture production, and military hardware. Kvint, Tiraspol’s 
oldest wine and brandy distillery (founded in 1897), remains the oldest operating commercial 
enterprise in the region. Tiraspol’s ties with industry are reflected locally — one a neighborhood 
is named for the local brick factory. Much of the region’s housing stock consists of apartments 
and dormitories built by factories to house workers. One factory, Elektromash, produced not only 
electric machinery and pumps, but also political figures. Its former deputy director, Igor 
Smirnov, has been president of the PMR since 1990, and its former sports director heads the 
Interior Ministry’s Migration department, the institution charged with issuing passports and 
handling registration. While these anecdotal connections between a single factory and the PMR’s 
leadership are not representative, they outline an important relationship between economics (the 
control of capital, the distribution of property, and the production, distribution, and consumption 
of goods) and political authority.  
 The region’s peculiarity must be seen in the context the region’s post-1945 economic 
boom and how the end of the Soviet Union brought longstanding economic, social, and cultural 
anxieties to the surface. Soviet development was integral to the region. Transnistria played a key 
role in the Soviet defense sector. Four-fifths of the region’s population was employed in 
industry, construction, and the service sector (King 2000: 183). Transnistria contained a 
disproportionate amount of infrastructure for its small size. A hydroelectric power plant in 
                                                                                                                                                       
216 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitors the peace agreement signed between 
Russia, Transnistria, and Moldova, with Ukraine as a guarantor. 
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Dubăsari, constructed in 1955, powered for the entire MSSR. In 1961, the Soviets build another 
large power plant in the left-bank city of Dnestrovsk. In the north, the MMZ steel works in 
Rîbnița (opened in 1984) is one of the most technologically advanced steel production facilities 
in Europe whose products are exported across the world.218 In Soviet times, left-bank factories 
were key suppliers of technical equipment and arms for the Soviet military. The region’s 
economic prosperity must be seen in the context of its union-wide function and dependence on 
the center for orders and financing.   
 Soviet development produced demographic changes as migrants from other regions of the 
Soviet Union arrived to work in the region’s factories. In 1936, Russians constituted 14 percent 
of the totally population in districts [raions] along the Dniester River. By 1989 Russians made up 
a quarter of the population, though Moldovans still formed a plurality (Moldovans today are 
concentrated in villages along the Dniester River). The rural population was nearly sixty percent 
Moldovan, while the urban population was only a quarter Moldovan (King 2000: 183). Like 
most of the Soviet Union, Transnistria’s urban areas were culturally and linguistically Russified. 
Residents tended to see themselves in the cultural context of the Soviet Union and later Russia 
(Kolstø and Malgin 1998: 107).  
 The lines between the economy (the wealth and resources of the region) and politics 
(relations, assumptions, and contests relating to power and authority) began to blur with the onset 
of perestroika and national independence movements. As a part of the Soviet military-industrial 
complex, the region’s economy tended to be seen in the Union-wide and later CIS context 
instead of Moldova. In the MSSR, infrastructure was oriented eastward, since Moldova was a 
                                                                                                                                                       
217 Today the city boasts a population of more than 150,000. 
218 Allegation of weapons production has also plagued the region and are cited by the West as a security issues that 
contributes to regional instability. Victor Bout, once one of the world’s largest arms traffickers, was alleged to ship 
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border republic. Moldovan rapprochement with Romania threatened to disrupt the region’s 
economy, and left-bank workers “reacted strongly against the disruption of economic ties among 
the various regions of the USSR that occurred in the late 1980s/early 1990s as the constituent 
republics became more independent” (Kolstø and Malgin 1998: 107).   
 The rise of nationalism in Moldova and the 1989 language law making Moldovan the 
sole official language of the republic edged Transnistria down the path of separatism. Residents 
resented the fact that they contributed disproportionately to the MSSR, receiving less than 20% 
back from the center. In 1990, Transnistria accounted for 40% of the GDP of Soviet Moldova 
while it only had 15.2% of the population and, territorially, only 12.4% of the country.219 During 
fieldwork, I encountered this sentiment often from left-bank residents who recalled the region’s 
productivity vis-à-vis right-bank Moldova. “They [Moldovans] think that Chișinău built 
Tiraspol.” This statement metonymically linked the two competing capital cities in Moldova but 
reversed their valence insofar the unrecognized capital disproportionately contributed to the 
MSSR budget.  
 The PMR economic distinctiveness vis-à-vis Moldova came to complement other means 
of belonging. In the PMR, belonging is constructed not on the basis of birth or nationality, but on 
the basis of fidelity insofar to Soviet internationalism given that there is no titular nationality in 
the PMR.220 Often individuals narrated their paths to the PMR as a matter of choice. One 
informant had a rather circuitous journey insofar as he was born in Tiraspol, worked for over 
four decades in Chișinău, and returned to Transnistria as nationalists came to power in Moldova. 
                                                                                                                                                       
his wares through the former Soviet airfield outside of Tiraspol. For more on this, see Peter Landesman’s 2003 
profile in the New York TImes Magazine, “Arms and the Man.” 
219 “Evolution of the Transnistrian Economy: critical appraisal,” CISR Moldova 2001 
220 Igor Smirnov, the president of the PMR, arrived in the region in 1987.  The Minister of State Security, Vladimir 
Antyufeyev, fled Latvia in August 1991 after being accused of numerous crimes in connection with the Latvian 
independence movement.  He first fled to Russia, then traveled to the region in September 1991 under the alias 
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Over conversation, it became clear that the Chișinău he knew differed greatly from its 
contemporary form. His Chișinău had Soviet-era street names and parks. His demeanor piqued 
when he asked me about where I lived; he professed ignorance when I tried to explain where my 
apartment was located.221 He returned to Transnistria in 1989 after Moldova adopted its language 
law. Later, when armed conflict broke out, he told of receiving a call from his daughter in the 
dormitory where he lived (he had given up his apartment in Chișinău). His daughter told him that 
she was leaving, i.e., going to live abroad. His response to her, in the imperative form, was a curt 
“don’t betray your motherland.” As he recounted this to me, his reply seemed rehearsed and 
devoid of emotion, as if it was a performance that required some amount of practice to come to 
grips with the act of replacing the familial bond with an ideological one. He himself spoke of 
returning home to Tiraspol because his motherland [rodina] demanded it. Yet even his idea of 
rodina was unsettled: in 1989 it was still the Soviet Union, but in 1992 it was the PMR. When I 
pointed this out, he dismissed it as unimportant and did not differentiate any further. The Soviet 
Union, having formally met its demise on December 26th, 1991, was, at the time his daughter 
called in 1992, a virtual polity, extant in its cumulative historical effects but without any tangible 
form. Not wanting to end on a debatable point, he stressed that the existence of the PMR was an 
objective fact - “the existence of the PMR is an objective fact [suchshestvovanie PMR - eto 
ob’ektivnyi fakt]. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Vladimir Shevtsov.  He later organized the internal affairs and security organizations of the PMR.  He is wanted by 
Interpol for his activities in Latvia and cannot travel to the EU due to a travel ban. 
221 Coincidently, he had lived on the same street as I did. He lived on Youth Avenue [prospekt molodezhi]; today it 
is called Renaşterii Boulevard. 
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The Transnistrian Economy: 1989 and Beyond 
 When the Moldovan national movement threatened the economic livelihood of left-bank 
residents, pro-independence movements in the Transnistrian region emerged in response to the 
threat of increased control from Chișinău. When Moldova passed the language law in 1989, 
political uncertainty had yet to affect the region’s economy. At this point, national movements 
engulfed much of the USSR and threatened the status quo, but the Soviet state had not yet 
collapsed. Similarly, in early 1990 rapid de-industrialization had not begun and left-bank 
residents saw no reason to believe the region would not remain productive in the future. 
 Transnistria and Moldova experienced the same economic shockwaves that reverberated 
across the Soviet Union. These included the denomination of Soviet currency and hyperinflation, 
decreases (or outright stoppage) in production, the disappearance of state subsidies on basic 
goods, and price liberalization. Whole industries became noncompetitive due to technological 
backwardness, and the Soviet economy fractured along national lines. For comparison, the 
Russian economy lost 45% of its total output in 1989-1998. By 2005, Moldova had recovered 
less than 50% of its 1989 Soviet GDP (Popov 2007: 39).   
 Like much of the CIS, Transnistria experienced massive de-industrialization during the 
1990s. Until 1992, Transnistria managed to avoid a sharp drop in production. While production 
in right-bank Moldova fell by 20%, Transnistria registered only a 6% decrease (Kolstø and 
Malgin 1998: 112). In 1991, the standard of living in the region was among the highest in the 
CIS, though 1992 marks the onset of a serious recession. Armed conflict in 1992 decimated a 
large part of the region’s infrastructure. As a landlocked region with few natural resources, 
Transnistria was adversely affected by the dismal Russian economy. Local enterprises remain 
dependent on imported raw material and the export of finished goods. De-industrialization, out-
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migration, and the collapse of Soviet agriculture have left the region’s economy insufficiently 
diversified. A single enterprise, the MMZ steel factory, generates the bulk of Transnistria’s 
legitimate economic output. 
 Despite this precipitous decline, images of economic prosperity initially constituted one 
of the primary means of differentiating the PMR from Moldova. Transnistria’s earliest efforts at 
political organizing were tied to the region’s enterprises. Factory managers were among the first 
to act against steps toward political centralization by Chișinău.222 To preserve a modicum of 
economic distinction vis-à-vis Moldova, the PMR state retained control over factories and other 
strategic enterprises in order to highlight economic differences vis-à-vis Moldova. Privatization 
occurred later than in Moldova, and the region’s subsidized gas and electricity contribute to the 
belief that reintegration with Moldova will negatively affect residents.223 
 The PMR has successfully linked political questions to a series of simple economic 
questions that portray reintegration as a bad economic decision.224 Who would willingly want to 
increase prices on natural gas, petroleum products, communal fees, and lose the Russian pension 
subsidies that put an extra fifteen dollars in the pockets of all pensioners, a significant portion of 
                                                
222 “Already in the 1980s there developed a dynamic that would culminate in full-scale war by 1992: Every move in 
Chișinău that pulled the republic farther away from Moscow was met by a countermove in Transnistria that drew 
the region itself farther away from Chișinău. It was a dynamic replicated in several Soviet republics at the time. 
While central elites in the capital were arguing for greater control over local resources and the revival of indigenous 
languages, they were also initiating a policy of centralization within their own republics, attempting to gain control 
over local party and state institutions that might see Moscow – rather than the republican capitals – as the legitimate 
locus of authority. These centralization policies prompted their own movements for autonomy and independence 
within the republic. Although national symbols were the mobilizational tools wielded by political elites, the key 
issues were not symbols and national myths but rather real problems of political and economic control.” (King 2000: 
185). 
223 While residents pay for gas, it is at a significantly reduced rate compared to Moldova. Thus is the subsidy divided 
between PMR state coffers and residents who pay for their utilities each month. 
224 This project of creating political subjectivities through economic processes lies at the heart of European 
integration and the EU. Peebles (1997: 590) argues that EU law enshrines the rights of commodities rather than 
people, with people primarily gaining rights only by demonstrating that they embody exchange value and thus are 
personified commodities. “The EU treaties codify Marx's discovery about a previously hidden aspect of capitalist 
society, namely that "the characters who appear on the economic stage are merely personifications of economic 
relations; it is as the bearers of these economic relations that they come into contact with each other" ... Humans 
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Transnistria’s population?225 The fact that nearly forty percent of the region’s population are 
pensioners makes them the most important political constituency raises a set of interesting issues. 
While having a population that consists largely of pensioners socialized in the Soviet Union is a  
benefit for a state that professes to uphold Soviet ideals, this aged population generate little 
economic productivity are remain passive consumers of goods and services. Their lives are, 
according to one regular informant, calculated to the last kopeck. One elderly woman explained 
that life was better in Transnistria, since gasoline was less expensive than in Ukraine and 
Moldova. Knowing that she did not own a car, I asked her how she even knew the prices. She 
replied that the prices are shown each day on state television. Having no refineries, it might seem 
odd that gas is cheaper than in Odessa, which boasts significant refineries. Considering the fact 
that in the Russian Federation taxes constitute more than half of motor fuel prices, keeping gas 
prices low (and publicizing this fact) creates an implicit basis for comparison measured in simple 
economic terms. Economic superiority becomes an apparent fact of life in the region through the 
selective monetization this and other similar price differences highlighted by the media.   
 The economic policy of the PMR leadership has been dictated not so much by communist 
principles as by the need to maintain the support of the workers' organizations. The people, the 
holders of sovereignty in the PMR, must remain convinced that the state protects them. 
Debilitating economic reforms occurred earlier in Moldova; any such reform policy in 
Transnistria would have led to the closure of unprofitable enterprises and mass lay-offs. These 
reforms occurred only after the Russian financial crisis in 1998, when local capital began to be 
                                                                                                                                                       
only fall within the scheme of EU law insofar as they are bearers of either the commodity labor power or the 
commodity money.” 
225 Pensioners make up a disproportionate part of the PMR population (the PMR's total population is between 
370,000 and 520,000). Estimates vary, but approximately 35% to 40% of the PMR’s total population are pensioners. 
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consolidated via privatization. Before then, privatization was not an option for PMR authorities 
— only after an economic crisis could social guarantees be abrogated. 
 
Privatization: The Big Picture 
 The Republic of Moldova adopted a law on privatization in December 1991. Though de 
jure part of Moldova, Moldovan authorities never led any privatization program in Transnistria. 
A 1997 regulation issued by the Supreme Soviet of Transnistria suspended privatization as “a 
predatory and anti-national action” (Gudim 2004). Such pronouncements offer residents an 
economic counterpoint to political disengagement: Moldova underwent privatization, and it 
became the poorest country in Europe. Logically, the PMR leadership prevented this from 
happening. As a presidential republic, Transnistria is similar to the Soviet state in that many 
legislative decisions are made on the basis of special orders and “decisions” that give individuals 
the right to transfer enterprises.226 If you want to take control of any property in the region, you 
need connections in addition to capital. Given the fact that much of the region’s economy is 
concentrated in the hands of a single company, Sheriff, private capital remains weak. 
 Privatization occurred gradually in the region. In 2002, two enterprises were privatized, 
in 2003 – twelve, and in 2004 – sixteen. Among those privatized were the largest contributors to 
the PMR budget, including the Moldovan Metallurgical Works (MMZ), the Moldovan Regional 
Electric Power Station (Dnestrovsk), and various machine-building, light and food industries. 
MMZ was sold in 2004 to Metalloinvest, a Russian mining/metallurgy company controlled by 
the Russian oligarch Alisher Usmanov, and the Kuchurgan power station was sold in 2004 to 
                                                
226 For more on the specifics of law and legal culture Russia, see Humphrey (2002: 107-109), specifically her 
description of Soviet law as an instrumental means of government. Soviet law did not require the consent of the 
public nor that of officials tasked with implementing the laws; it was largely composed of competing edicts and 
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Inter RAO UES, a company with connections to Boris Yeltsin’s First Deputy Prime Minister, 
Anatoly Chubais. Since the late 1990s, Russian capital has controlled the most profitable assets 
of the region. This has allowed them to reap the benefits of the region’s subsidized natural gas, 
since power plants and steel are heavily dependent upon natural gas.  
 At the local level, privatization secured and “legitimized” the property rights of local 
elites in the absence of a political settlement with Moldova. For heavily indebted factories, 
privatization wiped the slate clean by attracting funds for reconstruction and debt liquidation 
(and, as we shall see below, profitably “killing” these assets). Revenues generated by 
privatization formed an additional source of revenue for the state and those overseeing the 
process. Privatization was an attempt to legalize a property grab. The fact that the region’s 
strategic assets were privatized by Russian capital plays into the hands of regional authorities 
seeking closer ties with Russia. Privatization shields the PMR against the claims of Moldovan 
authorities who maintain that only they have the legal right to privatize property in the region. 
The fact that privatization occurred when it did shows that statehood had been successfully 
consolidated and the next step of establishing “democracy” could be undertaken.227 
 One informant stressed the shortened timeframe of capital consolidation in the region: 
“What took place over the course of a hundred years in America happened here in ten.” Himself 
a businessman who travelled with armed security, he was well aware of the bloodshed associated 
with primitive accumulation of capital. Of the local businesses not owned by Russian investors, 
Sheriff, owns the majority. By strategically allowing Kremlin-connected investors to purchase 
electrical-generating infrastructure and the region’s industrial crown jewel, the MMZ steel 
                                                                                                                                                       
regulations that supplemented and superseded existing laws (which continued the tsarist traditions of rule by 
decree). 
227 Only after privatization did political parties proliferate, of which there are ten today. Sheriff, the regional 
monopoly holding company, created two political parties and is rumored to control others. 
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factory, the PMR had become a dependent state that could now claim poverty when its gas debt 
of more than $2 billion dollars came due, since the Russian-owned enterprises drew up the 
region’s gas debt. Russian aid to the region is both charity to the Transnistrian people who are 
squeezed by an economic blockade and a subsidy for connected investors. As a place that is 
simultaneously outside of (yet an integral component to) any recognized authority (be in 
Moldovan or Russian), the region functions as an integral economic cog that allows Russian 
capital to realize a profit. There is a division of labor in the PMR economy: Sheriff captures 
internal markets, and Russia investors retain strategic infrastructure to launder subsidies from the 
Russian state. The natural gas bill remains unpaid, and its exponential growth serves as a 
deterrent to any political settlement, as the current gas debt of more than two billion dollars is 
roughly equal to one third of Moldova’s GDP.  
 
Privatization: From Below 
 Privatization condensed many of the economic issues addressed above. In this section I 
address how residents spoke of the privatization process.228 One informant, Vadim, told me 
about how privatization worked at his factory. Each worker received a share, and there was a 
meeting between management and workers to decide the fate of the factory. The director laid out 
a purchasing offer, and told the workers the amount each would receive for selling. Though 
Vadim could not recall the exact amount, he thought it was around twenty dollars. At that time, 
he explained, the factory was still organized in its Soviet-era collective structure. When the 
decision came up for a vote, some workers wanted to retain their shares and receive dividends, 
should the factory became profitable. The meeting was temporarily adjourned. One dissenter was 
                                                
228 Nobody would speak specifically about personal involvement, and I was unable to interview any government 
officials involved in the process. 
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pulled aside and told, in no uncertain terms, that if he did not sell and acquiesce he would soon 
be “feeding fish” in the Dniester, a not so subtle reference to the many corpses that turned up in 
the river during the 1990s. He acquiesced. The individual who purchased the workers’ shares 
was a straw man [podstavlenoe litso], someone who purchases an asset on behalf of another (in 
this case Sheriff). The possibility of manipulation [makhinatsiia], forever lurks in the shadows of 
the Transnistrian economy. Later, over tea, Vadim educated me in the nuances of post-Soviet 
politics, explaining didactically that one can never understand the essence of events [sut' sobytii], 
as reality could always be manipulated or altered.  
 Another scheme for making a bankrupt enterprise profitable occurs by literally 
dismembering it. A buyer purchases an unprofitable factory and takes out a large line of credit, 
ostensibly to revive the failing enterprise. Usually, this sum would be enough to cover the 
enterprise’s debts, with money left over for payroll and the purchase of equipment. The owner 
would then embezzle the money and return a percentage to whoever approved the loan and the 
initial purchase. Having exhausted the line of credit, the owner would declare the enterprise 
bankrupt and fire the workers. Some time later, a straw man would purchase the factory for a 
nominal price (as low as a few dollars) and then sell off the remaining assets. Larger factories 
often included a health clinic, sports facilities, dormitories, apartments, and other property such 
as a vacation resort in addition to the factory itself. Now freed from their obligations to provide 
services to the workers, these assets could be rented, sold, or turned into independent units for 
generating revenue. The ultimate stop of privatization entails literally stripping the factory of 
equipment and scrap metal and shipping it to a buyer in Russia or the CIS. Local firms specialize 
in logistics and shipping. The inheritance of the people – the factories that provided for and 
allowed residents to differentiate themselves and the region economically – is literally stripped 
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away. Though blatantly illegal, there are no consequences as long as the right payoffs are made. 
Given the general lack of a clear property title as a result of socialist practice and easily 
manipulated shareholder registries, one can argue that both state administrators and managers of 
state enterprises had little incentive enforce property rules and regulations (Varese 1997). 
Historically, reforms that foster an efficient functioning of the economy only emerge in response 
to pressure from property holders (Hay et al 1996: 564). Given the fact that all enterprises were 
owned by the state, is it any wonder that the process would be grossly inefficient at best, 
thoroughly criminal at worst? Those who are aware of these schemes have no recourse and no 
incentive to get involved, which would only spell trouble. Simple workers are powerless when 
faced with the profit-seeking impetus of capital. Residents, attuned to the rhetoric of crisis, are 
unwilling or unable to acknowledge the economic predation happening before their own eyes. 
They chose the blue pill.   
 Privatization of the region’s most valued assets occurred under murky circumstances, and 
residents understood that officials profited from the transactions. Far from equitably distributing 
assets, privatization enabled a cadre of connected individuals to gain control of the profitable 
enterprises in the region for a fraction of their assessed value. During an interview, the head of 
the Transnistrian Community Party stressed how authority, vlast’, remains separate from the 
people.   
We have a situation in which power is separate from the people. [Those in] power earn and 
enrich themselves, and the people and the state live in poverty. Pensions are $80! You can 
imagine what that is like. Those who steal have millions, and others have nothing. Our goal 
is to come to power, to create favorable living conditions. We will not destroy private 
property ... We will concentrate on those oligarchs who illegally privatized state property. 
Take, for example, the KVINT cognac factory. They sold it to Sheriff for 20 million 
dollars, when it was valued at nearly 500 million dollars. Somebody put the remaining 
money in their pocket. The Moldova Steel Works (MMZ), the printing and paper factory 
[he continues to list assets] ... We want to return all of them to the state.  They generate real 
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income that goes directly into the pockets of the oligarchs (personal interview, November 
11th, 2008). 
 
He distinguishes between the state and those occupying its institutions. Far from not believing in 
the state, he saw state institutions as co-opted by individuals. These individuals, not the state, 
were to blame for the situation. There existed a simple remedy: return the state to its rightful role 
as a re-distributor by revisiting these corrupt deals. Far from the state withering away under 
communism, his experiences in Soviet times led to expectations vis-à-vis the state that today 
remain unfulfilled. Not sufficiently providing for its citizens, state institutions had been 
deformed under false pretenses. Those at the helm of the state can only sell its assets, not provide 
for its citizens. The people, in his words, are a means for the enrichment of the authorities: 
biomassa. Recognition is unimportant for those in power despite its constant invocation as the 
cornerstone of political discourse.   
The authorities do not care whether or not Transnistria is recognized. They do not care 
about the people [literally, they spit on the people –plevat’]. They will pack their 
suitcases and leave [when this ends].   
 
The demands of performative sovereignty lead to a situation in which economic issues remain 
buried beneath the “political issues” of international recognition. 
 During research, activists involved in the early strike movement stressed the fact that the 
idea of political separation emerged only after Moldova rejected their overtures for economic 
autonomy. As early as 1989, there was talk about a free-economic zone (along the lines of the 
Estonian model during late perestroika). Between its industries, food production, and power 
generation, in 1989 Transnistria was an amazingly productive region. Today, however, residents 
speak not of the economic differences but of systemic ones, since for nearly two decades the 
PMR and Moldova had developed their own “system” – economic rules, educational system, 
political, legal, etc. The PMR uses Russian standards, while Moldova operates according to 
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European standards. This idea of a system and its concomitant systemic base of knowledge was 
used in discussion of education, language, culture, politics, foreign affairs, and any other sphere 
in which disagreements, collective or individual, could potentially be found. 
 
Local Capital Accumulation: Sheriff 
 Political disengagement has been profitable to a few local businesses. The isolationist 
policies of PMR authorities vis-à-vis Moldova have allowed a local holding company, Sheriff, to 
forge an unchallenged monopoly in the region.229 Sheriff was founded by two state security 
officers who started a business to support the families of other policemen. In the 1990s, they 
began taking over the booming cigarette smuggling business.230 At that time locals made money 
smuggling cigarettes from Ukraine to Transnistria and onward to Europe. Gradually, Sheriff took 
over other informal businesses that generated significant income (cigarettes, liquor, frozen 
chicken legs). In the words of one resident, Sheriff was untouchable: “Nobody could touch them 
because they had significant contacts with the police and military as well as with the MGB,” the 
feared Ministry of State Security. Sheriff took over the business opportunities that allowed 
residents to make money in the aftermath of the war. Like many successful businesses in the 
former Soviet Union, who actually stands behind Sheriff remains a mystery; its two owners are 
well-known figures, but it is unclear what control they exercise. Some residents believe that 
members of the President’s family are silent partners, while others say that Sheriff is the 
economic arm of the “power ministries.” 
 Sheriff’s dominance can be traced to 1996 when it concluded a contract on “mutual 
cooperation” with the PMR government. This arrangement created the preconditions for 
                                                
229 In the PMR there is an economic division of labor. Russian investors own the strategic infrastructure (electricity 
generation, the power grid) while Sheriff controls the local consumer goods, both retail and wholesale. 
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monopolizing trade in the region. President Igor Smirnov “recommended” that the state rent the 
largest (and most profitable) state food stores to Sheriff. At the time, these stores were stocked 
with local products and patronized because of their prices, selection, and locations. They were 
Soviet-style stores, with separate counters for each department, but they functioned. Gradually, 
they were closed and replaced by western-style Sheriff supermarkets. For closing its competition, 
Sheriff was rumored to have paid a half-million dollars up front and monthly financial aid to the 
tune of hundreds of thousands of dollars.231 Sheriff’s monopoly was not built upon ingenuity or 
hard work, but upon connections, that most valuable commodity in the former Soviet Union.232 
 Sheriff’s business grew to cover a wide variety of industries and include a network of 
supermarkets, gas stations, and Moldova’s most successful football club, which boasts a massive 
training complex and stadium outside the city.233 Sheriff controls a large regional bank in 
addition to owning the sole telephone (fixed and mobile) and internet service provider in the 
region. Other businesses include textiles, broadcast television, cable/satellite television, auto 
sales, publishing, cognac production, bread making, meat/poultry production, milk production, 
aquaculture, second-hand clothing, light manufacturing, and a local advertising firm. 
 Sheriff has its own customs broker and logistics company that serves as an intermediary for 
other small businesses. One informant told me of a friend who was looking to import kegs of 
beer to sell during the hot summer months. After formalizing the details of his business plan, he 
scheduled a meeting with Sheriff. He was directed to the office of an executive who explained 
                                                                                                                                                       
230 Smuggling was prevalent (and profitable) in both left and right-bank Moldova. 
231 These numbers should not be seen as exact figures.  But given the times, they should be seen for what they are: 
extremely large sums of money paid to alter the fundamental dynamics of market processes in the region. Figures 
cited in Krasnaya Zvezda, December 7, 2001. “Republic of Sheriff” Orest Kollontai. 
232 For more on the importance of informal connections and institutions in the post-Soviet period, see Ledevena 
1998 and 2006. 
233 Just as PMR exports to Europe go there with Moldovan customs stamps, when Sheriff plays in the European 
Champions League, they play under the Moldovan flag.  When the Moldovan international team plays a home 
match, they play it in Tiraspol at Sheriff stadium, since it is the only FIFA approved stadium in Moldova. 
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how business would proceed: Sheriff would import the beer trucks through their own customs 
yard, and he would be responsible for paying a fixed fee per truck. Sheriff would handle the 
documents, logistics, and conveyance to and from the customs yard. He would not be paying the 
state customs yard, but rather Sheriff for the privilege of conducting business. The terms of the 
deal were not negotiable, and it was made clear to him that there would be consequences if he 
proceeded without Sheriff. Whether you run a small market or kiosk, you purchase your 
inventory at one of Sheriff's wholesale depots. Sheriff makes sure that wholesale prices on 
certain goods remain high for their competitors in the retail business to ensure that people 
continue to patronize their supermarkets.  
 
 
  
Fig 10. Photo of a typical Sheriff supermarket in Tiraspol, PMR. Photo by author. 
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 Sheriff supermarkets are known for their creative expiration dates. Friends warned me to 
avoid dairy products, as it was common knowledge that they would buy expired stock, change 
the expiration dates, and sell it as fresh. Since Moldovan imports were prohibitively taxed, 
Sheriff had no competition and could dictate the terms of sale, since no alternative suppliers 
could exist in the region.234 Sheriff is also known for its harsh treatment of workers, and due to 
the precarious economic situation they have an unlimited reserve of labor in the region. In the 
alcohol section, all wine and liquor (except wine from Moldova) have no customs stamps; 
cigarettes sold in Sheriff also have no customs stamps. Many products found in Sheriff are 
counterfeit; one foreign researcher visiting a Tiraspol colleague purchased a counterfeit Colgate 
toothbrush that resulted in bleedings gums and deodorant that left a rash. The emergence of the 
region as a sop for imported gray-market foodstuffs has decimated local food producers, as their 
products are now unprofitable. Despite having some of the most productive agricultural land in 
Moldova, the region imports a disproportionate amount of its food. As the first western-style 
supermarket in the region, Sheriff’s consumerist offers index civility. Consistency and the 
ubiquitous chain store, the bane of consumerism in the America, indexes progress itself. 
Shopping as civilization. 
 Sheriff makes life difficult for small businesses.235 One small business owner I interviewed 
had $500 worth of cigarettes confiscated simply because they had Ukrainian customs stamps (the 
cigarettes were purchased locally). A recent law (rumored to have been passed at the behest of 
Sheriff) made the sale of Ukrainian cigarettes illegal. This rule forced smokers to purchase 
                                                
234 Currently, Moldovan imports are taxed at a rate of 100%, essentially making them uncompetitive. 
235 Though some might see this as the inherent competition in capitalism, the significant political and legislative 
power possessed by Sheriff insulates them from any potential competition. The situation is much more akin to a 
state-supported monopoly. The PMR is small enough and the cost barrier associated with establishing a market 
presence high enough to limit competition. Challenging Sheriff simply is not feasible given their cozy relationship 
with PMR authorities. 
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contraband tobacco products supplied, of course, by Sheriff. Consequently, cigarettes with 
Ukrainian customs stamps increased in value, since they were seen as unadulterated. Demand 
swelled, and customs officials on the PMR's eastern border with Ukraine were directed to 
intercept shipments. It was common knowledge that border guards themselves preferred 
Ukrainian cigarettes. Once it was clear that this regulation was not being effectively enforced, 
Sheriff put its own employees on the border to monitor the situation. The border, the physical 
limit of the state's coercive powers, was policed by those serving not a state institution that held a 
monopoly on violence, but a quasi-state institution that held a monopoly on trade. Despite 
Sheriff’s best efforts, smokers can still find Ukrainian cigarettes. The cigarettes for sale in 
Sheriff supermarkets look almost exactly like the Ukrainian brands previously available. The 
packaging is the same, though some have fake duty-free stickers: duty free Philippines, Dubai, 
and, perhaps most curiously, “North Africa.”  
 If one works in a business owned by Sheriff, one can choose to receive one’s salary 
through a local debit card, Raduga (rainbow), which allows one to receive a 3% discount at 
Sheriff and other Sheriff-controlled stores. With the Raduga card you can access the local 
network of ATMs that operate only in the PMR. Having no competition, Sheriff uses its 
monopoly to take a cut at every step of the process, ensuring that pensioners spend the majority 
of their monthly disbursement at its stores by targeting them for discount programs that other 
retailers cannot afford, ensuring that its employees patronize its other businesses, and that it 
profits every time someone speaks on a phone or uses the internet. Thanks to its charitable 
programs for seniors, Sheriff pays a much lower effective tax rate than its competitors. 
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Fig. 11. Sheriff Stadium at night. Constructed in 2002 at an estimated cost of $200 million, the 
main stadium can seat over 13,000. The stadium complex occupies more than 40 hectares and 
consists of the main stadium plus five other fields, numerous training fields, a covered arena for 
winter use, and a soccer academy to develop local talent, and residences for players. Many of the 
Moldovan national team’s matches are played here.   
  
 
Fig. 12. Billboard advertising FC Sheriff, Sheriff’s football team. FC Sheriff plays in the Divizia 
Naţională, the top division in Moldovan football. In addition to being a seven-time winner of the 
Moldovan Cup, FC Sheriff regularly plays in the UEFA Champions League, Europa League, and 
other tournaments such as the CIS Cup. Photo by author. 
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Sheriff has created a diffuse economic structure that blurs the line between business and politics.  
On paper, it is a holding company, a company that owns other companies' outstanding stock. Yet 
in reality, Sheriff is a company that has profited from close relations to the state. Its low tax 
burden, its widely publicized charity programs for pensioners, and its ubiquitous corporate logo 
(an old Western-style sheriff's badge) lend it an aura of invincibility within the region. Sheriff’s 
name and logo perhaps best exemplify how in the PMR the law truly exists solely at the level of 
representation. Sheriff illustrates how the law functions as an icon, a corporate logo, a symbol of 
a brand that alludes to what is lacking in the PMR (the law as an objective tool of justice) yet 
which remains ubiquitous at the symbolic level. Locals readily accept the Sheriff supermarket 
chain as “ours,” settled custom in the region.236 
 In both the consolidation of the PMR’s sovereignty and the emergence of Sheriff, one 
notices two deft acts of substitution with wide resonance in the PMR. As a set of state 
institutions, the PMR can lay claim to two key victories. On the one hand, with Russian support, 
the PMR successfully repelled Moldovan aggression, eliminated its primary sovereign 
competition and negated the potentially deleterious effects a Moldovan national state might have 
had on the region – or at least on the members of the Transnistrian elite. On the other hand, by 
internally consolidating their power and eliminating (or supplanting) a visible criminal element, 
the PMR’s authorities disarmed the externally generated discourse of criminality. Sheriff is an 
indirect result of eliminating competition both in the licit and illicit economies. Intimately linked 
with the state project (insofar as it is both a symptom and a product of the PMR’s unique 
position), Sheriff has transformed the absence of law (i.e., Transnistria as a “black hole”) into an 
                                                
236 The concept of ours [nashe] denotes something that is considered to be ours or local. It is opposed to the foreign. 
As an adjective, nashe can be applied to consumer goods, ideas, formal/informal institutions, accepted social 
standards, currencies, food products, etc. It is important to note the policing mechanism implicit in this idea: that 
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excess of it insofar as Sheriff substitutes consumerism for its illicit gains (crime). Ironically, the 
criminal is the Sheriff. This substitution is neither virtual nor discursive but real - its economic 
monopoly could only be realized in tandem with the political processes described above. Yet 
when measured against the social and economic decay left by the collapse of the Soviet state, the 
consumerist offerings of Sheriff point to the (real or imagined) economic prowess of the PMR 
itself. The fact that Sheriff is local only serves to insulate it from criticism.  
 
Economic Fictions: Blockades, Sovereignty, and Revenue  
 In November 2002, the PMR introduced a 20% duty on Moldovan imports. Four months 
later the PMR introduced migration controls for foreign citizens entering, leaving and transiting 
the territory of Transnistria. In 2003, the fee for non-residents was set at a rate of 3.4 PMR 
rubles, i.e. 7 Moldovan Lei or about fifty cents (today the fee is around $1.60) (CISR 2003: 19). 
To gather this fee, migration posts were built on the borders of Moldova and Ukraine. In less 
than a month, these posts generated more than seven million dollars, a not insubstantial sum for 
the PMR budget. More importantly, state agents could collect tribute, since foreigners were now 
at the mercy of customs, migration, and security officials who could exploit this legal uncertainty 
for personal gain.237 Registration procedures added yet another material dimension to the reality 
of the PMR and afforded a new revenue stream for bureaucrats and guards. When crossing the 
border, foreigners must pass through three separate bureaucracies (state security, migration 
control, and finally customs), each with their own rules, regulations, and prices, should any 
                                                                                                                                                       
which is not ours is foreign and often threatening by definition. This is perhaps all the more important in a place like 
the PMR 
237 A state positions such as a border guard or customs officer is commonly referred to as an income-giving place 
[doxodnoe mesto]. The benefits received (money, gifts, or services) are tribute [dan’]. Humphrey (2004: 429) 
discusses how tribute in the post-Soviet world constitutes both a “technology of sovereignty” that cannot be separate 
from the wider symbolic imaginary of urban survival in Ulan-Ude, Russia. Among expatriates in Chișinău, I heard 
stories of individuals paying “fines” in excess of 150 Euros, more than twice the monthly salaries for border guards. 
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irregularities be found. I once asked a state security officer why foreigners needed to pass 
through these duplicate bureaucracies, and she rubber her fingers together, the universal sign for 
money. After monetizing the stream of people crossing the PMR border, goods subsequently 
followed. 
 In July 2003, Transnistria introduced a 100% customs duty for all goods imported to the 
region from Moldova. This action signaled a complete switch of trade to shadow economy, since 
legitimate trade with Moldova was now economically unfeasible. In essence, Transnistria sought 
to disengage fully from Moldova and conduct trade through solely through Ukraine. In March of 
2006, in response to EU requirements and a European Commission memo on combating illicit 
activities, Ukraine introduced new customs regulations on its western border with the PMR by 
declaring that it would only accept goods from the PMR with proper Moldovan documentation. 
From 1996 until 2001, Transnistria freely exported with customs seals provided by Chișinău — 
these goods were not subject to Moldovan taxes. In return, PMR authorities were to establish 
joint customs centers with Moldova on the Ukrainian border (Moldovan officials were forbidden 
from entering the PMR). Despite this unfulfilled obligation, the PMR used Moldovan customs 
seals freely until new ones were introduced in 2006.   
 This dispute over economic regulation boiled into a political event as Ukraine began to 
accept only the new Moldovan customs documents for PMR exports in March 2006. The change 
in documentation emerged in response to demands from the EU to regulate Moldovan exports in 
conjunction with EU trade preferences. As a project in the service of a common economic 
market, bringing Moldova into the European market meant regulating trade. What was from the 
European perspective a technocratic decision was seen as an “economic blockade” in 
Transnistria. This idea of a blockade illustrates how tangible steps toward integration with 
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Moldova on somebody else’s terms become politicized. Protests were organized, with factories, 
community organizations, youth organizations, and various Cossack forces participating in 
public demonstrations. Acquaintances told of being released from work obligations and 
transported to the central square to protest, with banners and materials prepared in advance. In 
response to the blockade, Russian political parties and community organizations sent an aid 
convey from Russia to Tiraspol, whose arrival was celebrated as another public example of how 
Russia supports Transnistria during times of crisis. The Russian State Duma recognized the 
events as a “blockade” and warned that events might lead to a “humanitarian disaster.”  
 The “blockade” became a means of reinforcing the idea of residents as a separate people 
threatened by its neighbors. This sequence of events illustrates how a decision in the realm of 
taxation becomes the basis for a political event of significance for residents. Though this is not 
unusual — after all, this is how international trade is conducted — the peculiarities of the PMR 
required a collective response to this shift that challenged their economic independence. This 
event became an opportunity to once again perform its sovereignty to itself and to outsiders. 
While in reality the blockade was more real than virtual, its effects are talked about years later. 
To many, the political aspect seemed unimportant: what was important was that the community 
came together (even if they had to be bussed or otherwise induced to). 
 From the perspective of the Moldovan state, left-bank businesses could easily avoid this 
blockade. Firms wishing to export with Moldovan customs seals must simply register in 
Chișinău. Temporary registration documents are easily obtained, and the tax burden for these 
newly registered companies is negligible, according to Moldovan officials. This “blockade” 
generated significant good will for PMR authorities insofar as it further contributing to the 
mutual distrust between left- and right-bank Moldova. In a New Year's address in 2006, PMR 
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President Igor Smirnov declared that the PMR lost more than $420 million dollars during the 
blockade, a number that exceeds some estimates of Transnistria's GDP. 
 Residents’ memory was selective. Certain facts went unacknowledged in the context of 
the blockade. Local activists, bystanders, and deputies in the Supreme Soviet who could cite by 
memory agreements and memorandums on taxation between Moldova and Transnistria professed 
ignorance when I brought up the fact that the PMR essentially blocks Moldovan products by 
making them economically unprofitable through a 100% tax. Beer produced sixty-seven 
kilometers away in Chișinău costs substantially more than Russian, Ukrainian, and European 
beer in at a market in Tiraspol. Far from allowing for a clear understanding of regional economic 
issues, the sense of siege allows for the messy details to fade away and for the political 
community to be reconstituted. Important details – who profits when Moldovan imports are shut 
out of the PMR, who gains politically when they greet the Russian aid convey, and what popular 
expectations emerge when residents hear outsized estimates of lost revenue – become secondary. 
What is important is who helped Transnistrians in their time of need (Russia) and who caused 
this situation (Moldova, Ukraine, and the EU). The losses from this "economic blockage" are 
useful fictions, constituting a huge percent of its GDP. They are part of a performative project 
built upon individuals’ own experiences in the PMR.  
 This dispute over economic regulation by Moldova and the framing of the issue as a 
“blockade” points to the ideological successes of the PMR state. In the face of a two-decades 
long uncertainty, residents saw this blockade as Moldovan aggression. The language and rhetoric 
used to describe the blockade was violent: bringing Transnistria to its knees, strangling the 
Republic. When confronted with the reality of the tens of thousands of protesters (despite the fact 
that these protesters were ordered [zakazany]) and viewed alongside the pronouncements of the 
 182 
PMR leadership, residents described the protests as the spontaneous, collective expression of the 
people. One protest organizer, experienced in information warfare and propaganda, spoke with 
pride about the protests success at the symbolic level. Residents freely utilize the images, 
ideologies, and constructs circulating in the media and in political discourse. While some do not 
accept these forms as such, their stable existence in the media leads to passive rhetorical use in 
an uncritical manner by residents. These local images remain at odds with the political lexicon of 
Moldova, which seeks closer ties with Europe. 
 
Systemic Differences 
 The objective differences between the PMR and Moldova emerged as a result of their 
divergent trajectories in the post-Soviet period. In the introduction, I wrote of how the PMR 
functions as a system that functions above the individual that displaces blame and evacuates 
agency. In the economic realm this systematic ordering of reality according to Russian standards 
has a practical component. Since their initial separation Moldova and the PMR have had 
different mechanisms of economic management. Moldova’s economy is now dominated by the 
private sector, while in Transnistria the economy initially was state-driven. Similarly, in 
Moldova market-based methods of regulation are practiced while in Transnistria close 
administrative regulation of enterprises remained the norm until privatization.  
 In Moldova agriculture is based on private property; land can be freely bought and sold. 
Under the PMR Constitution all land belongs to the state. A 2003 referendum on the introduction 
of private land ownership did not pass due to low voter turnout.238 One local businessman 
seeking investors for a real estate venture told me that despite there being no law on private 
property, any potential investment with him would be secure, since he had good connections 
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with the state. In the PMR, the state controls access to land. Residents who are citizens 
permanently residing in Transnistria can lease land for 99 years. The lack of a clear private 
property regime allows the state to, in effect, ratify every potential transaction. Whether it is the 
privatization of an apartment, a simple land-lease, an agricultural venture, or construction, the 
state can potentially intercede in any transaction, or at any step of the process. Literally, the 
physical basis of the region is subject to the whims of PMR state institutions and its 
bureaucracy.239  
 The basis for receiving state benefits differs as well. While modern, private pension 
systems have emerged in Moldova, the state disburses all pensions in Transnistria; Moldova is 
moving in the direction of a free-market, European pension system. In Transnistria, pensioners 
(of an estimated 370,000 residents, more than 150,000 are pensioners) receive additional Russian 
“humanitarian aid” along with other discounts (e.g., Sheriff’s senior discount program). Officials 
from the Moldovan Ministry of Reintegration classify pension supplements, dobavki, as Russian 
support for separatism, since people receive material benefits ($15 per month) channeled through 
the PMR state.240 Left-bank politicians deny this despite the visible breakdown on pension stubs 
clearly specifying what part of the pension comes from the PMR and what comes from Russia. 
Pensioners are thus reminded where the extra money comes from and are left to fret what might 
happen should the situation change.  
 Living in Transnistria confers other benefits on residents. Utilities are cheaper in 
Transnistria, which pays lower, non-market rates for electricity, gas, and communal tariffs.241 
                                                                                                                                                       
238 It should be noted that this is the only referendum ever to fail in the PMR. 
239 Property right and stock ownership remain notoriously difficult to define even today in many post-Soviet 
countries. For an overview of how ill-defined property right affected the transition to capitalism in Russia, see 
Varese 1997, particularly 590-592. 
240 Russia gives this aid to all pensioners living in the PMR regardless of what foreign passport they hold. 
241 In 2009, Transnistrians paid $0.08 per cubic meter of gas and $0.04 per 1kWh of electric power. In Moldova 
electric power is three times more expensive, gas - four times. As the tariffs are several times lower than the price on 
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Cheap natural gas subsidizes industries like bread making, while the porous border and large 
informal economy keep Sheriff supermarkets stocked with imported foodstuffs. Any change is 
seen as threatening due to residents’ already precarious existence, since change can be measured 
in simple economic terms. Charity and social benefits are indirectly politicized insofar as 
receiving any category of benefits requires Transnistrian citizenship. Russian citizenship offers 
benefits and is easily obtained. Well-connected Russian passport holders can, for a price, get 
registered [propisano] in Russia, which allows them to receive an additional pension from the 
Russian Federation. The supply of natural gas from Russia indirectly finances the PMR, since the 
region does not pay Gazprom for gas that residents themselves pay for. The government accepts 
payment, but the external gas debt continues to grow. Far from being unrecognized or non-
existent in a de jure form, this performative polity is real to residents. The PMR state provides 
the subsidies, economic benefits, and the ideological framework required for a coherent 
existence. In light of the significant external subsidies, Transnistria is more aptly seen as a 
dependent state that proclaims its independence and performing its sovereignty to its citizens.  
 Transnistria challenges the narrative of an open, integrated Europe in the same way that 
the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad did before EU expansion in 2004. In the run up to the EU’s 
eastward expansion Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave bordered by Lithuania and Poland, was 
similarly constructed as a potential zone of instability, with rampant smuggling, infectious 
diseases, unsecured arms caches, and uncontrolled population flows threatening the European 
                                                                                                                                                       
the Russian gas supplied to Transnistria, the PMR is not able to pay completely for gas supplied by the Gazprom. As 
a result, the debt reached $2 billion. Gazprom cannot apply any sanctions, as the PMR is not recognized and for the 
reason that the transit gas main goes through Transnistria westwards (its disconnection may result in the violation of 
the Russian concern's commitments to foreign partners). For more on this, see Chamberlain-Creanga and Allin 2010 
and Bruce and Yafima 2009. 
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Union.242 Like the Kaliningrad question, Transnistria sheds light on what occurs when a 
supranational polity like the EU runs into the unsettled territorial and economic realities of the 
post-Soviet world. Implicit in this normative frame is the idea of internationality, the idea that 
the nation-form is the global standard for territorial control.243 This idea of territory and 
internationality is itself the product of a capitalism that has carved up the world into property 
owned by states. Wars are fought over ownership and control of territories, with the profit 
motive playing a large historic role in determining where and when conflicts arise.  
 From the EU perspective, Transnistria is an entity in need of economic discipline and 
commensuration (Espeland and Stevens 1998). In 2008, I interviewed two deputies from the 
PMR Supreme Soviet who were skeptical of EU’s stated intentions to integrate the region by 
allowing it access to the common EU market. Both saw integration as a way to usurp their means 
of governance. Based on 2008 figures, the EU is Moldova’s largest trading partner, accepting 
nearly 48% of Moldovan exports; Russia is Moldova’s second largest export destination (29%) 
(Eurostat 2009).244 When I asked about the EU role in the region, specifically the new Moldovan 
trade regime,245 both deputies stressed how disruptive this regime was. In the words of one 
deputy, Ukraine, under its pro-American leaders (this was 2008, the last years of Yushchenko’s 
Orange Revolution), signed onto the blockade and led what he described as an economic 
“genocide” against its own people, citing the fact that many residents are also Ukrainian citizens. 
                                                
242 “Despite the use of the ‘black hole’ rhetoric, the EU’s concerns in Kaliningrad were primarily economic. In 2001, 
the region’s per capita income was five hundred dollars, fives times less than Lithuania’s and forty times less than 
the EU average” (Krickus 2001: 125). 
243 “[Internationality is] a style of thought and global social organisation that tries to generate a plurality of nations, 
in order that, for any piece of land, and for any human being, there should be a definite answer to the question 
‘which nation is responsible?’ Internationality, you might say, is the tendency for the global imposition of the 
nation-form.” (Jonathan Rée, 992: 9–10). Benedict Anderson (1991: 19) similarly argues that modern “state 
sovereignty is fully, flatly and evenly operative over each square centimeter of a legally demarcated territory.” 
244 These numbers are based on goods exported with Moldovan customs documents. 
245 Under the new Moldovan regulations, exports were accepted only with the new Moldovan custom stamps. The 
Moldovan customs stamps that the PMR had used freely before were now invalid. 
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 He stressed that all negative information about smuggling was ordered [zakazany], and 
paid for by the West. Furthermore, he added, such misinformation must be viewed in terms of 
the competition between the United States and Russia. He seamlessly segued into a discussion of 
the economic blockade and how the issue of EU trade preferences was but a ruse to bring the 
PMR under Moldovan control. To illustrate this point, he gave the issue of how EU trade 
preferences for apples are only valid in February. Until February, the apples must be stored, 
since you cannot supply them earlier. He asked whether this made sense, since apples are 
harvested from June until October – why should they only be sold in February? This would 
require storage and infrastructure. From his perspective, the benefits of the European market are 
outweighed by the costs required to comply with its regulations. 
 Another deputy told of numerous problems introduced by the Moldovan customs regime 
for his constituents. Since the 2005 customs regime went into effect, managers at the MMZ steel 
factory have been required to export through Moldova with Moldovan railroad wagons. He told 
of receiving angry calls from managers at the factory who had to pay Moldovan bureaucrats to 
provide the needed cars. Previously, they had exported directly through Ukraine and onward to 
Russia. Due to the new customs regime, managers at MMZ must arrange transport through 
Chișinău, pay to arrange the wagons, and then transport their goods through a checkpoint in 
Moldova before turning around to head to Ukraine or Russia. EU trade preferences turned a 
previously simple economic transaction into a circuitous journey that required navigating two 
contradictory bureaucracies, each with their own interests. The agreement between Moldova and 
the EU (with Ukraine’s support) forced PMR economic output to be re-routed through Moldovan 
state institutions where they were now subject to the standard post-Soviet bribes and bureaucratic 
rent seeking. What is important from the perspective of Transnistrian economic entities is that 
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the previous way of doing business is now impossible, since they are not fully part of an 
economy controlled by a single state. The change in the customs regime opens what was once 
solely a Transnistrian source of revenue to the prying hands of a “foreign” authority. While he 
did not deny there were benefits, he resented the fact that money flows from the PMR to those 
uninvolved in the production process.   
 Crises offer a powerful means of motivation. The crises experienced by region (most 
notably the 1992 war, along with numerous blockades, floods, and droughts) are caused by 
outsiders, by those seeking to liquidate PMR statehood, or they are acts of God. These 
catastrophes are avoided only through the ingenuity of local politicians and with the beneficence 
of the Russian Federation. Unable to repay Russia, the PMR repays its debt symbolically through 
a pro-Russia ideology and by defending Russian interests. This pro-Russian ideology is paraded 
publicly and dispersed throughout society. It remains available whenever disputes or 
irregularities arise. Fealty to Russia is ritualized means of assuaging geopolitical anxieties or 
denying agency or complicity. 
 As a polity that exists outside any recognized legal framework, the PMR threatens the 
stable jurisdictional boundaries of a united Europe and raises the question of who is responsible 
for regulating the region’s economic outputs? Though legally part of the Republic of Moldova, 
Russia exercises the primary means of control through its subsidized natural gas that finances the 
regional budget. Russia provides a yearly aid to Transnistria, with figures ranging from 30 
million to over 200 million dollars.246 Though a small, visible portion of this aid is earmarked for 
vulnerable sections of the population (mostly to pensioners and orphans), the vast majority is 
                                                
246 Valery Kuzmin, the Russian Ambassador to Moldova, stated in June 2010 that Russian humanitarian aid to the 
region totaled $27-29 million dollars per year for the last three years, "Transnistria must be treated as an equal 
partner in conflict settlement talks," http://www.azi.md/en/story/11938 Accessed September 20, 2011. It is unclear 
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earmarked for “supporting Transnistrian industry, its national currency, and the solvency of its 
state pension fund.”247 The tendency for outsiders to see Russia as directly controlling 
Transnistria is false, if only because the authorities have had nearly two decades to consolidate 
their rule and position themselves as the sole conduit for Russian aid. The PMR state remains the 
sole (re)distributor of internal and external wealth. This distribution operates within material 
(pensions supplements, government benefits) and symbolic (recognition of residents’ difficult 
subject positions) registers. Whether it is a few dollars a month in discounts, hundreds of 
thousand dollars in tax credits, or cheap gas that you never use because you do not own a car, 
everybody gets something.   
 
“Washing” Money: The Middle of Nowhere as the Center of Everything   
 Money is a social relation, a symbolic system, and a material reality.248 Money can either 
be a source of national stability or of collective anxiety.249 When the state fails to provide a 
                                                                                                                                                       
what the category of humanitarian aid includes and what other types of aid (economic, military, financial) Russia 
gives to the region. 
247 “Transnistria will receive from Russia more financial assistance.” http://politicom.moldova.org/news/transnistria-
will-receive-from-russia-more-financial-assistance-200879-eng.html 
248 Money can be divided into categories, each with different terms used to describe them. Tokens denote the 
physical representation (usually coins or bills) they serve as money. Cash is a term of accounting, the sum of tokens 
and other highly liquid legal claims (e.g., cash on hand for businesses); money in the bank is cash, but not a token 
until it is redeemed. Currency denotes all claims, potential or real, for a given class of tokens with regard to the 
holder; currency implies an issuer, a government, or a community that uses the currency. Money is all of the above, 
but in the abstract sense; to speak of money is to speak of society, of an embedded cultural context in which 
particular tokens circulate. Money is instituted and defined by a society; it cannot exist independently of a society 
that uses it. Subject to convention (law, regulation, and custom), money is a floating signifier, representing nothing 
in particular but rather receiving its content from its context, from the will of its users (Westbrook 2004: 41-42). 
Money forms no associations, and its promise to representing anything in particular is never fulfilled, as its inherent 
fungibility eludes any singular representation. 
249 Simmel (1907) wrote at length about money and modernity, about how money’s abstraction and anonymity 
liberated people from status distinctions and fostered egalitarianism yet paradoxically left them with only money to 
judge the world around them (Maurer 2006: 19). Hart (1986) posits money as relating to political entities and to 
markets, “two sides of the coin,” as money is a token backed by the state and a commodity set in motion by the 
market. The state side of the coin reflects political authority while the market side reflects the horizontal relationship 
inherent in market exchange (Hart 1986; Maurer 2006: 27). Through money, the state creates value through its word 
(and, by extension, belief in this word) and markets create value through material exchanges. The iconography and 
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stable monetary environment, alternative currencies proliferate, as was the case in the United 
States during the Great Depression. Even today, local currencies circulate alongside national 
ones. Yet when a currency’s inherent fictionality is revealed, there can be profound economic 
effects and social disruptions.250 Though largely insulated from international financial flows, 
money in Transnistria is alternately a curse or a blessing, a reminder of unfulfilled hopes or a 
measure of relative enrichment. The Transnistrian ruble, the only official currency circulating in 
this unrecognized country, alludes to the paradoxes of modern economics and the larger political 
background in which exchange takes place. The basic tenet of money– that its value is backed by 
nothing more than faith in its issuing entity – is particularly salient in place like the PMR.   
 The PMR’s currency dates to 1993 when Soviet rubles ceased to circulate. In 1991, the 
region experienced an acute shortage of money that was aggravated when PMR was forced to 
leave the (Soviet) ruble zone. In 1993, old Soviet rubles with stamps glued on them were put into 
circulation.251 One year later special, PMR rubles were printed in Russia and Austria. The 
Transnistrian ruble was initially not a currency but instead functioned as a payment coupon. 
Nicknamed the suvorovka after the famous Russian general depicted on it (all denominations of 
the currency bears his portrait), the currency has had a difficult time. Since its introduction, the 
exchange rate has plummeted; in the summer of 1995 one U.S. dollar could buy 35,000 - 40,000 
Transnistrian rubles (Kolstø and Malgin 1998: 112-113). In 2000, the Transnistria ruble was 
redenominated from 1,000,000 to 1. Since then, it has largely maintained its stability, with its 
exchange rates set by the Transnistrian central bank, since the currency is not traded 
internationally. 
                                                                                                                                                       
symbolism of money offers a chance to understand how money related to national identity and how its functions in 
larger political projects to strengthen national sentiment and solidarity (the most modern example being the Euro). 
250 Witness the price of gold, which from 2000 until 2010 has skyrocketed from under $300 to more than $1200 per 
ounce. 
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 The use of old Soviet rubles may at first glance seem like an ad hoc means of payment 
useful to differentiate themselves vis-à-vis Moldova. Yet like most things in Transnistria, the 
story is more complicated and lends credence to the maxim that the middle of nowhere is the 
center of everything.252 Caches of old Soviet rubles and the lure of illicit convertibility converge 
in a tale of how the Soviet 14th army, based in Tiraspol, temporarily turned Transnistria into a 
money laundering operation on an unprecedented scale. Much of what follows is based upon 
recollections from residents and from the memoirs of military officials with direct knowledge of 
it. For a brief period during the summer of 1993, in the immediate aftermath of armed conflict 
with Moldova, the military field bank of the 14th Soviet Army became a sinkhole for old Soviet 
rubles, a place where trains full of worthless money were exchanged for newly minted Russian 
rubles and later United States dollars. Russian leaders in Moscow decided to use the bank to 
exchange the old Soviet money that, according to officials, had not already been exchanged. This 
order came from none other than Yeltsin’s defense minister, Pavel Grachev.253 At that time, the 
exchange of Soviet rubles for new currencies had ceased in all of the former Soviet republics 
except for war-torn Tajikistan, the last country to leave the ruble zone in 1995. In the summer of 
1993, billions of old Soviet rubles ceased to be stores of value and were worth less than the paper 
they were printed on. The military field bank was ostensibly to be used for the financial needs of 
the 14th Army (salaries, purchasing food, equipment, fuel, etc.), yet this order from the Ministry 
of Defense allowed the bank to convert old Soviet rubles into Russian rubles.  
                                                                                                                                                       
251 The stamps depicted Tiraspol’s founder, Alexander Suvorov. 
252 I borrow this expression from Jack Hitt’s print and radio journalism on Nauru. See “The Billion-Dollar Shack,” 
The New York Times Magazine, December 10th, 2000 and his This American Life piece. 
253 Grachev gained notoriety primarily because of his military incompetence and longstanding allegations of 
corruption. In the PMR, he was alleged to be involved in a scheme that used the military-field bank of the 14th 
Army to exchange then-worthless Soviet rubles for Russian rubles. During fieldwork, informants described 
suitcases, automobiles, and trains full of old Soviet rubles that were converted. Allegedly, Alexander Lebed and 
Mikhail Bergman (the former commander of the Tiraspol garrison of the 14th Army) tried to halt this illicit scheme 
but were personally rebuked by Grachev. 
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 One lifelong resident of Tiraspol told me of how he personally witnessed caravans of 
trucks and trains carrying Soviet currency into the region from Russia and far flung parts of the 
former Soviet Union.254 Then (and now) the region was legally part of the Republic in Moldova, 
located hundreds of kilometers from the Russian Federation. This exchange scheme is but one of 
the many machinations [makhanatsia] that occurred as the remnants of the Soviet Union were 
picked apart by those with one hand in the state-controlled economy and the other in the free 
market.  
 In his memoirs, Mikhail Bergman (former commander of the Tiraspol garrison of the 14th 
Army) portrays Alexander Lebed (then commander of the 14th Army and later a Russian 
presidential candidate and governor) as trying to disrupt these exchanges. Ultimately, Lebed was 
unsuccessful in the face of pressure from Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, President Yeltsin, and 
PMR authorities. Informants told me that this illicit exchange was not limited to Kremlin 
insiders. It was common knowledge that businesses from Transnistria, Moldova, and other 
Soviet republics exchanged money in the region. The opportunity was not lost on individuals, 
who arrived in droves to exchange their old Soviet rubles. One elderly resident, speaking about 
the introduction of new money in Transnistria, described how the locals were powerless in the 
face of a monetary flood of unprecedented proportions.   
Russia did their own money, we ordered money in Moscow for Transnistria, Sergei 
Dubinin [at the time Deputy Chairman of the Russian State Committee on Economic 
Cooperation with CIS States] wouldn't give out this money that was already paid for. 
What could we do? At that time, old Soviet money from all republics went into the 
garbage. Nobody needed it. Somehow, suddenly, people knew that in Transnistria they 
still used the old Soviet money. People came from all the countries of the former USSR 
in cars filled with the old money, with bags of money.  They bought everything that they 
could find in stores. You understand, even the wooden handles of shovels didn't remain. 
Nothing – empty shelves. How could we live? Then they [Transnistrian authorities] 
quickly printed these little stamps (with Suvorov); they started to call this money 
suvorovki [after Alexander Suvorov, the Russian general and founder of Tiraspol]. Each 
                                                
254 In all likelihood these Soviet rubles had already been exchanged. 
 192 
stamp had a number 1,000, 10,000, 15,000, 50,000, 100,000 … devaluation was terrible, 
catastrophic. At the beginning, when these stamps came, what did they do? Each worker 
was given a checkbook, attested for by the bookkeeper and factory director. [When you 
wanted to buy something,] you would go to the store and have them deduct the amount 
from your checkbook. Previously, you could buy a car with these check books. To go to 
the store and use it to buy half a kilo of sausage! It was savagery. Huge lines … we all 
lived through this … Later there was an understanding with Russia …. It [money] would 
come through military field bank of the 14th army. Lebed was the commander. Lebed 
closed this, and they [Transnistrian authorities] remained without anything. Lebed was a 
populist.   
 
Far from existing as an exchange bureau for Soviet rubles of dubious provenance, the military 
field bank was the legitimate channel for receiving money from Moscow, money that was, in his 
words, bought and paid for. In his narrative, the PMR state is blameless, as it is individuals 
(Dubinin, Lebed) that hindered the calm transition. During the time of this exchange, one 
informant told me, everything had its price. And when money could literally be conjured from 
trash, it was hard to refuse a good deal — everything was for sale. Military officers sold the 
equipment and supplies of the 14th Army at cut-rate prices, from cars, fuel, equipment, and even 
apartments designated for servicemen and their families. The spoils of the Soviet state were 
natural resources to be extracted by those who knew how to navigate the terrain between the 
institutions of a then non-existent socialist state and the emerging capitalist market.  
 Despite this all, international recognition remains the orienting frame of the Transnistrian 
subject. Remarking on the sudden disappearance of state socialism, one informant condensed the 
myriad of economic problems in the region in terms of the issue of recognition.   
Before the fall of the USSR we had a socialist system. There was socialism. We got used 
to that system, we were born under it, and we lived our whole lives under it. And 
suddenly socialism collapsed. It began in the center, and then it collapsed everywhere. 
Well, how to survive? It is easier for those countries that are recognized to survive. Ours 
isn't recognized. A factory, if it works, it produces products. Products can't simply go into 
storage, products should be exported, sent to those who ordered them. There should be 
imports and exports, but to do that you need to conclude contracts with somebody. But 
the world says that we can only conclude contracts with countries that are recognized, we 
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are an unrecognized state. If you can't fulfill your obligations, they you can't obtain 
economic liability … we are unrecognized.   
 
He concluded this exchange by talking about the need to create private enterprises that would 
then be able to conclude contracts in the context of capitalist exchange. In his mind, recognition 
would confer convertibility upon the PMR’s economy and enable it to prosper by engaging with 
other recognized countries on equal terms. As one reads this, however, one is struck by how 
outdated notions of production, contracts, and business practices are overshadowed by 
recognition. He speaks as if global economic competition would vanish once recognition is 
secured. When required, blame can be placed on individuals or on collective entities, but blame 
is never found within. In this dichotomous worldview, the larger context of plunder and 
manipulation is never connected with locals. The last critical step – connecting the dots – is 
never taken, as the evidence might lead back to a founding untruth. Liminality-at-large once 
again rears its ugly head.  
 The dichotomous worldview of us versus them constitutes a scalable logic that easily can 
be applied to other realms. During my time in the region, the details of embezzlement and 
corruption were known right down to the persons involved and the amount of money. Such 
intimate details functioned not as revelations to be shouted from the rooftops, but as the basis for 
local knowledge. These revelations hark back to the writings of Canetti, who argued that secrecy 
lies at the heart of power. Taussig expands upon Canetti’s dictum through his notion of the 
public secret, “that which is generally known, but cannot be articulated” (1999: 5). The 
circulation of the public secret creates social subjects who know what not to know, who 
understand the details but are unable to articulate them publicly. It is not that people are unable, 
but that there is no sense in articulating these details, since nothing will change and most want to 
avoid trouble for themselves and their families. On numerous occasions I was reminded, in 
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response to some question, of the Russian proverb, “the less you know, the better you sleep.” 
The region’s hyper-marginality and uncertain legal basis only contributes to the intrigue and 
paranoia residents speak of when describing the current state of affairs.255 
 
Economic Flows and Informational Architecture 
 Perhaps more than anything, what stands out when viewing the aforementioned economic 
issues is how each has been refined and shaped by regional particularities. In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, Soviet development had given the region a rich industrial base that played an 
outsized role in the economy of the MSSR. This economic differentiation became the basis for 
political disengagement. This subsequent political separation afforded the PMR the largess of the 
Russian Federation, a sponsor with geopolitical and economic interests in the region. Russian 
subsidies insulate the region from the demands of market discipline and provide pensioners with 
just enough benefits to see no incentive to change. Within the PMR, state institutions and 
bureaucrats have staked fiefdoms in which significant economic rents can be generated.  
 Sheriff’s connections with PMR authorities are not disputed, though its opacity vis-à-vis 
the state positions it beyond criticism, for it functions as a provider where the state falters. Two 
decades of separation have created a readily available inventory of systemic differences between 
the PMR and Moldova; the PMR’s initial hopes and goals of economic prosperity and 
independence now anchor a politicized reality that lacks any significant productive base — it is 
purely rhetorical and performative. On more than one occasion President Igor Smirnov has 
declared that the PMR has all of the preconditions to become a “small Switzerland.” Such 
                                                
255 Undoubtedly there are other schemes for making money in Transnistria (some of which I deal with elsewhere), 
though my research was limited by my position as a foreign interlocutor limited the lines of questioning I could 
realistically pursue. 
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proclamations contain the required keywords of prosperity that overlook the very real economic 
predation and decay in the region.    
 Though Russia reliably supports the PMR, its support is not unconditional. The region's 
most valuable assets remain in Russian hands. Perhaps sensing the need for change, Russia no 
longer unconditionally supports President Smirnov. Until a few months ago, pensioners received 
additional Russian “humanitarian aid” each month in the form of pension supplements of $15 a 
month. Russia recently suspended its aid payments until their distribution methods could be 
refined and an independent audit conducted. Meanwhile, the former President Igor Smirnov was 
forced to pay the supplements with natural gas utility fees. These receipts have traditionally been 
used for discretionary spending — the money previously was deposited in a bank connected to 
the president’s son, now since the resumption of Russian aid in 2012 they have been directly 
transferred to the new President Yevgheny Shevchuk. 
 Virilio famously declared that information is architecture by other means (2007). In the 
PMR information becomes a means of social control, a way to create the appearance of order. In 
Transnistria, secrecy, rumor, intrigue, and the selective narration of events give the population a 
vocabulary with which to apprehend their present situation, seen to be the result of “double 
standards” by the West. For those who lived through the late Soviet period, the 1992 conflict 
with Moldova, or have simply experienced PMR statehood, the state is not the entity that profits 
from business, but the legitimate successor to the Soviet Union. The chaos of the 1990s and the 
present state of affairs preclude blame for local leaders. This narrative forecloses culpability: 
nationalists caused the Soviet Union to disintegrate. Moldova tried to take over our land and our 
factories, but we fought back and won.  After more than two decades, residents find a degree of 
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comfort in being cast as outlaws and bandits.256 In the words of one resident, the primary success 
of the PMR has been to turn the region into a “swamp” in which people, ideas, and initiatives are 
not thwarted outright but left to sink on their own. Just as any attempt to build a business is likely 
to end in disappointment if it catches the eye of someone with more connections or Sheriff, any 
attempt to analyze the situation critically will only lead to disappointment when faced with a 
system that ceaselessly realizes its profit at the people’s expense. 
 
Conclusion 
 I now want to return to the question of the people as biomass, [biomassa]. How does a 
population become biomassa? The quote itself comes from the former director of the 
Transnistrian Central Bank. Though unattributed, it presciently summarizes the physical and 
material situation of residents. The people, an undifferentiated mass of individuals who spend, 
constitute passive consumers, individuals who earn a meager salary or subsist on a miserable 
pension. Due to its near-monopoly, Sheriff successfully captures the majority of the region’s 
economic transactions. Money not captured by Sheriff goes to pay utility bills and rent, funds 
gathered by the authorities to pay for Russian gas that finances the government. When this quote 
came up in conversations, reactions to the notion of the population as biomassa ranged from 
tirades of curse words to nods and affirmations. Rooted to the region by familial bonds and 
proud of this once-productive place, this biomassa is not infinitely renewable. Fifteen years ago 
the region’s population was nearly 750,000; official statistics today put the number 520,000, but 
in reality it is probably closer to 370,000, with nearly 150,000 pensioners (Fedorov 2009). When 
                                                
256 Soon Transnistria's outlaws and bandits will come to the big screen. In October 2011 shooting wrapped on a film 
adaptation of a largely false criminal memoir written by a Transnistrian living in Italy, Nicolai Lilin. For more 
discussion of the book, Siberian Education, see Bobick 2011: 249-252. 
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people cease to be useful politically, they are not deprived of citizenship or expelled from the 
community, but abandoned to a slow death (Berlant 2007).  
 One recent article in a local opposition newspaper, “Genocide – Transnistria?” was 
written by Ivan Mikhailovich Fedorov, a ninety-four year old veteran of the Great Patriotic 
War.257 The article talks about the man who brought peace to Transnistria, General Lebed, who 
proclaimed in 1992 that Moldova was conducting “genocide against its own people.” This 
genocide, a “monster with many heads,” continues unabated through poverty, hopelessness, 
alcoholism, drugs, and a lack of spirituality. Transnistria, Fedorov writes, is “probably the only 
state in the world whose government looks at the death of its own people with absolute 
indifference.” According to the author, the main weapon to combat this genocide is the love of 
one’s land, the place where they were born and raised. Yet this weapon is also a curse. Having 
failed to build a “little Switzerland,” residents can live in ignorance or to accept their place in the 
system. Residents object to being seen as ignorant about the affairs of their country, but 
discerning the truth from the fictions propagated by the state is asking too much of the generative 
appendages of the state machine. Acknowledging complicity would implicate the self in the 
process.  
 Having experienced the demise of a superpower, the audacious hopes of a young state, 
and the collapse of its ideals, residents are left with frustration, apathy, and cynicism. In the face 
of proclamations that posit Transnistria as heaven on earth, the disjuncture between the mediated 
world and the real world becomes too much to bear. The text of Ivan Mikhailovich’s article bears 
this out. Having no strength left to question or to object, he can only recall the chilling anecdote: 
“if you are raped, try to relax and have fun.” Though cruel, for this veteran of the Great Patriotic 
                                                
257 “Genocide – Transnistria?”  Геноцид по – приднестровски? In Man and His Rights, Человек и его права. No. 
37(84). http://dnestrnews.info/n37-84/597-genocid-po-pridnestrovski.html Accessed November 8, 2010. 
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War this expression appropriately captures the very real situation of people living without 
protections. Not abandoned by sovereign power nor merely the holders of sovereignty, in a literal 
sense the people are sovereign power insofar as they perform it yet also constitute the static force 
that generates the material means of statehood.258 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
258 For more on the body and sovereignty, see Agamben 1998, 1999. These topics are addressed in both the 
introduction in the section “Sovereignty and Anthropology” as well as in “Biology and the Nation.”  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CHE GUEVARA IN TIRASPOL: GEOPOLITICS, KNOWLEDGE, AND SPECTACLE 
 
 
 
 
Hanging above the counter was a black tee shirt with a portrait of Che Guevara and the 
inscription: ‘Rage Against the Machine’. On the piece of cardboard under the tee shirt it said: 
‘Bestseller of the month!’ There was nothing surprising about that – Tatarsky knew very well (he 
had even written about it in one of his concepts) that in the area of radical youth culture nothing 
sells as well as well-packaged and politically correct rebellion against a world that is ruled by 
political correctness and in which everything is packaged to be sold. 
 
Victor Pelevin, Generation P 
 
 
 
The spectacle is not a collection of images; rather, it is a social relationship between people that 
is mediated by images. 
Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle 
 
 
 
Everywhere there are postmodernists – they haunt us. 
            Dmitri Soin 
 
 
In the 21st century, wars are not fought solely on the battlefield. The battle for public 
opinion — the information war — constitutes a front whose importance is acknowledged yet 
which is an unlikely candidate for ethnographic research. This chapter investigates a single 
organization, Proryv,259 located in Tiraspol. Proryv is a Che-themed political movement that 
emerged in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution in 2005. As a project that began as a youth 
social movement and later became a political party, Proryv offers a unique perspective on PMR 
social issues, political practice, and knowledge production (Boyer 2005). Proryv conducts 
various activities (sports, charity, education, politics, leadership) and seeks to instill patriotism 
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and reciprocity in the young generation of Transnistrians. Proryv, like other political parties, 
seeks to build up a constituency by increasing its “brand” through marketing techniques, 
agitprop,260 and public relations. Proryv’s own activists and leaders use of this distinctly modern 
marketing vocabulary (brand, market segment) alongside a distinctly Soviet political lexicon. As 
an explicitly postmodern project (more on this below), Proryv sheds light on the social life of 
philosophical knowledge and spectacle in the former Soviet Union.  
Competitive elections created a new system of information brokers and consultants 
(political technologists) whose primary job was to manipulate political processes while 
maintaining the appearances of democracy.261 Political technologists serve simultaneously as the 
meta-programmers, system designers, and decision-makers of the formal aspects of politics 
(elections, campaigns, parties, etc.) (Wilson 2005). Astutely aware of the power of old and new 
technologies, political technologists have created a system of virtual objects and institutions such 
as political parties, think tanks, and civil society organizations that mimic their democratic 
equivalents. A focus on the underlying terms and knowledge used by the practitioners of virtual 
politics allows one to revisit social theory and academic discourse through ethnography. While it 
is one thing for an academic with a steady diet of social theory to deny that there are any fixed 
meanings, it is another to see such thinking in action in the capital of an unrecognized separatist 
state.    
In the context of the PMR’s non-recognition, it is useful to look at its unique symbolic 
and representational processes. The PMR, like much of the world, has experienced a shift 
                                                                                                                                                       
259 The organization’s preferred self-appellation is either the shortened “Proryv!” or the somewhat length People’s 
Democartic Party - International Youth Corporation “Proryv!” Typically it is abbreviated in Russian as НДП-ММК 
“Прорыв!” 
260 They use the Russian term for this, agitprop, which is short for agitation and propaganda. The term originated in 
the Soviet Union as a shortened form of the Department for Agitation and Propaganda, otdel agitatsii i propaganda. 
261 This is true even in the West, where the spin doctor is a long-accepted part of American politics. 
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whereby its political economy shifted from the production of actual goods and commodities to a 
symbolic economy in which images dominate. It is a place which, to paraphrase Guy Debord, 
there has been a marked shift from having to appearing (Debord 1994). The vibrant social, 
cultural, and economic life of the Soviet period existed, while today the PMR exists largely 
because of its ability to maintain the facade of a state. Similarly, Baudrillard (1994) addresses the 
shift from a modern society organized around the production and consumption to a postmodern 
one organized around simulation and the play of images and signs. In the latter, codes, models, 
and signs constitute a social order in which simulation rules.262 In this context, identities are 
constructed through the appropriation of images, which become enmeshed within codes and 
models that influence how individuals perceive themselves and their relations to others. This 
logic of simulation permeates economics, politics, social life, and culture. Ultimately, simulation 
determines the contours of reality: how goods are consumed, how politics occurs, how culture is 
produced, and ultimately how everyday life is lived. 
 
Introducing Proryv 
Proryv’s headquarters are hard to miss. Situated on the central street in Tiraspol, the 
looming statue of Alexander Suvorov on horseback glances obliquely at its office. Proryv’s glass 
façade features two large (two-meter high) portraits of Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, 
both of which are framed by the iconic black headshot of Che Guevara. The portraits appear 
abnormally stylized in a city marked by its otherwise bland Soviet architecture, not unlike the 
                                                
262 In Simulacra and Simulation, Baudrillard writes: “To dissimulate is to pretend not to have what one has. To 
simulate is to feign to have what one doesn’t have. One implies a presence, the other an absence. But it is more 
complicated than that because simulating is not pretending: “Whoever fakes an illness can simply stay in bed and 
make someone believe he is ill. Whoever simulates an illness produced in himself some of the symptoms” (Littre). 
Therefore, pretending, or dissimulating, leaves the principle of reality intact: the difference is clear, it is only 
masked; whereas simulation threatens the difference between the “true” and the “false,” the “real” and the 
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mirrored shopping centers that periodically punctuated the Soviet-era buildings common in 
provincial cities across the former Soviet Union. Next to each poster is an endorsement for these 
twin pillars of Russian politics: “Putin’s Proryv,” “Proryv is for Dmitry Medvedev.” The Russian 
tricolor and the flag of the PMR frame the commentary itself.  
The Russian word proryv translates into English as “breakthrough.” The organization is 
modeled on pro-Western organizations such as Otpor (Serbia), Kmara (Georgia), and those 
active in the Ukraine during the Orange Revolution. Proryv was founded in June 2005 as a youth 
corporation and became a political party in 2006.263 According to their website, Proryv was 
founded by a group of sociology students who initially organized a series of actions in support of 
democracy and human rights. After these actions, students turned to their sociology professor, 
Dmitri Soin, Proryv’s erstwhile leader and ideologue, to “show them the way” to political and 
social self-development. In their own words, these actions instilled a sense of camaraderie and 
awakened a desire for political engagement.264  
In 2005, “colored revolutions” and an economic blockade by the Republic of Moldova 
threatened Transnistria.265 Proryv’s metamorphosis from a group of sociology students to a well-
funded social movement is directly related to these threats. Street-level pickets, marches, and 
flash mobs constitute Proryv’s agitprop repertoire. Tireless self-promoters, their website 
describes their earliest actions as resonating far beyond the PMR: “the actions reverberated on 
                                                                                                                                                       
“imaginary.” Is the simulator sick or not, given that he produces “true” symptoms? Objectively one cannot treat him 
as being either ill or not ill.” (Baudrillard 1994: 3). 
263 The office name of Proryv is the International Youth Corporation Proryv, and they later added the qualifier 
People’s Democratic Party after forming their political party in 2006.  It is unclear whether the corporation is merely 
an umbrella label or whether the organization actually functions like a corporation, with shared, a corporate board, 
etc.  Aside from newspapers, small publications, internet advertising on their websites, and short courses, Proryv had 
few means of generating cash that would lead one to believe that it was a corporation. 
264 Transnistrian “Proryv!” Official site.  http://proriv.wordpress.com/ Accessed August 8, 2010.  All quotes for this 
section come from the organizations website.  All translations are my own. 
265 Proryv’s website lists the threat of colored revolutions, the subsequent economic blockade, and the referendum of 
2006 as formative events that required their assistance. 
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the walls of international organizations, on the border with Moldova and Ukraine, and in 
international youth forums and conferences.”266 Proryv actions have three primary goals: (1) to 
preserve the Russian presence in the PMR; (2) to defend the rights of Transnistrians and to 
affirm their right to statehood; and (3) to oppose “the double standards of the international 
community.” These points contain the core tenets of the PMR’s unrecognized existence: 
maintaining Russian support, performing and affirming PMR sovereignty, and articulating a 
critique of international sovereignty in the 21st century. The People’s Democratic Party “Proryv” 
was founded in response to calls for Proryv to “come to power” that came in  the form of 
increasingly loud demands that they assume a formal political mandate.267 The organization 
views this as noteworthy: “The uniqueness of the situation lies in the fact that no adult party has 
created a youth movement and the youth movement grew into a political party.”268  Though this 
situation has been repeated in both Western and Eastern Europe, it is a first for the PMR. 
Like most founding myths, this one tends to obscure more than it reveals. This official 
history effaces the Kremlin connections that initially financed the organization. Much intrigue 
remains centered on a single individual, Modest Kolerov. In 2005, Kolerov was appointed by 
President Putin to head a newly created “Department for Interregional and Cultural Relations.” 
This department sought to create a more direct means of influencing the affairs of countries in 
the former Soviet Union with Russian citizens and significant Russian-speaking populations. It 
was during Kolerov’s push to justify public expenditures in Russia’s “near abroad” that pro-
                                                
266 The website lists additional informational resources that Proryv’s founders spontaneously created, including 
internet sites, newspapers, and “cooperation with television and radio.” These informational resources eventually 
became Lenta PMR (http://www.tiras.ru). 
267 The stated constituents of the party include the intelligentsia, small and medium business owners, workers, civil 
servants, and veterans. 
268 Transnistrian “Proryv!” Official site. http://proriv.wordpress.com/ Accessed August 8, 2010. 
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Russian social movements like Proryv found their startup capital.269 A quote from Kolerov in 
Kommersant270 makes clear his views on Russia and its neighbors: “Russia must stand up for its 
interest in the post-Soviet territory.” His weapons, he stressed, would not showcase Russian 
“hard power,” but would instead be “culture and spirituality.”271  
Reacting to the success of the Orange Revolution and the threat posed by western-backed 
social movements, the Kremlin sought to usurp the energy of social movements by cloning them. 
These Kremlin-backed projects utilized the form of these social movements – youth-driven, 
street-level activism, catchy branding – but supplied their own content in the form of a discourse 
that posited Russian-speaking regions as threatened enclaves requiring moral and material 
support to resist NATO and the West.272 While Proryv mimics the organizations that played a 
key role in “colored revolutions,” it supports the status quo and its platform is hardly 
revolutionary. 
Proryv organizes a range of activities in Transnistria. They were the first organization to 
popularize Russian holidays in the region, adding to the widespread belief that the PMR is in fact 
part of the Russian Federation.273 Proryv vigorously promoted the 2006 referendum in the region 
that affirmed the PMR’s independence.274 The organization’s social and humanitarian programs 
                                                
269 In response to a question about funding, Soin told me that Proryv has not received one cent from the PMR 
government. Proryv is self-financing, obtaining 50% of its operating budget from the sale of newspapers, flags, Che 
Guevara notebooks, and other things. The other 50% comes from unnamed “Friends of Proryv.” Due to Soin’s 
former position in state security (MGB), Proryv is often referred to by residents as a state-security project. 
270 Kommersant is owned by Alisher Usmanov, an oligarch with Kremlin ties and significant assets in the PMR, 
including the MMZ steel plant in Rîbnița, the single largest contributor to the PMR's official budget. 
271 “Putin Appoints Velvet Counterrevolutionary,” Kommersant, March 23, 2005. 
272 The off-the-record story about Proryv’s financing is as follows: the Tiraspol-based Proryv (the origin of the 
Proryv brand) received a substantial sum of money (rumored to be a few million dollars), which was supposed to be 
divided up between the various international Proryv fronts (i.e., in the Crimea, Abkhazia, etc.).  The initial funds 
were never divided up, and they proved to be critical to Proryv, which now boasts its own printing press, newspaper, 
web portal, and leadership school, among other things. 
273 Russia Day, Day of the Russian Flag, Day of the Russian Constitution, and the St. George ribbon campaign 
274 For more on the 2006 referendum and other referendums in the PMR, see chapter two, "Creating a People: 
Referendums, Nostalgia, and Subjectivity” 
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include assistance to veterans, orphans, and the disabled, as well as an array of activities that 
seek to develop patriotism and political activism among youth and young adults.  
Proryv positions themselves as battling an entrenched elite despite established 
connections between its leadership and PMR state security. Despite supporting independence and 
recognition, they position themselves as an opposition force and claim to be blacklisted from 
local media. Since January 2008, Proryv’s radio broadcasts have been forbidden by the Ministry 
of Information and Telecommunications, which sought to blunt the “growing prestige and 
popularity of the movement.”275 With the airwaves closed, Proryv raised their profile through 
marches, pickets, and flash mobs.    
Proryv's headquarters also house the "Che Guevara High School of Political Leadership.” 
The school was founded in 2005 to prepare party cadres and encourage youth participation in 
politics. Named in honor of the Marxist revolutionary, aside from its logo and a few black and 
white photographs, there is no other connection with Che or revolutionary politics. The school's 
course offerings concentrate on political technology276 and practical skills such as marketing and 
website construction. Recent offerings include courses on "Political marketing, political 
technology, political advertising and election campaigns;" "Computer technology;" "Website 
building;" "Information marketing;" and a vague course called "Psychological Success."277 
                                                
275 Transnistrian “Proryv!” Official site. http://proriv.wordpress.com/ Accessed August 8, 2010. 
276 Political technology includes any and all efforts made to organize electoral success through subterfuge.  A whole 
industry of political technologists and PR specialists has emerged in the post-Soviet space in response to the 
demands of competitive elections.  Part spin doctor, part propagandist, the political technologist uses any and all 
means at their disposal to achieve the results ordered by their client.  Perhaps the most glaring success of political 
technology is the transformation of Vladimir Putin from an unknown state security officer to the steely-eyed, 
straightforward face of Russia.  One anonymous Russia political technologist wrote in a guest column describe 
political technology as existing in a place where law does not apply and the imagination serves as a break on reality.  
“Political technology diverges from political science in the same way that science fiction differs from ordinary 
fiction. Anything is possible in a land without rule of law; the only constraint is the imagination, and political 
technologists certainly don’t lack for imagination.” A Russian "Political Technologist" Weighs in on the Arrest of 
Khodkorkovsky’s Lawyers http://www.robertamsterdam.com/2007/02/a_russian_political_technologi.htm Accessed 
August 5, 2010. 
277 Courses generally run for two weeks and cost 200 PMR rubles (around $20 at the current exchange rate). 
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Instruction remains more focused on image-crafting and political technology than on the actual 
training of leaders. Graduates of the school include activists from Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, and Georgia, though the majority is drawn from the PMR. Inside the school, desks 
are arranged much like a classroom in front of a podium ringed with the flags of Proryv, Russia, 
and the PMR. The executive offices in the back are enclosed in glass. When filled with people, it 
feels like a clubhouse or a bustling meeting place. 
Proryv has a practical structure that demands participation: youth come for the social 
activities and gradually engage in more explicitly political activities like rallies, protests, vigil, or 
roundtables. In their activism, Proryv seeks to connect international events with local concerns 
through their unique brand of youth activism.278 A typical Proryv action might consist of a 
handful of activists marching with banners and a loudspeaker, or a solemn candlelight vigil to 
commemorate an important date. Reactions to Proryv actions ranged from apathy to incredulity 
as to whether they were to be taken seriously. Most events are filmed and posted online. As a 
participant-observer in many of these events, I found myself returning to the question of 
sincerity: what did Proryv want? Did they truly want to reform the PMR, to distract attention 
from other pressing issues, or were they simply another shade in the democratic palette of the 
PMR?  
Political practice in the PMR is oriented around appearances and image-driven. These 
can be actual or potential images of prosperity, of the bodies of those killed during the 
“undeclared war” with Moldova, or of a thriving democracy with more than ten political parties. 
Regular informants stressed that despite the appearances of democracy, local political formations 
were subject to strict control by authorities who feared anything not under their direct control. 
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The vertical power structure of the PMR left no room for unauthorized formations. This was also 
case with the media and civil society. The state-controlled media provided a strong base upon 
which to construct a coherent, unified political edifice. Those media not under the controls of the 
state remained ineffective (e.g., trade union or opposition newspapers with low circulation) or 
were controlled by powerful economic interests (Sheriff’s media companies remain the only 
alternative to state-controlled media, most notably in the realm of television).  
 
Dmitri Soin: The Man, the Myth, and the Legend 
Proryv is known locally because of its founder and leader. Sensational rumors, innuendo, 
and gossip surround Proryv and its founder, Dmitri Soin. Proryv’s earliest actions were meant to 
shock by creating a spectacle. Dmitri Soin’s past and present jobs included stints as a sociology 
professor at Transnistrian State University, a lieutenant colonel in Transnistria’s feared state 
security service (where he headed the department of ideological affairs and the protection of the 
constitution), author, political consultant, businessman, political technologist, market researcher, 
sworn enemy of the Moldovan state, and, it is alleged, arms trafficker and accused murderer 
(Soin is currently an Interpol wanted criminal).279 In December 2010, he was elected to a five-
year term in the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet, the highest legislative body in the PMR. When I 
first met him in October 2008, on the business card he handed to me his title was simply 
“leader.”  
                                                                                                                                                       
278 Recent marches have included titles such as “Peace in Palestine, Gas in Transnistria,” “Bureaucracy No, Youth – 
Yes," and anniversary commemorating the 20th anniversary of the PMR, the 4th anniversary of the 2006 
referendum, and other political events. 
279 Dmitri Soin is wanted by Interpol for “crimes against life and health.” Other titles include member of the Russian 
Association of Political Sciences, candidate of sciences in sociology (equivalent to the Ph.D. degree), and director of 
the Transnistrian branch of the Council for National Strategy of Russia, among others. 
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I first obtained an interview through the head of Proryv’s youth wing. Initially she 
appeared hesitant when I first requested an interview; I insisted she call him and mention my 
academic interest in the region and to explain to him that I needed to access to the body [dostup k 
telu]. This phrase literally means “access the body” and implies having access to a politician or 
powerful official who solves problem.280 Usually, one must pay to “access the body” and the 
favors it is capable of granting. Soin proved to be a key informant, later helping me obtain 
permanent registration in the region. Friends speculated that he unofficially served as a 
protection “roof,” krysha, during the course of research.281 We typically met in his club, located 
on the top floor of the Hotel Aist, an aging Soviet-style hotel dominating the embankment. The 
club, Sedmoe Nebo, Seventh Heaven, houses, in addition to the yoga club, his offices and the 
office of their newspaper and its website.282 Operationally, Sedmoe Nebo was the nerve center 
while the Che Guevara School was the public face of Proryv.   
The fact that Tiraspol had its own university was a point of pride in the region. Until 
2006, Soin served as vice chair of the sociology department at Transnistrian State University 
(PGU) where he taught political sociology, conflict sociology, international relations, sociology 
of religion, and market research.283 He defended his kandidat284 at the Institute of Sociology of 
the Russian Academy of Sciences. When he retired from state security in 2006 he resigned his 
university position “to work in business.” On numerous occasions Soin bragged of his work as a 
                                                
280 Typically meetings and payments are arranged in code. In Moscow, a meeting with the Putin is rumored to cost 
“two cakes with cream.” One cake equals a million dollars, and if a request indicates cream that means that the 
money must be transferred abroad before the meeting can take place. 
281 In the post-Soviet period, the term krysha denotes an individual or group acting as a protector of an individual or 
business. 
282 Despite being called a "club," it is more accurate to describe it as a fitness club that served tea and coffee to its 
clientele. 
283 In addition to a fruitful recruiting base, informants told me that Soin’s work in the university extended beyond the 
classroom. In the words of one key interlocutor who had recently graduated from the university, “Soin turned the 
university into a swamp.” Initiatives died slowly, and any sort of activism was impossible. 
 209 
political consultant on campaigns at the regional and national level in Russia and about his 
sociological research institute. His experiences in state security, politics, and the academy inform 
his methods and projects. Whether speaking about business or politics, Soin remained attuned to 
information and the power it held. He was constantly intervening in an informational field that, 
in his words, operated according to changing rules in the 21st century. As both practitioner and 
scholar, he was reflexively aware of his own position within a social field encompassing the 
realms of state security, the academy, politics, and civil society. For him, the link between these 
fields was practical insofar as he measured power by connections and their ability to marshal 
resources, be they crowds, cash, or information. 
 
Postmodern Politics 
A performative, self-referential logic was central to Proryv. The idea of creating and 
serving a demand is central to understanding Proryv’s role in the PMR. As a movement that 
tends toward visible, if questionably effective, street actions, one must remain attuned to the 
content of actions and their stated purpose as well as to their role at the systemic level. With this 
in mind, I begin by describing some vignettes that emerged over the course of participant 
observation before moving on to some ethnographic description.   
Despite being the leader of a Che-themed social movement, Soin professed little interest 
in Che as a historical figure: “people think I sit up here smoking cigars all day … I chose Che 
Guevara for one simple reason: kids think he is cool. Anywhere you go, Che is a cool guy. He 
smokes cigars, has a beard, rides motorcycles, and is a revolutionary.”285 Che is a resonant image 
                                                                                                                                                       
284 Roughly equivalent to the Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) degree. It is the first post-graduate degree in the former 
Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries. It is followed by the Doktor Nauk (Doctor of Sciences) degree. 
285 Quote by Dmitri Soin in "ArticleYouth Cults in Non-Existent Countries," Vice Magazine. 
http://www.vice.com/read/youth-cults-in-nonexistent-countries Accessed October 12, 2011. 
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in the otherwise bland world of the PMR political marketplace. Just as Che’s image adorns t-
shirts, hats, and the cover of Russian postmodern fiction, the iconic image of Che superimposed 
on a vibrant yellow background nods to the effective use of colors and marketing in the Orange 
Revolution.286 In the 21st century, every revolution needs both a color and a logo. “As a 
marketer, I do not act from the fact of what does or does not appeal to me; I proceed from the 
fact of what is needed. I am absolutely not interested in what I like or do not like.”287  What 
better way to engage youth than by utilizing an established pop culture icon? Despite this 
conscientious effort at branding, Proryv retained the feel of a back room political project insofar 
as spontaneity and creativity were lacking. The fact that its ranks were drawn from teenagers did 
little to dispel this contrived feeling.   
My conversations with Dmitri Soin could have occurred in a lecture hall or in a smoky 
office where election strategies might be planned, though most occurred in his office overlooking 
the Dniester River. The topics of our interviews ranged from the academic to the mundane. More 
than once the subject of postmodernism came up, which he described as “the basis of my 
projects … I enter the information field, create a shiny brand, and it fixes itself in this field.” 
Soin’s projects emerge in a very real sense from the post-1989 paradigm that Fukayama (1992) 
deems to be the “end of history.” Liberal democracy has triumphed, and the laboratory of 
democracy becomes another venue for experimentation. What Castells (2000) terms the 
information age marks not only the beginning of fundamental reconfigurations in the realm of 
production, social relations, and governance, but also of knowledge itself. There is, on the one 
hand, an explosion of opinions, sources, and ideas, but also a blackout in which information 
                                                
286 The cover of the Russian edition of Victor Pelevin’s Generation P features Che in his iconic beret that is adorned 
with a Nike symbol. 
287 Interview with Dmitri. Soin, November 17, 2008. 
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becomes a strategic resource to be shaped according to the changing imperatives of capital, 
states, interest groups, or individuals.   
In a postmodern world, contradictions are celebrated, with self-referentiality functioning 
freely in the absence of a totalizing narrative.288 Information forms the basis for Soin’s projects, 
of which Proryv is the most visible. In addition to websites containing original articles and 
aggregated news summaries, Proryv publishes a weekly newspaper, Russian Proryv. Information 
is literally his bread and butter, as his personal businesses include a printing company that 
creates the material distributed by Proryv.289 Printed matter plays a central role in Proryv’s 
activities, with actions often having custom crafted materials. Usually of a very high quality, 
these items remain functional (notebooks, pens, pencils) so that even if recipients disregard its 
message and symbols, the objects remain functional and may later realize their original political 
purpose. Proryv balances politics with pragmatism.  
This idea of an object or piece of information living beyond its initial context is central to 
Proryv’s media holdings, which includes a network of websites that aggregate and disseminate 
information, often via unattributed sources, rumor, or innuendo.290 Proryv’s flagship site, Lenta 
PMR, exists alongside RIA Dnestr (Russian Information Agency Dnestr) and Consulting 
Mobile,291 the latter two run by a Proryv associate.292 Often a single story will be reposted or 
                                                
288 "Postmodern sensibility does not lament the loss of narrative coherence any more than the loss of being. 
However, the dissolution of narrative leaves the field of legitimation to a new unifying criterion: the performativity 
of the knowledge-producing system whose form of capital is information." Aylesworth, Gary, "Postmodernism", 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/postmodernism/ 
289 These distributed items include calendars, pamphlets, manifestos, folders, notepads, newspapers, pens, pencils, 
and posters, among other things. 
290 This is a standard practice in Russian-language internet media, and thus should not be seen as an aberration but 
rather as the norm. 
291 Consulting Mobile offers image consulting and PR services, including political consulting, Image PR, 
(Informational wars, measures to neutralize unprincipled competitors), analytics and opinion polls, and other 
internet services and web advertising. Its URL is http://consulting-mobile.ru/index.php Accessed August 21, 2010. 
292 The links between these sites are neither hidden nor openly acknowledged. Often, articles will appear on Lenta 
PMR but will be authored by Consulting Mobile. 
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reprinted multiple times under different headlines to increase its audience.293 Stories range from 
information pieces (exposes, defenses, or salvos) to traditional articles or press releases 
documenting regional events. This information network allows Proryv’s actions to be magnified, 
manipulated, and disseminated quickly in both print and cyberspace. I now look to Proryv’s 
manifesto in order to shed light on the organization’s philosophical foundation. 
 
The Proryv Manifesto: Postmodern Ethics for a Turbulent World 
Proryv’s philosophical blueprint can be found in their manifesto (2008). The manifesto 
itself, a snug A7 format, can easily fit in one’s hand and includes both Russian and English texts. 
The manifesto begins with the story of how thirteen unnamed community organizations joined 
together to rise up against “bureaucracy, a totalitarian regime and injustice.” News of this spread 
across Transnistria, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, and even reached the EU and the United States. 
Proryv’s name establishes a direct relation between it and youth who seek to “breakthrough” the 
present situation in which violence, enslavement, and double standards prevail (2008: 3). Non-
recognition plays a prominent role in the manifesto insofar as it is an extended elaboration on 
PMR as a state founded in accordance with the people’s will “which is not recognized by the 
world bureaucracy only because we want to live with Russia” (3). The manifesto forcefully 
rejects the New World Order, American-led globalization, NATO, and other “aggressive 
international structures” and is a corrective to the “lies, gossip, and legends that surround the 
Corporation.”  
Proryv was founded by youth who were moved by the heroic deeds of the older 
generation. The actions of civil society in the 1990s – the meetings, referenda, self-defense, and 
the armed struggle with Moldova – are the most recent manifestation of a regional Slavic 
                                                
293 This has been referred to in the blogosphere as a “circle jerk.” 
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genealogy connecting the Kievan Rus (880-1350), Suvorov’s founding of Tiraspol (1792), the 
Great Patriotic War (1941-1945), and the conflict with Moldova (1992). As a state, the PMR is 
the logical culmination of this series of events. “For some it is an unrecognized republic, but for 
us it is Motherland that needs to be protected” (5). The current generation that grew up 
experiencing life only within the PMR can only realize themselves if the PMR’s statehood and 
sovereignty are recognized. 
The manifesto reverses some of the many the negative associations of the PMR as a 
lawless region and instead claims that Moldova requires discipline (Bobick 2011). This is an 
ironic shift, with Proryv offering a 4-D plan294 for Moldova: democratization, decriminalization, 
denazification, and demilitarization.  
The course of sovereignty and independence of Pridnestrove – this is our course. Unity 
with Russia and the Ukraine is the road of life for our state. Support of all the progressive 
movements in the world – it is our transnational mission (2008: 7).  
 
This vague “unity with Russia and the Ukraine” will provide the inspiration the region needs. 
The PMR is never the aggressor; Proryv too forsakes a defensive posture: “We stand up for our 
rights but do not defend ourselves. Defense always leads to defeat” (2008: 9).  
The Che Guevara High School of Political Leadership is described as a place where 
cadres emerge prepared to spread freedom around the world. “Our ideology is not just phrases, 
theses and calls. It is first of all fundamental modern knowledge in the fields of informational 
and political technologies, marketing and management, psychology and other important spheres 
of science that are important for successful struggle” (2008: 8). Proryv’s bête noire, the former 
Moldovan Vladimir Voronin, makes an appearance. Echoing the themes of chapter three, Proryv 
offers to send Voronin to the “Museum of political dead bodies” (2008: 9; Verdery 2000). 
                                                
294 This is an ironic reversal of one Moldovan political analyst’s (Oazu Nantoi) plan for solving the Transnistrian 
dispute. His 3-D plan entailed democratization, demilitarization, and decriminalization. 
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Symbolic violence aside, Proryv positions itself as breaking through the information blockade by 
creating the conditions for individual self-realization.   
Much of the manifesto decries war and corporations while simultaneously voicing a host 
of conspiracy theories that circulate in the Russian media: that AIDS was created by the US 
government, the Russian cross (Russia’s demographic crisis, increasing death rate and declining 
birth rate - addressed in chapter four), and the proliferation of drugs and alcohol from the West. 
The most interesting topic singled out for discussion is terrorism. Retroactively, the origins of the 
PMR and the Transnistrian narod emerge from the flames of “Moldo-Romanian terrorism” — in 
1992, “terrorists acted in accordance with western plan of annihilation of east-Slavic citadel – 
Pridnestrove.” (2008: 16). Sectional headings include wars, terrorism, epidemics, cataclysms, 
and loneliness. This last section places Western consumerism alongside a deterministic view of 
nations as repositories of genetic material.295 Europeans, enslaved to capital, cannot support the 
national genetic fund [genofund] because consumer culture creates an ever-increasing dialectic 
of needs and wants, the ultimate message being that you should not procreate if you cannot 
consume.296 In this childless wasteland, loneliness and moral degradation reign.297 The biological 
basis of the nation, the genofund, must not be abandoned in favor of an alienating consumer 
culture. Above all, the PMR demands a stable biological basis for reproduction, something the 
manifesto see as anathema to capitalism as practiced in the West. Like the biomassa described in 
                                                
295 Though different, the prevalence of biological metaphors of the population and nation are striking, from the 
population as biomassa, see Chapter three, “The Economics of Separatism: Fiefdoms, Subsidies, and the Virtual.” 
For more on biological metaphors in sociology and Russian social science, see Oushakine 2007, 2010. 
296 This idea of the nation as a repository, a genofund, is remarkably similar to the biomassa rhetoric from the 
economics chapter. 
297 “Business industry around love to children has expanded so much that people are simply afraid to create a family. 
Fear that you can’t buy everything that advertising proposes has become a powerful psychological weapon. Millions 
of people are depressed, suffer from impotence, have serious psychological deviations. Society is under pressure 
from the “New world order” and moves towards absolute decadence and self-destruction” (2008: 20-21). 
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chapter four, the term genofund is a return to biology when other positive models of national 
belonging are not applicable (cf. Oushakine 2007). 
Amidst this morass of conflicting values and desires, Proryv alone holds the truth, a truth 
that emerges, somewhat paradoxically, through postmodernism.  
In fact, “PRORIV!” is a foundry of managers and leaders of the third millennium. In the 
blast furnace of the Corporation, in accordance with postmodernism recipes, intellect, 
will, purposefulness and physical perfection merge together and give birth to a new, 
highest-quality harmony of the third millennium. This makes “PRORIV!” the center of 
attention and attraction of those who long for truth, independent of national, religious, 
and social status. (2008: 22).   
 
This idea of harmony becomes a template for a future in which money will become devoid of 
functional value and exist only in museums. Curiously, despite its internationalist and anti-
capitalist overtones, Proryv’s manifesto fails to reference the Communist Manifesto despite its 
internationalism. “We don’t divide people by nationality, race and religious indication. We 
divide them into those who are ready for self-perfection and those who will always stay at the 
level of biological existence.” (2008: 26). The manifest constructs a somewhat contradictory 
genealogy that includes both archaic religious texts and contemporary postmodern works.  
Our sources are the ancient philosophical systems, with which we can get acquainted by 
reading the sacred texts. [Sic] But in comparison to orthodox conceptions, we cultivate 
inside ourselves a postmodernist understanding of those daily occurrences propagated to 
us by television, the internet, and other mass media. We are skeptical to the perspectives 
of the society of consumption. If mankind doesn’t overcome consumerism and 
parasitism, it will die. That is why the mega project “PRORIV!” is so important. Our 
name can be interpreted as the action directed at overcoming the existing negative state of 
affairs. Our way is for those who are strong of spirit. Either us or nobody. [sic] (2008: 26-
27).   
 
The message is clear enough: Proryv is an organization capable of generating new formations, 
ideologies, and means of self-perfection.298 
                                                
298 Its mystical, anti-consumerist message intimates that the manifesto’s unnamed author or authors are familiar with 
Russian postmodern fiction, particularly the writings of Victor Pelevin. 
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At the manifesto’s conclusion, postmodern sensibility is balanced with pragmatism in the 
form of an ideological crib sheet. An appendix lists what Proryv is for and what they are against. 
Proryv is for: (1) International recognition of PMR; (2) The eternal and indestructible Union with 
Russia; (3) Brotherly relationship with the Ukraine, Republic of Belarus and other countries of 
Commonwealth of Independent States; (4) Good education and public health services of high 
quality; (5) Normal economics and just distribution of the results of work; (6) Building social 
state where human rights will be protected; and (7) a healthy way of life, harmony, peace and 
cooperation.  
The items Proryv is against looks very much like an agenda that could appear at any anti-
globalization protest. The organization is against: (1) War, double standards, blockades, famine 
and all kinds of violence; (2) Social injustice, division for the very rich and the very poor; (3) 
Ecological irresponsibility, pollution of the environment, unending exploitation of natural 
resources; (4) Alcoholism, drug addiction, corruption and crime; (5) Any kind of nationalism and 
fascism; (6) Religious fanaticism and extremism; and (7) Dictatorship, manipulation and 
exploitation. At its most basic level, the manifesto elaborates a political platform cum wellness 
plan on the basis of postmodernism, a movement that allegedly heralded, theoretically speaking, 
the death of the metanarrative and coherency.  
The confluence of critical theory, post-Soviet irony, and the unrealized political teleology 
of the PMR offer an enlightening view on the social life of theory and its role in mediating a 
contradictory post-Soviet reality (Boyer 2001). The manifesto merges conspiratorial whisperings 
resonant in the post-Soviet world with a standard progressive political agenda (social justice, 
environmentalism, human rights, etc.) in order to create a contradictory yet resonant picture. 
From a marketing perspective, the manifesto contains something for everyone, from the 
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pensioners that participated in the strike actions that led to the region’s disengagement to 
individuals simply seeking a healthy lifestyle to youth who simply want to be cool like Che. 
When faced with the reality of a fragmented post-Soviet existence that lacks an overarching 
national narrative, the allure of being connected to something greater should not be 
underestimated.299 Though lacking coherency, the manifesto provides keywords and themes that 
offer the possibility of overcoming isolation.  
 
Methods: Theory, Branding, Cloning 
Ethnographic data and its theoretical component rest upon observed phenomena. Proryv’s 
use of a social science vocabulary (networks, systems, documents, interest groups, market 
segments, etc.) offers insight on knowledge production in a place where the relationship between 
knowledge and reality is less mediated. The Soviet Union lacked a distinct civil society to exist 
between the state and the people.300 Post-Soviet reality remains a canvas upon which to realize 
ideas and introduce novelty, whether it is in the realm of politics, consumption, language, or 
leisure, with reality an overdetermined spectacle derived out of the effects of the message that 
you create, cultivate, and disseminate. The relative durability of the PMR as a polity has little to 
                                                
299 Oushakine (2009: 73) describes how information offers a means of connectedness. “Post-Soviet narratives, 
brought to life by market irrationality, stemmed from a dual desire to register profound disagreement with the 
dominant view of Russia’s development and, at the same time, to offer a new cosmology of connectedness, a new 
form of totality that could effectively replace fragmented or dysfunctional cultural frameworks of the previous 
period. Political control of the Soviet regime and consumerist illusions of the market society were replaced by the 
fantasy of a large-scale presence in convoluted networks of relations. The fear of individual isolation attributed to 
capital was overcome by a vision of polymorphous embeddedness in the constant flow of information.” 
300 One can put forth the argument, as Buck-Morss (2000: 29) does, that the Soviet Union was the first modern state 
to be under civil society’s control. The proclaimed goal of communism was the withering away of the state, its 
substitution by mass-democratic participation, — “communism” as the rule by all of civil society. 
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do with good governance; it is the result of imposing order upon an unruly informational and 
ideological terrain301. 
Public relations (PR) are central to Proryv's activism.302 Every action I witnessed had at 
least one dedicated cameraman for documentary purposes. Visually chronicling events allowed 
the organization to extend events beyond the immediate context and to create consumable 
informational products (video clips, press releases, photo montages). Building its brand often 
entailed controversy. Proryv’s early actions included stealing the flag of the OSCE mission in 
Tiraspol and replacing it with their own, sending model boats with burning Moldovan flags 
across the Dniester River, burning an effigy of Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin dressed as 
a Nazi, and barricading numerous pro-Western NGOs. These actions were meant to get people 
talking. Soin was unabashedly proud of how these actions achieved in a short time what it 
usually takes years to do – to increase brand awareness. Getting people talking was the first step, 
and the second step entailed polishing the group’s image.303  
As a political party Proryv bases its hopes for electoral success on the strength of its pro-
Russian orientation. Proryv mimics United Russia insofar as it too seeks to build a brand that 
intuitively appeals to voters.304 Astutely attuned to widespread belief in the idea of “Russian 
standards,” Proryv highlights the electoral discrepancies between Russian and PMR to agitate for 
                                                
301 Numerous informants involved with Transnistrian NGOs told me of their interactions with Soin when he worked 
with the MGB, the Ministry of State Security.  Mostly these involved questioning NGO leaders about their funding 
sources and the purpose of their trips abroad for trainings and seminars. 
302 The term piar, from the abbreviation for public relations, has entered the Russian language without translation. A 
Russian dictionary (Kratkii slovar’ sovremmykh poniatii i teminov 2002: 410) defines piar as “information in the 
mass media for publicity and image making as part of electoral technology.” Black piar applies to the formation of a 
negative opinion of an individual or political formation. 
303 Personal interview with D. Soin, November 11, 2008. 
304 That is, just as United Russia is the party of Putin, Proryv is the party for Russia. Both have a singular focus and 
remain electoral vehicles that 
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changes that would benefit their party.305 Within the PMR, they agitate for freedom of speech, 
democracy, human rights, and an end to the Ministry of Information’s blacklisting. There is a 
role for everybody. My role, Soin intimated, would be to publicize the plight of Proryv as it 
battled against the entrenched bureaucracy of the PMR state.306 The PMR, Soin continued, was 
one large network system to be activated. Proryv's network contained a few hundred dedicated 
individuals, he explained, and they have programs in place to identify "like-minded people." 
These people would become the critical mass required for electoral success. "In a large country it 
would be difficult, but given that we have a small republic, here it is easier. As a sociologist I 
understand that."307   
Proryv must be viewed in terms of the novelty it brings to the PMR. After the Russian 
financial crisis in 1998, the PMR elite found themselves presiding over a sustained period of 
stagnation. The war with Moldova had been won, and power had been consolidated. Authorities 
realized that military hardware was effective in creating political authority, it had less use in the 
information society where creating, distributing, diffusion, and manipulating information is a 
significant economic, political, and cultural activity in its own right (Castells 2000). Never 
wanting to embrace democracy as an unknown, they found it easier to outsource its redefinition 
to a new class of informational professionals and political technologists. In the absence of a 
lasting political settlement, redefining the visible manifestations of politics was far easier. 
Branding was central to Proryv’s success in occupying an ideological niche. During my 
field research, an online “initiative group” called “New Left Path” appeared. It was to become 
the Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a clone of Eduard Limonov’s National Bolshevik Party. 
                                                
305 These include demands for party lists, reform of the executive branch, the liquidation of the post of vice 
president, and the naming of a prime minister, among other things. 
306 Personal interview with D. Soin, November 11, 2008. 
307 Personal interview with D. Soin, October 23, 2008. 
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Essentially, it would have been the third communist party in the region. The communist brand 
was already saturated, as there existed the Transnistria Communist Party (PKP) and the 
Communist Party of Transnistria (KPP-KPSU). The former is an opposition party, the latter a 
political party appearing only sporadically on Soviet holidays. The PKP controls the Pravda 
brand and publishes an opposition newspaper. Their denunciation of the looting of the region’s 
Soviet industry has led them into direct confrontation with PMR authorities and Sheriff. The 
KPP-KPSU is a conservative communist party without representation at any level of 
government. Supported by the authorities to dilute the strength of the PKP, they are defined 
primarily by their banners than by anything else. As the “authorized” communist clone, state 
media covers them. The authorities fear the PKP because they agitate for investigating the 
privatization shady deals. They have a large constituency of pensioners and are the only party 
that does not see international recognition as the most important issue in the region. To 
paraphrase Warhol: one's a company, two's a crowd, and three's a party. 
The Communist Party of Bolsheviks project never came to fruition; today its website is 
periodically updated with reposted stories from that deal with economic issues.308 When I first 
broached the question as to whether this would be a genuine organization, Soin assured me that it 
was real, and furthermore, that I should partake, much like John Reed did in the Russian 
revolution.309 Post-Soviet politics is marked by a proliferation of body doubles and clone parties 
that blur the distinction between what is real and fake. In the PMR, one can potentially speak of a 
single vested interest (Sheriff) that has created a simulacrum of political competition in order to 
                                                
308 Originally located at http://levput.wordpress.com/, the site moved in May 2009 to http://leftway-pmr.su/.  As of 
August 2010 the site had not been updated since June 2009. 
309 Reed’s first person account of the Bolshevik Revolution, Ten Days that Shook the World, was a bestseller and 
was made into a Hollywood film with Warren Beatty.  Reed’s title also graces the famous film of Eisenstein, 
October: Ten Days that Shook the World. 
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prove that the PMR is a democratic country. Proryv is a minor player in Transnistrian politics, 
having a small constituency but leading visible actions.  
 
 
The Information War 
 
 
After the first bomb, the atom bomb, which was capable of using the energy of radioactivity to 
smash matter, the spectre of a second bomb is looming at the end of this millennium. This is the 
information bomb, capable of using the interactivity of information to wreck the peace between 
nations.   
 
        Paul Virilio, The Information Bomb 
 
 
 
The information war was a constant point of reference for Proryv. The information war 
constituted a scalable point of reference encompassing widely different situations.310 Proryv’s 
leader has long been involved in the information war with Moldova, even going as far as to 
author a dissertation on the subject. Soin stressed that initially Transnistria won the information 
war with Moldova. This victory was Pyrrhic insofar as it allowed old ways of thinking to be 
preserved; state officials continue to think within categories that are no longer effective. This 
failure to adapt to a changing world resulted in substantial losses. While the authorities cling to 
old technologies, the world operates with new ones. Soin found this failure to “market” the 
region appalling. He stressed to me that Transnistria carries an idea very close to the idea of the 
American Revolution – the right of nations to self-determination and the right of the people to 
revolt against unpopular policies. 
Soin himself was not immune to “black” or negative PR. He was enmeshed in a scandal 
in 2005 that allegedly involved the sale of radioactive Alazan rockets to a British journalist 
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posing as an arms dealer.311 During the time of the “Twitter revolution” in Moldova, Moldovan 
informants in Chișinău told me how Soin masterminded the riots.312 Allegations of weapons 
smuggling have plagued the region since the early 1990s when self-defense forces appropriated 
arms from the 14th Army. Reports of arms smuggling typically take the form of de-
contextualized reports by journalists who visit the region and “investigate” the sensational 
rumors of arms smuggling, human trafficking, and contraband.313 Soin compared the allegations 
of weapons sales to Iraq’s WMDs: “I am a specialist of information wars, not uranium.” These 
stories were a boon to Proryv. After the rocket scandal broke, journalists sought him out for 
interviews and continue to. More often than not, he explained, they end up writing articles that 
were positive — engaging the information war on all fronts allows for negative information to 
become a means of furthering strategic objectives.  
PMR officials were not immune to the shifting sands of the information field. President 
Igor Smirnov, following the lead of Dmitry Medvedev, created a video blog, a practice his 
successor now follows. New media becomes an emerging front in the information war, a means 
to critique ideological opponents. One interview on YouTube with the PMR’s feared Minister of 
State Security, Vladimir Antuifeev, uses the trope of double standards to dismiss the allegations 
of arms smuggling that have plagued the region for nearly two decades. Antuifeev calmly speaks 
of the infamous speech of Colin Powell before the UN General Assembly where he claimed to 
                                                                                                                                                       
310 The information war was used to frame political disputes with Moldova, intra-CIS disputes among Proryv fronts, 
intra-PMR disputes between political or economic competitors, or a means to ossify the idea of a post-Cold War 
division between Russia and NATO that conveyed geopolitical cachet on the PMR. 
311 “Radiation rockets on sale to ‘terrorists,’” The Sunday Times.  May 8, 2005. 
312 This rumor, along with many others, turned out to be false. One rumor told of a Russian military personnel and 
arms being transported through the city in unmarked vans. Similar rumors circulated in Kiev during the Orange 
Revolution. 
313 Though most of my evidence is intuitive at best, many who come to the region looking to explore the outsized 
rumors tend to find what they are looking for if only because they are perceived as gullible foreigners.  After all, 
what guide would pass up the opportunity to string together an adventure, especially if at some point there is a large 
potential payoff for the middleman. 
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have definitive evidence that Saddam Hussein was developing WMDs. The fact that this became 
a pretense for invading a sovereign country is not lost on people like Antuifeev and Soin. The 
same information systems that operate in our own hyper-mediated world are found in the PMR, 
where the existence of the state itself is at stake. Organizations like Proryv exploit the very real 
slippage between the rhetorical pronouncements of the West and their actions, and its supporters 
are aware of how the opinions of a select few create the (geo)political reality of the masses.   
Economic interests also shape the emergent fronts of the information war. Economic 
interests like the Sheriff holding company exercise control over the only alternative to state-run 
television. On the political field, Sheriff has created numerous political parties that play the role 
of the soft opposition to the president. Vested economic interests like Sheriff (along with other 
regional enterprises) sponsor the forms that prolong and support the ongoing dramaturgia of 
politics in the PMR.314 To preserve the status quo, parties interested in prolonging the PMR’s 
existence reshape the contours of democracy. Today, the region boasts ten parties, an opposition 
controlling parliament, and regular elections. As needed, political technologists and PR 
specialists [piarchiki] are imported from Russia to fine-tune these formations. 
 
The Social Field: Proryv in Context 
In the PMR, Marx’s idea that the dominant ideas of any given time are those of the 
dominant class must be seen in the context of the necessity to maintain the larger political system 
at all costs. State institutions attempt to overcome the uncertainty of everyday life by projecting a 
coherent sense of belonging. This translates into attempts to control the inputs and outputs of 
                                                
314 This process of business interests dictating the forms taken by politics is discussed in detail by Andrew Wilson in 
Virtual Politics. He mentions how Moldova is small state with a small number of entities actively creating parties: 
“Moldova is almost entirely a virtual state, with a narrow range of interests operating behind a shifting pattern of 
party labels.” (Wilson 2005: 46). 
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politics. Unable to offer tangible growth or a decent standard of living, the state must appeal to 
intuition in order to efface the very high material costs of Transnistrian (in)dependence.315 The 
PMR is our way, control over our land and destiny. Out of this ambiguity emerge dichotomous, 
scalable logics that offer coherency: the dialectic of controlling/controlled (the former the 
ostensible goal of the state, the latter its apotheosis); the logics of ours [svoi] – strange [chuzhoi]; 
the domestic as good, the foreign bad. The views of those controlling the means of production 
(initially material, now largely symbolic) become state policy. At the level of policy and political 
discourse, the state and those authorized to speak on its behalf supply the inputs to politics. 
Politics is control, not choice.   
Residents remain suspicious of outsiders and their ideas. Many linked their precarious 
material situation to foreign ideas like democracy and capitalism. Ideas originating from 
unfamiliar places are bad. It is a less authoritarian version of what Selim (2009) describes in 
Uzbekistan. The minutiae of research – requests that remain unanswered, doors that do not stay 
open – prove this. Selim talks about the intrusion of governmental prerogatives in the social 
sciences. This is the case in the PMR too, where the basic terms of the field of politics itself are 
policed by these unwritten yet implicitly understood prerogatives: independence as affirmed and 
performed by the people, loyalty to Russia is the central tenet of the state, and  negotiations with 
Moldova must occur on an equal basis. These assumptions, once stubborn negotiating tactics or 
abstract ideas, now form the reality of political life in left-bank Moldova. A case like Uzbekistan 
contrasts the penetration of market-based imperatives in scholarship in core countries, where 
universities are increasingly forced to submit to managerial thinking and economic demands. 
From the periphery, from a place like the PMR, it is clear how the unstated assumptions of a 
                                                
315 For more on this see Project Impact’s edited volume Moldova-Transnistria: Working Together for a Prosperous 
Future: Economic Aspects. Cu Drag Publishing House, Chișinău, 2009. 
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country influence its subsequent knowledge production. In the United States, geopolitical 
hegemony of the US and of capital remains uncritically accepted. In a place like the PMR, whose 
existence is predicated on geopolitical intrigue, local social knowledge serve as integral 
components of the local cosmology.  
 
Ethnographic encounters with the Information War  
During field research I found myself to be a target in an emerging front of the 
information war. The conflict involved a local blogger from the Eurasianist Union of Youth, a 
group associated with the Eurasianist philosopher Aleksandr Dugin.316 Dugin’s 1997 work, 
Foundations of Geopolitics, advocates not a military means of achieving Russian dominance but 
a “sophisticated program of subversion, destabilization, and disinformation spearheaded by the 
Russian special services, supported by a tough, hard-headed use of Russia’s gas, oil, and natural 
resource riches to pressure and bully other countries into bending to Russia’s will.” (Dunlop, 
n.d.)317 Local historians have constructed a historiography in which the PMR is the culmination 
of various peoples seeking to live peacefully with their Orthodox brethren, with Russia.318 
Eurasianist doctrine views Moldova as part of the “Russian South” that will be bound to Moscow 
at the expense of ties with the “rational-individualistic West” (Dugin 389, cited in Dunlop, n.d.). 
In Transnistria, Eurasianist philosophy serves as an antidote to anything overtly pro-Western or 
                                                
316 Dugin’s ideas are heavily indebted to Karl Haushofer, the founder of the geopolitik school of thought that came 
to play an outsized role in Nazi Germany via his student, Rudolf Hess. Of particular importance is Haushofer’s view 
of frontiers not as political or natural boundaries, but as fluid and determined by the will of particular groups. 
317 This is remarkably similar to the role played by the PMR as it relates to the geopolitical orientation of the 
Republic of Moldova: as long as the PMR exists, the Russian Federation has a direct means of ensuring that 
Moldova remains a sovereign state in name only. 
318 This is mostly the work of a historical research center at Transnistrian State University. For an overview of 
Transnistrian historiography in English see Solonari 2003. 
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funded by Western interests.319 Insofar as it polices the contours of politics in the region, 
Eurasianism serves as a compass oriented to Moscow.   
In May 2009, a blogger affiliated with Dugin’s Eurasianist Union of Youth from posted 
an entry entitled “Orange Proryv.”320 The entry constituted a multi-pronged attack on Proryv’s 
leadership.321 It voiced alarm at Proryv’s involvement with “geopolitical competitors” of Russia, 
and detailed the ineffective measures of Proryv’s flash mobs and “ritual” marches. The post 
asked why, at a time of crisis, Proryv’s leaders seemed more interested in obtaining funding than 
actually doing something. In his view, the organization had turned from a tool for political 
change into an organization on a path to irrelevancy. Despite claiming kinship with Eurasianism, 
Proryv was under the influence of “Orange” forces. Proryv’s youth leadership regularly engaged 
with representatives of Western embassies and foundations, and the organization gave cover to a 
Romanian journalist suspected of gathering sensitive data on strategic facilities within the PMR. 
Proryv’s leaders met regularly with a US citizen (myself) “who most likely plans to exploit the 
opportunities of the corporation.” The entry ended with a call to make Proryv accountable for its 
questionable use of the image of Russia for narrow and selfish purposes. “We are not indifferent, 
then, as to what direction Transnistrian society will develop, and furthermore, today the image of 
                                                
319 Commonly cited covert funding of anti-PMR activities include George Soros, the US Embassy, Boris 
Berezovsky, or the Romanian government.  Whether or not any of these entities actually fund projects in the region 
remains an open question.  That said, rumors circulate widely and disinformation is common.  For example, I helped 
prepare a grant for a sociological research center associated with Proryv through the US embassy Democracy 
Initiative Small Grants project.  The grant was denied, and was under $5,000.  Soon after submitting the grant I 
heard rumors circulated that Proryv had received a grant from the US embassy (cited amounts ranged from $10,000 
to $20,000). 
320 The initial article and its numerous responses are examples of “black piar,” a term that in Russian means the 
formation of a negative opinion of someone or something (Ledeneva 2006: 33). 
321 Vladimir Bukarski, “Orange Proryv: Continuation” http://bukarskii.livejournal.com/730916.html Accessed 
August 22, 2011.  
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Russia is used by the self-serving leadership of the corporation. Please adequately respond to the 
provocative activities of Proryv!”322   
Proryv’s information bomb locked onto the blogger in question. First, his biography and 
life trajectory became fodder for ridicule. His itinerant stints in Chișinău, Tiraspol, Israel, and 
Moscow became the wanderings of an individual who could never quite find his place, trying out 
various religions and ideologies before settling on an ultra-Orthodox Eurasianist identity. 
Proryv’s response, “The Kiss of Judas, Vladimir Bukarskii,” detailed his peripatetic ideological 
path that included stints as a Zionist, a democrat, extreme rightist, and neo-Nazi.323 The article 
ended with a link to a video of Bukarskii praising Mussolini. Reposted on Lenta PMR and other 
websites, the information contained in the article came “from the case files of Consulting 
Mobile.”  
This information bomb also targeted the leader of the Eurasianist movement, Aleksandr 
Dugin. Numerous articles appeared which were thinly veiled attacks on his personal life. One 
article alluded to Dugin’s bisexuality and involvement with the occult. Entitled “The Gay Reich 
of Dugin,” the article was posted on Lenta PMR but later disappeared. This front closed as 
quickly as it appeared, with the articles simply disappearing from Lenta PMR’s servers. The 
blogs that started the dispute were updated less frequently, and eventually became frozen relics 
of this forgotten front in the information war. 
 
 
                                                
322 This slander was potentially damaging to Proryv, since the post brought attention to the fact that Proryv sought 
grants and sponsors in both Russia and the West. Vis-à-vis Proryv’s brand friendly, Che-themed revolution, 
Eurasianism enjoys strong support among influential political circles in Moscow. Its foundational texts are taught in 
social science departments and in government institutions that train diplomats, military officers, and intelligence 
professionals. It would not be an understatement to say that it enjoys significant support within the Kremlin. 
323 Not knowing him personally, I withhold judgment as to whether these facts are true or false. 
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On Activism and Ideology  
Many interlocutors in both right and left-bank Moldova often would ask what exactly 
Proryv did and what the organization stood for. Perhaps outsider status allowed them to revisit a 
phenomenon that they instinctively dismissed yet longed to learn about. As a regular participant, 
my position both as a scholar and an invited foreign guest offered me unique access to the group. 
For ethnographic purposes, I offer a composite sketch of the meetings I attended.324 Typically, I 
would attend weekly organizational meetings and planned political actions.  
Proryv meetings began with a series of chants accompanied by raised firsts that serve as a 
call to order: Che Guevara – Glory!  Heroes – Glory!  Russia – Glory!  Transnistria – Glory!325 
One felt the crowd emerge as they were called to order. Youths who had only moments before 
been milling around, talking, jostling for a computer screen, or slouching on tables were 
suddenly transformed into a mass that that shouted with a single voice: the revolutionary body. 
Meetings were occasions to discuss organizational issues and plan future actions. Mundane 
organizational tasks were broken up by the occasional movie night, chess tournament, or sports 
competition. The progress of the activist groups of ten [desyatok] was assessed, with 
commendations or criticism given publicly in a group setting.326 
Self-criticism and discipline were central themes of meetings. Often, a meeting would 
begin with a dressing down by Soin or the executive director due to low attendance and a lack of 
overall participation, problems during the summer months. This presented an opportunity for 
self-criticism of an individual and organizational nature. Proryv needed to be running like 
clockwork and activists must be ready, should the need arise. Dressing down was an attempt to 
                                                
324 I attended approximately twenty-five Proryv meetings over the course of fieldwork.  These are presented as a 
single meeting in order to forefront the experience and feel of meetings. 
325 Че Геваре – Слава! Героям – Слава! России – Слава! Приднестровью-Слава. 
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get activists to understand themselves in the context of forces beyond their control. He often 
inserted them into hypothetical situations (i.e., “turbulent times, when your republic needs you”) 
or quotidian ones (“when somebody asks you what Proryv stands for”). Activists should be able 
to respond to geopolitical, republican, and ideological queries. The existing PR materials are 
tools for building Proryv’s ideology and espousing its views.  
In the context of an information war, everybody was a potential member. Once, Soin 
spoke of how there was a real need to educate others (strangers, family members, parents, and 
friends) about what Proryv does. During one meeting, activists discussed plans for holding an 
open house at the Che Guevara School. Proryv needed to counter the belief that it is a place for 
nationalists or social outcasts and show others that this was not the case.327 To convey 
authenticity, they discussed how they must demonstrate that they carry an ideology [provodit’ 
ideologiyu]. The active construction of this public self-image creates a positive image of the 
organization and allows them to become carriers of an ideology [nositel’ ideologiyu]. If each 
member becomes a vessel, this will attract people [privlekaet lyudeij]. Yet success is not solely 
measured in political terms. Proryv seeks to create a healthy way of life and to form healthy, 
holistic individuals. This focus on wellness stands in stark contrast with other political 
movements concerned solely with patriotism. Vis-à-vis other parties that offer a standard 
political platform, Proryv sets itself up as a total experience, an ideology of life. I thought back to 
a conversation I had years ago with a local man who did home renovations. Unable to procure 
what customers wanted locally, he would go to Odessa and buy “contraband” components. For 
                                                                                                                                                       
326 These groups, made up of a senior activist and young followers, would train and mentor young members in 
various Proryv activities and track attendance and participation in contests and other activities. 
327 During research, I benefited from my position as an outsider, which enabled me to be taken within the context of 
Proryv’s drive for openness.  As mentioned above, there was a marked stress on inviting outsiders in, on making 
Proryv open and more hospitable to counteract rumors, which potentially might damage its image.  The leaders 
stressed the need to talk and to show exactly what Proryv is from the inside.  During my time in the region, Proryv 
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Transnistrians, he said, there is simply no choice: “People buy not what they want – they buy 
what they can here.” The situation is similar in politics: people “buy” into what political 
formations exist, not necessarily ones that they feel strongly about. Proryv fulfills the demand for 
novelty and variety.   
During one summer meeting, they discussed a planned trip to the northern regions of 
Transnistria. The trip would be part action, part recreation. The first leg of the journey would 
consist of marches, public agitation and distribution of printed materials. On the return trip, there 
would be visits to monasteries, waterfalls, and other touristic points. The geographic and cultural 
diversity the PMR would be taken in, ideologized, and enjoyed by activists. The terms used to 
describe the their activities – agitprop, ideological work – harkened back to a revolutionary 
vocabulary in which the newspaper was the printed organ of the party, and ideology was 
something explicitly crafted and openly discussed. Such a vocabulary gave credence to the 
notion that the events that gave birth to the PMR truly were revolutionary. 
Reciprocity was an integral aspect of the organization. Soin intoned that, “what you get, 
you must give to others,” echoing the gift as posed by Marcel Mauss. Activists received training 
and experience from the organization, and in turn they served it. On more than one occasion Soin 
described Proryv as something that he built but that now gives youth a productive outlet to 
realize themselves.328 In this context of providing, Proryv leaders slip into paternalistic roles, 
offering information, advice, and mentorship for youth. Proryv gave individuals a place where 
they could receive guidance that would otherwise be provided by the school, the state, or the 
church.  
                                                                                                                                                       
hosted guests from Germany, Finland, Romania, Austria, Belgium, and France (in addition to guests from less exotic 
locales like Russia and Ukraine). 
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Participation entailed responsibilities. Activists were expected to be able to recite to 
others what Proryv stands for. In light of Proryv’s printed materials, Soin stressed that this 
should not be hard. To illustrate this point, he took a brochure and opened it. The pamphlet 
contained a series of talking points from the Proryv manifesto: it listed seven things Proryv was 
for and seven they were against. Activists were expected to be prepared to articulate exactly what 
Proryv is. Original thought was not stressed, and the finer points of the party platform were not 
subject to debate. The executive committee creates the materials that activists disseminate. It is a 
factory model: goods, products, and ideas are created and produced in a material form 
(pamphlets, flags, etc.) and “sold” through marketing.   
Meetings closed with the Proryv song. Its musical accompaniment sounds like the 
soundtrack to a spaghetti Western, with the pounding beat building to a crescendo that produces 
a rousing call to action. This song contains many of the more esoteric aspects of Proryv’s 
ideology – e.g., Proryv’s followers being “children of the sun” seeking to bring forth a bright 
future. The emphasis on the future implicates Proryv in a structurally similar teleology to the 
Soviet project in which present difficulties were endured for the sake of building socialism for 
the future. Important meetings included the singing of the Transnistrian and Russian anthems. 
With the Transnistrian anthem, there was often confusion about the words.329 Despite being the 
official anthem of the PMR, the anthem appeared to have been rarely sung; its presence in the 
everyday repertoire of activists appeared diminished, especially compared to the Russian 
                                                                                                                                                       
328 This issue of youth and alcohol is depressing. I personally witnessed youth as young as twelve purchasing vodka 
and other drinks which they consume on the riverfront embankment. With few other opportunities, youth turn to 
what is readily available and inexpensive: alcohol and cigarettes. 
329 Typically the Transnistrian anthem was sung only when there was an “international” activity (e.g., a roundtable 
or forum) or when guests from Russia were in attendance (e.g., an event with representatives from the United Russia 
Party or other Russian youth organizations). The Transnistrian anthem is based upon a 1943 composition “Long live 
our State” (Да здравствует наша держава), one of the tunes proposed to be the anthem of the Soviet Union. 
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anthem. Few knew the words, and activists fumbled as if reciting a long-forgotten prayer, 
moving their lips while waiting for it to end.330  
 
S dnem rozhdeniya! Proryv Turns Four 
Proryv celebrated its fourth anniversary on June 1st, 2009. Proryv’s self-presentation to in 
these times affords additional insight into the organization’s practices and PR. The events 
included a roundtable discussion, a meeting with the PMR president, a picnic, and an avtoprobeg 
(car rally). On May 31st, an “international youth roundtable forum” was held at the Che Guevara 
school. Entitled “International Cooperation in the Context of the Global Crisis,” the forum 
included representatives from local political parties; a representative from the Moscow branch of 
Young Guard, Molodaya Gvardia, the youth wing United Russia; and the leader of a Crimean 
NGO. The subsequent press release stressed that Proryv had united all of these groups under the 
banner of their singular commonality, their desire to be with Russia.   
Notable for its unanimous affirmation of a vague “future cooperation with Russian 
organizations,” the roundtable was a time for generalities and affirmations. Each representative 
was given a few minutes to speak, which typically entailed an introduction and a list of their 
past, current, and future projects. No members of the audience posed any questions. During his 
speech, Soin took the opportunity to position Transnistria in the same light as South Ossetia. He 
spoke about the attack on South Ossetia and stressed the fact that Russia acted decisively and 
protected its citizens. He stressed the commonalities between South Ossetia and Transnistria, 
noting both the number of victims and the common fates of the regions. Both are located in 
conflict zones in which Russia guarantees peace and stability. This harks back to phenomena 
                                                
330 The Russian anthem typically garnered a rousing performance; accompaniment alternated between the standard 
orchestral version and a modern rock one recorded by the Russian band Lubeh. When I asked about the choice of 
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described in chapter three. The dead are a vital repository of excess, unsymbolized negativity 
that serve as a reminder of what could happen if Russia ceased to maintain peace. This specter of 
death and destruction is the centerpiece of PMR statehood ideology. This sequence of events 
becomes part of a larger narrative of belonging with Russia that is affirmed by the presence of 
international guests. Russian and Ukrainian guests spoke of the hospitality locals had shown 
them, and of how they now have a feel for what the PMR truly is. They promised to tell others 
back home of the plight of Transnistrians. One delegate from Molodaya Gvardia discussed 
future cooperation through summer work camps, which constitute an important geographically 
and symbolic link between the region and the Russian Federation. Through these camps, youth 
not only have the opportunity to earn money (a patriotic antidote to the burgeoning work-travel 
business with the United States), but also to see “with their own eyes the endless expanse of 
Mother Russia.”  
The presence of delegates from Molodaya Gvardia, the youth wing of Putin’s United 
Russia party was a trump card for Proryv. At a post-roundtable gathering, the problems of the 
region were posed to foreign delegates: uncooperative officials, the high entry barrier for parties, 
and the difficultly of participating in elections. These issues, unable to be solved internally, were 
subjected to the expert opinion of a representative member of Putin’s party. The presence of 
Putin’s United Russia conveyed a symbolic cachet upon Proryv that they leveraged into a 
meeting with the PMR President. The subsequent press release connected their discussion with 
the need for reform. “Of course, interest in such matters is not accidental – during the previous 
month Transnistria has been shaken by political struggle at the highest level … the youth could 
                                                                                                                                                       
music, one activist responded that they had changed it because the Soviet music was “too sad.” 
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not deny themselves the pleasure of listening to Russians, and finally discussing the same set of 
problems that today occupy the minds of the highest officials of the Transnistrian state.”331  
The anniversary picnic was delayed due to the fact that Proryv and its guests were 
meeting with the PMR President.332 The pre-party meeting began with a speech that positioned 
Proryv as a place for youth who have no other place. Rhetorically, Soin’s speech positioned 
Proryv as an antidote to youth inaction in politics; Proryv does not turn anyone away, and they 
do not indoctrinate. “Proryv is not against anything, we are only for things.” From course 
offerings to the social activities, the ideology of negativity is replaced by positive self-
development. The culmination of the meeting was the graduation of new activists and the 
presentation of party cards. The ceremony was rushed because of the delayed start; each graduate 
was presented with a party card and/or activist ID and congratulated by Proryv’s leaders. Each 
paused for photographs as diplomas were presented. Recipients lingered for pictures with 
presenters and guests. Recognition remained important insofar as Proryv was a place where 
activists were acknowledged, where they learned valuable skills, and where they received 
guidance. As I witnessed graduation, the idea that activists were paid or otherwise induced to 
participate seemed remote (most of my informants from the local university assumed that 
activists were paid for their participation). After the ceremony, everybody marched with Proryv 
banners to a local café where a field kitchen was set up outside with grilled chicken, plov (a 
Central Asian rice dish), cabbage salad, and assorted non-alcoholic beverages (at the meeting 
that preceded the party beer was promised, which bought spontaneous applause from all in 
                                                
331 “International Youth Forum in Tiraspol,” June 2, 2009. http://www.tiras.ru/evrazija/9729-molodezhnyjj-
mezhdunarodnyjj-forum-v.html Accessed August 23, 2011 
332 From INFOtag Information Agency Digest 3.6.2009  “Transnistrian President Igor Smirnov has signed an order 
about the setting-up of a Council of Enterprise Directors in order to provide economic stability and to minimize the 
influence of the world financial crisis on the PMR national economy. The Council included Presidential Advisor for 
Industry, ex-Minister Anatoly Blashku. Earlier a Public Council was set up in Transnistria and on Monday the 
matter was of a possible setting-up of a Youth Council by the Transnistrian President.” 
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attendance). Astutely aware of public appearances, activists had been warned not to come in 
dirty or disheveled clothes. Individuals who regularly smoked around the group went behind the 
building to remain out of sight. After an hour, the food ran out and the police showed up to guide 
the traditional Proryv car rally [avtoprobeg] down the streets of Tiraspol. 
 
 
 
Fig. 13. Typical Proryv march on the streets of Tiraspol. Photo by author. 
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The Spectacle of Politics: Avtoprobegi 
The Russian word avtoprobeg translates as car rally. An avtoprobeg usually follows a 
particular route and is planned with particular political goals in mind.333 Proryv's car rallies were 
not so grand and are held annually on Russia Day, Day of the Russian Flag, Constitution Day, 
Proryv's anniversary, and in response to various local events (e.g., the 2006 referendum and the 
economic blockade).  
Proryv’s Day of Russia avtoprobeg consisted of a parade of more than fifty cars, taxis, 
and motorcycles.334 Each flew a different flag, with the repertoire including the Russian tricolor, 
yellow Proryv flags, PMR flags, and a lone Molodaya Gvardia flag. In this avtoprobeg, as in 
other Proryv marches, flags serve as visual citations and change. Some banners are made for 
specific events and decorated with slogans, while others constitute part of a regular repertoire. 
Flags and banners of other organizations, typically received as gifts, are added to subsequent 
avtoprobegi and marches in order to stress Proryv’s international ties. While the PMR views 
itself as a sovereign state, at any given rally the majority of flags were Russian.  
                                                
333 One notable avtoprobeg follows the military exploits of Alexander Nevsky. Another avtoprobeg sponsored by 
the United Russia party, the "Great Path of Russian Civilization," begins on the shores of the Bălțic and ends at the 
Pacific port of Vladivostock. 
334 June 13th, 2009. 
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Fig 14. Preparations for Proryv’s fourth anniversary avtoprobeg. Photo by author. 
 
This particular avtoprobeg contained a number of foreign cars: a Landcruiser, a few 
Audis, and other foreign cars. The bulk of the other cars were local taxis. As the rally passed the 
central square, activists distributed calendars and trinkets to bystanders and congratulated them 
on Day of Russia. Special materials were printed up for this holiday. A small laminated calendar 
depicting the two-headed eagle with the image of St. George slaying the dragon was imprinted 
upon the background of the Russian flag. Written directly under the eagle crest was “Proryv!” 
and “We are Russia!” (My – Rossiya); the back of the plastic card contained a calendar. The 
calendars handed out on Day of Russia Day were thick and laminated.335  
The Lenta PMR press release included pictures of activists handing out printed materials. 
Entitled, “In the heart of every Transnistrian is the Day of Russia,” the press release added a 
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historical dimension to the phenomenon of the avtoprobeg.336 The article paints Russia Day as 
the logical culmination of regional history in which the PMR remains a citadel of Russian 
interests, as it has since the time of Suvorov and the earliest Cossack settlements. 
Avtoprobegy are but one component of the larger political spectacle. The parade itself is 
stage-managed to offer spectators a ready-made visualization of politics to prove civil society 
exists.337 These visible manifestations of civil society are important insofar as they support the 
widespread belief that Russia is the only loyal supporter of the PMR. Proryv seeks to 
domesticate these beliefs for their own benefit. Maintaining these connections, real or imagined 
will lead to success in the domestic political arena. Vis-à-vis Moldova, which has, to varying 
degrees of success, oriented itself to the West after the EU accession of Romania, in the PMR all 
hopes for a viable (if dependent) polity lead through Russia. During public holidays, political 
rallies, and protests, I never once saw the Moldovan flag. Displaying any national flag besides 
the Russian, Transnistrian, Soviet, or Ukrainian is simply not possible, as they lie outside the 
field of proper politics (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). 
The parades, the explicit construction and marketing of ideology, and the public 
spectacles are not limited to Proryv. Other local political formations display a similar structure in 
which ideology emerges alongside a visual display. Banners, flags, parades of people, lines of 
cars are but some of the ways that politics emerges visually. This notion of visuality is important, 
one local political analyst stressed, because the subsequent photographs “show” that a vibrant 
civil society and democracy exist in the region. Civil society is a matter of visibility, about 
                                                                                                                                                       
335 Even among people who do not support Proryv, I have found Proryv agit-prop materials.  Most of the items are 
practical (calendars, small notebooks, notepads, pencils, pens, etc.) so that people hold on to them even if they 
disagree. 
336 «ПРОРЫВ!»: В сердце каждого приднестровца – День России “Proryv: In the heard of every Transnistrian is 
the Day of Russia” http://www.tiras.ru/2009/06/13/proryv-v-serdce-kazhdogo-pridnestrovca.html 
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showing that there is a vibrant civil society in the PMR. Individuals and groups critical of the 
PMR leadership flatly state there is no civil society here - all movements and social groups in the 
region lack a constituency. For example, the much-heralded OSTK, an organization associated 
with the PMR’s earliest moves toward independence, is ostensibly formed from local 
factories.338 Though the region’s factories are shuttered, the organization is presented in the 
media as if it represents the factories and workers of a boom time. Most OSTK members are 
pensioners who have turned it into a vessel for expressing their singular vision of politics. The 
fact that photographers and participants vastly outnumber spectators raises the questions of 
audience – exactly what purpose do these actions have, and for whom are they organized? 
These actions bring together multiple layers of an already over-determined reality: the 
ideological level, the visual, and the material. The public parade and visualization of politics 
allows for a sense of belonging to emerge for participants that intuitively makes sense of life in 
the region. In such a situation, even for non-political residents, the PMR is part of a larger 
feeling, of an unrealized destiny — it is the closest thing they have to preserving the Soviet 
Union. To paraphrase Baudrillard, the less genuine copy can have a similar if not greater salience 
in the absence of any externally generated symbols. 
 
The Spectacle Continues: “Peace in Palestine, Gas in Transnistria!” 
In early January 2009, I received word that Proryv was planning a march entitled “Peace 
in Palestine, Gas in Transnistria.” Set to occur on January 14th, the march brought together two 
widely different events – the Ukraine-Russia gas crisis of early 2009 and the ongoing Middle 
                                                                                                                                                       
337 Typically there are a small number of spectators, based upon my observations and informal surveys.  That said, 
the fact that they take place among the busiest central streets allows for much passive observation.  Despite this fact 
most people generally glance at the rally and continue going about their business. 
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East conflict.339 The march reflected Proryv’s desire to connect its activism to world events. 
While ostensibly for a domestic audience, the action’s subtext alludes to the fact that, far from 
denying the world beyond the PMR, Proryv actively creates a space for itself in it. Curiously, 
Proryv was denied permission to hold the march without reason.340 Proryv turned this non-event 
into a means to voice criticism of local authorities and to strengthen their image as an 
oppositional force fighting an entrenched local bureaucracy.  
The proposed march was to go from the Che Guevara School to steps of the OSCE 
mission. The idea linked two widely divergent events with radically different origins: the 
escalation of the conflict in Palestine and the ongoing gas crisis in Transnistria.341 The march 
was organized in conjunction with the Transnistrian branch of the Liberal Democratic Party of 
Russia (LDPR).342 When I arrived at the Che Guevara School, I found twenty LDPR 
representatives armed with flags preparing to march. This constituted significantly more people 
than any other Proryv action I had witnessed. As the local supporters of the local branch of a 
party founded by the well-known nationalist noisemaker Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the LDPR 
contingent were visibly older and their presence visibly contrast with Proryv’s young image.  
                                                                                                                                                       
338 OSTK, the United Work Collective Council (Объединенный Совет трудовых коллективов) is the organization 
that led the political movement for Transnistrian independence. 
339 The Russia–Ukraine gas dispute of 2009 arose as a result of a pricing dispute between Russia and Ukraine when 
Russian Gazprom refused to conclude a supply contract for 2009 unless Ukrainian gas company Naftogaz paid its 
accumulating debts for gas previously consumed. The dispute began in 2008 with a series of failed negotiations, and 
on January 1 Russia cut off gas supplies to Ukraine. On January 7, the dispute turned to crisis when all Russian gas 
flows through Ukraine were halted for thirteen days, completely cutting off supplies to Southeastern Europe, most of 
which depends on Russian gas, and partially to other European countries. 
340 This denial is addressed in more detail below. 
341 As a result of the gas dispute between Ukraine and Russia in January 2009, gas supplies to the region were 
significantly decreased.  Factories lost supplies, central heating supplies were disrupted, and there were even bread 
shortages as bakeries had no fuel for production.  The dispute highlighted the precarious economic position of the 
region, and how its outstanding gas debt afforded little leverage in a time of crisis. 
342 The Transnistrian branch of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, a party formed by the ultra nationalist 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky in 1990.  A populist noisemaker, Zhirinovsky is best know dreaming of the day when Russian 
soldiers can wash their boots in the Indian Ocean.  A staunch supporter of separatism across the Soviet Union, he 
remarked that Romania was an artificial state created by Italian Gypsies who seized territory from Russia, Bulgaria, 
and Hungary.  See Fedarko, Donnelly, and Graff, 1994, “Hello, I Must Be Going” Time Magazine, January 10, 
1994. 
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When I stepped inside, people were milling around and preparations had begun. The 
deputy director of LDPR was in attendance rallying the troops, and everybody was busy with 
preparations. There was a much more energetic feeling that typical meetings. A cameraman from 
Lenta PMR was on hand to document the meeting. Soin opened the meeting with Proryv’s 
customary invocation and call to order: Glory to Russia! Glory to Che Guevara! Glory to 
Transnistria! Glory to the LDPR! In his introduction, Russia played an outsized rhetorical role. 
His use of phrases such as “we love Russia” and “Russia gives to us” hinted at Russian aid to the 
region. He continued by citing Russian beneficence in the sphere of pensions and social aid.343 
Proryv stood for good relations with Russia and for loyalty to Russia. Maintaining this 
relationship results in increased aid for those that need it most. Yet because of bickering within 
the PMR, because of the actions of authorities, Russia had ceased to continue to give generously 
and without question to the region.  
His speech addressed the impact of the gas crisis on the region. Any discussion of natural 
gas in Transnistria touches upon a raw political nerve, since natural gas is subsidized in the 
PMR. People pay for gas, but the authorities use the money gathered to finance their budget. 
People resented the fact that the region did not control its energy resources.344 While he pointed 
out that the day before partial supplies had been restored, he lingered on two unknowns: how 
long the gas will flow and how much it will cost. The victims of this gas dispute were the 
region’s pensioners, children, and orphans. The poor are left to bear the cross of this political 
dispute between Ukraine, a neighbor, and Russia, the PMR’s sponsor. He talked about his 
proposal to develop strategic gas reserves to prevent future crises yet was careful not to blame 
Ukraine. The gas crisis left PMR authorities exposed, since they remained responsible for 
                                                
343 Soin was quick to point out that then, in 2009, this aid was then absent due to the neglect of this relationship by 
authorities. 
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making sure that gas is provided for its citizens. In essence, Proryv pointed out the duplicity of 
the state’s actions - taking gas it fails to pay for. The authorities responded to this perceived 
provocation by forbidding the march because of the undue attention it drew to this touchy 
subject.  
The second theme of the march – Peace in Palestine – offered an explicit international 
comparison between the PMR and Palestine. Soin laid out a narrative that linked the struggles for 
a Palestinian state to their own armed conflict with Moldova: both were bloody, both were the 
result of nationalist policies, and both struggle for international recognition in the face of 
international double standards. The march would have ended at the OSCE, chosen because of its 
international mandate in the region.345 Returning to the theme of gas, he stressed that while 
houses were now being heated, uncertainty persists. His words emphasized a lingering 
uncertainty, something neither good nor bad but which allows for the worst-case scenario to be at 
hand for rhetorical invocation.   
Later, over coffee, Soin speculated as to why permission was not granted. He stressed 
that their initiative to create strategic gas reserves had upset the authorities by drawing undue 
attention to the region’s significant gas debt.346 Proryv had taken too much initiative at a time 
when discontent was rising. The subsequent press release describing the non-march and linked it 
and Proryv with events occurring on the world-stage.347 The title, “The March which did not take 
place, or who is against peace in Palestine and gas in Transnistria?” was a salvo directed against 
those responsible for blocking the march. The press release stressed the fact that Proryv quickly 
                                                                                                                                                       
344 By the time of his speech (January 15th, 2009), gas supplies had been restored to the region. 
345 The OSCE is the only recognized international office operating in the PMR 
346 The PMR owes nearly $2 billion dollars to Gazprom for two decades of gas.  Residents pay their gas bills, but the 
bill never gets paid; this constitutes an unofficial means of financing the government. 
347 Марш, который не состоялся или кому противен мир в Палестине и газ в Приднестровье?  “The March 
which did not take place, or who is against peace in Palestine and gas in Transnistria?” 
http://www.tiras.ru/2009/01/19/marsh-kotoryjj-ne-sostojalsja-ili-komu.html Accessed August 23, 2011. 
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reacts to political events by bringing them to the public’s attention. Proryv stands ready to react 
quickly to political events both inside and outside the PMR, as was the case during the blockade, 
the 2006 referendum, and the tragic events in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
This Proryv action is a performance of what can be called dependence as independence. 
Unable to exercise independence, the only available option is to offer up another performance 
with the slate of characters: Transnistria plays the victim, caught amidst forces beyond its 
control, and Russia emerges as the sole problem solver. This situation of dependency was not 
lost on one resident who described the region as a country of beggars [strana poprashaikov]. The 
trope of crisis is a potent political tool. Every year since 2006 a new crisis emerges that demands 
new forms of aid and external assistance. The economic blockade (2006) was followed by 
drought (2007) and floods (2008). Presently, the PMR is in the grips of the world economic crisis 
(2008-present). With each crisis, the people are rhetorically mobilized to think the worst, and the 
authorities give voice to this notion of a people under siege by external forces. In this 
dramaturgia, only one true savior emerges: Russia.  
The visible manifestations of groups like Proryv constitute the most elementary and 
didactic form of a message residents receive in a variety of forms. From the passports people are 
encouraged to get (Russian or Ukrainian, but not Moldovan), to the language they use (Russian), 
to the media they watch (Russian), to the regional power they believe will deliver them from evil 
(Russia), much of social and political life in the PMR is oriented around constructing a discourse 
that acknowledges the support of Russia and seeks to domesticate it. In the PMR, “Russia” is a 
shifter, a linguistic term without a fixed meaning. As such, it changes its valence and content 
according to the context in which it is used (Gal 1991: 444). As a physical object, a country, 
Russia lies hundreds of miles away. This distance, however, does not preclude its invocation as a 
 244 
fundamental tenet of PMR politics. Russia is the contemporary political component to the sense 
of belonging provided by the 1992 war, which is modeled according to the Great Patriotic War.   
The political life of this non-event was prolonged when Proryv decided to pursue the 
matter in court. By the time the case came up, gas had long been restored and spring had arrived. 
As an international guest of Proryv, I was invited to attend the trial as an observer. The trial 
consisted of Proryv's attorney reading out their complaint orally, having the complaint taken 
down in writing by the court (protocol). Their complaint was two pages long. During the 
proceedings, two other observers from the OSCE and the British Embassy were present. Apart 
from these observers, their lawyer, and myself the only other person in court was a lone Proryv 
employee. Initially, she introduced me as a representative of the US Embassy, to which I 
explained that I was merely an independent observer.   
The court itself was housed in a drab building off Tiraspol’s main street. Proceedings 
were archaic, with hand-written protocols. At the building entrance hearing schedules, room 
assignments, and judge assignments were handwritten and posted on the walls. The distinct 
rituals marking the justice system as the domain of the state – the swearing in, the pageantry – 
were absent. The judge was seated behind an old wood-laminate desk, and behind him on the 
wall hung a framed portrait of the PMR president and the PMR flag. The judge appeared bored 
by the proceedings, surfing the internet on his desktop computer. He challenged the lawsuit on 
the grounds that it had no merit since they were not asking for the action to be held, just a 
decision that said the initial denial was unjust. Officials refused to answer their complaint in 
court, not deeming it worthy. The judge appeared disinclined to believe that their human rights 
had been violated.   
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Fifteen minutes into the proceedings, the leader of the political party and other Proryv 
activists showed up, hoping to join the proceedings. The judge refused them entry, saying that 
that the session had already began. Clearly, the judge was aware of Proryv’s penchant for public 
relations. Any attempt to make the meeting a spectacle would have to wait until after the hearing. 
Proryv made reference to the Constitution of the PMR, to the document that founds the republic 
and becomes the foundational metric of 'law' in an area that is outside the bounds of 'recognized' 
law. Eventually, the court eventually found the decision of the city administration to be unlawful, 
giving the organization a symbolic victory.348 This court appearance was the first of two that 
culminated with a serious case of slander brought against Proryv after municipal elections in 
May 2010. The second suit sought to close their newspaper by fining it nearly $100,000 
ostensibly for stating in print exactly how much a city council seat could be bought for. Had 
Proryv shed its mantle of a virtual opposition party and thrown down a challenge to the ruling 
authorities?  
 
Economics, Politics, Spectacles: The Anti-Crisis March(es)  
 On December 27, 2008, Tiraspol felt the full force of the world economic crisis. 
Awareness of the economic crisis did not spike because of a sudden devaluation of the currency, 
or because of gloomy economic pronouncements in the media. Proryv attempted to bring this 
crisis to the public’s attention through an anti-crisis march. The march did not seek to blunt the 
effects of the crisis, nor did it offer practical solutions. Instead, Proryv marched to voice their 
                                                
348 Суд удовлетворил иск ММК-НДП «ПРОРЫВ!» к главе госадминистрации Тирасполя. Костырко, ты не 
прав! [The court granted the petition of the MMK-NPD “Proryv.” To the head of the city administration: Kostyrko, 
you are wrong!] http://www.tiras.ru/obshhestvo/7639-tiraspolskijj-sud-udovletvoril-isk-mmk.html Accessed August 
23, 2011. 
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concerns about the effects of the crisis in the region.349 Attendance was sparse – around sixty 
people – due to unseasonably cold temperatures. I arrived as flags were being unfurled and 
positions were assigned. During his speech Soin stressed that Proryv was well-prepared for the 
crisis, but that, practically speaking, there was not much they could do. Activists and participants 
milled around outside the Che Guevara School, forming two lines, while organizers negotiated 
with a policeman for traffic control along the route. At the front of the march was a yellow 
banner with black lettering that simply said “Anti-crisis March;” other banners included the 
standard yellow Proryv banners, two PMR flags, three Russian flags, and one Soviet flag. 
 
 
Fig 15. Anti-crisis March in Tiraspol. Proryv’s headquarters visible in the background. Photo by 
author. 
                                                
349 В Тирасполе состоялся Антикризисный Марш! [In Tiraspol there was an Anti-Crisis March!]  
http://www.tiras.ru/2008/12/27/v-tiraspole-sostojalsja-antikrizisnyjj.html Accessed July 23, 2011. 
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The route of the march traversed some of the more important political and economic 
spaces in Tiraspol, beginning in the center near the Suvorov statue and continuing to the central 
market. The path from the Suvorov statue to the central market is a place where pensioners sell 
their possessions or homemade goods to supplement their pensions. No strangers to economic 
hardship, the peddlers barely acknowledged the marchers. The march continued past the 
Orthodox cathedral (financed by Sheriff) before turning onto the main street and onwards to the 
university. During the march slogans were shouted through a loudspeaker: “Work, pay, pensions 
– YES! Crisis – NO!” “Russia help Transnistria!” “Proryv is against the crisis!” Despite the fact 
residents could not stop talking about the crisis amongst themselves, there appeared to be little 
participation or even acknowledgement from bystanders. Those that engaged the spectacle had a 
blank stare on their faces. A promised speech at the end never materialized, perhaps because 
there was no crowd. At the university the organizers got into waiting cars and participants 
walked back; marchers were given printed material to distribute. Minutes later, as I engaged 
bystanders, most were unaware that any anti-crisis march had even occurred. Most appeared 
more concerned with going about their business.  
Despite this lack of engagement with the public at large, the march was considered a 
symbolic success in the subsequent online press release, later reprinted in their newspaper. The 
press release quoted the leader of Proryv’s political party, who proclaimed: 
… everywhere we encounter the anxiety and concern of the people about their fate and 
the future of the republic. Therefore, as a youth movement and party we cannot step 
aside, we boldly challenge the crisis. Our marches will be held in all cities and regions of 
Pridnestrove.350   
 
Having witnessed the march, I found this suggestion that Proryv was expressing the concerns of 
the people to be as hollow as their bold challenge to the crisis through shouts and banners.   
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Subsequent anti-crisis marches were held across the PMR, with a regular cast of 
participants bused in from Tiraspol. The majority of the marchers were young students, 
individuals whose positions in life insulated them from the direct effects of the crisis. Unable to 
secure the active participation of residents in the different locations, Proryv activists themselves 
canvassed the PMR to gather support for their anti-crisis message. The geographic location 
changes, but the actors remain the same. Proryv merely took their slogans and marches across 
Transnistria, then creates press releases chronicling the wave of anti-crisis marches occurring 
across Transnistria. By organizing and setting the stage of these marches, they are spreading their 
brand, honing their ideological message, and ultimately creating a spectacle that positions the 
organization as a force for change.   
This series of actions illustrates how Proryv spins an issue through their informational 
infrastructure. Building their brand required them to highlight periodically the gap between the 
economic pronouncements of the authorities and the existing precarious situation. While 
President Smirnov states that all of the conditions exist for the PMR to become a “little 
Switzerland,” residents find themselves in a precarious economic situation and give little 
credence to such pronouncements. Seeking to create newsworthy events, Proryv media sources 
chronicled the “growing wave of anti-crisis marches” in the region.351  
The goals of the marches were both practical (directed toward local political 
constituencies) and symbolic (directed as they were toward the Russian state). Practically, the 
marches drew attention to the economic effects of the crisis and requested Russian financial 
                                                                                                                                                       
350 “In Tiraspol an Anti-Crisis march occurred” http://www.tiras.ru/2008/12/27/v-tiraspole-sostojalsja-
antikrizisnyjj.html Accessed August 22, 2011.  
351 “Anti-crisis Marches cover all of Transnistria,”  
http://www.tiras.ru/tema-dnja/7706-antikrizisnye-marshi-okhvatili-vse.html Accessed August 22, 2011.  
“A Wave of Anti-crisis Marches in Transnistria Grows,” 
http://www.tiras.ru/tema-dnja/7445-volna-antikrizisnykh-marshejj-v.html Accessed August 22, 2011. 
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assistance for the region, which has more than 120,000 Russian citizens. Symbolically, the 
marches sought to rally local organizations and civil society about the unfolding “humanitarian 
crisis,” a crisis that would undoubtedly become monetized and subject to rents as aid and charity 
made its way from the Russia to the PMR. Proryv was aware that marches and slogans would not 
directly stimulate economic growth, though they hoped to force authorities to act quickly to blunt 
crisis’ impact. How they planned to do this was never explained. Even in the context of an 
economic crisis, Proryv’s attempts to force authorities to acknowledge the economic meltdown 
fell on deaf ears.  
The idea that Proryv are the victims of an information blockade from the highest levels of 
bureaucracy remains a central tenet of their self-presentation. Not supported from above, Proryv 
must seek support from below.352 One issue that remains to be clarified is the overall goal of the 
anti-crisis marches: were they part of a pre-election agitation campaign to increase Proryv’s 
political brand, an indirect challenge to the unofficial media blackout, or something else? While 
these marches are part of a branding campaign and simultaneously a response to a perceived 
blockade, above all they constituted a visible front in their ongoing information war. 
 
Conclusion: Proryv in 2010 
When I returned to Tiraspol in September 2010 the court case against Proryv was in full 
swing. After local elections in March 2010, a local judge in Tiraspol claimed that an article 
posted on Lenta PMR about a contested local election between Proryv’s candidate and another 
candidate (the godchild of Tiraspol’s appointed mayor) had caused her significant physical and 
emotional distress. As is often in the post-Soviet world, the winner of local elections in 
Transnistria was the candidate that could command the most administrative resources, 
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adminresurs. Proryv’s candidate in the local elections was favored to win this district. An 
unattributed article on Lenta PMR alluded to the price required, in this case, to receive a 
favorable judgment in a Tiraspol courtroom. This piece had upset the judge, and she immediately 
countersued and demanded one hundred thousand dollars for damaging her moral and physical 
health. She alleged that, due to the scandalous allegations and personal criticism against her that 
appeared in print, she had trouble sleeping and her health had deteriorated. It seemed as if this 
would be the end of Proryv’s media empire, as the judgment sum was clearly meant to close their 
newspaper. Furthermore, the case implicated not only Proryv’s print media, but their associated 
electronic media holdings, which raised the issue of jurisdiction, since Lenta PMR was hosted 
outside of the PMR and the news story in question lacked an author.353 Furthermore, since the 
trial involved the family of the Tiraspol mayor (a close confidant of the president), Proryv was 
unable to find a lawyer to take their case: no attorney would touch it. 
After some maneuvering, the trial was moved to the northern city of Grigoriopol after 
Proryv claimed that they could not receive a fair trial in Tiraspol. Unable to secure a lawyer, 
Soin told me that he “learned the legal codex in a single day” before heading off for the 
preliminary hearing in Grigoriopol. Because the financial burden was so large, the defendants 
(Soin and another editor, Roman Konoplev) demanded material proof that her mental and 
physical health had been degraded because of the criticism. The trial was adjourned for 
information gathering. By shifting the burden of proof, Proryv forced the plaintiff to prove 
exactly how and to what degree she had been upset by the criticism. The judge ruled that she 
must provide doctor’s certificates and attestations proving she had been harmed. 
                                                                                                                                                       
352 Lest one forget that it was the voices of residents that forced them to form a political party in the first place. 
353 Tiras.ru is registered through a Russian domain name registration service but its servers are in Germany. 
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Months later, as I arrived in Tiraspol in September 2010, the trial was set to begin. As a 
“friend of Proryv,” I was invited to attend the trial as an independent international observer. The 
shift of venue left the trial in the hands of a young, relatively inexperienced female judge. As we 
gathered early one morning to drive together to court, the defendants seemed confident that 
Proryv would finally have their day in court. We had just passed the Tiraspol city limits when we 
received word that the trail was once again postponed. We later found out that the trial could not 
be held because “the judge needed to go to Chișinău.” Only in the PMR could a judge cancel a 
trial the morning of the session in order to travel to the capital of the country that had attempted 
to commit “genocide” against Transnistrians. Later as we drank tea and discussed the situation, 
the defendants wondered aloud how they would frame this latest bureaucratic move in the media. 
Like seasoned political technologists, they plotted their next move – should they return to the 
court to make a public spectacle, taking pictures of the empty courtroom? Or should they plot a 
different means of counter-attack, to better exploit the judge’s visible anxiety to their advantage?   
They spoke about the absurdity of the situation, and of how this latest incident shows 
what little regard institutions hold for formal law in the PMR. The session in question was 
rescheduled for the next week, but that date came and went without notice. The plaintiff had not 
submitted the proper medical diagnoses. They speculated that she did not want to endanger her 
job and her standing with the court. Based upon the symptoms that she claimed (sleeplessness, 
anxiety, inability to concentrate, fear), if she had submitted medical attestations she would be in 
jeopardy of losing her position because if her illness became part of the public record it could be 
used against her. After all, who wants to be judged by someone not fully in control of his or her 
emotions? Proryv had trapped her into admitting that her symptoms were feigned, and that they 
were merely an excuse to muzzle their newspaper. Perhaps my presence as an independent, 
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international observer had scared the judge, or simply the fact that the defendants demanded that 
the accusations be supported by an objective source led the accuser to conclude that the court 
case was not worth risking one’s job for, especially one as lucrative as a judgeship. The court 
case that initially seemed to spell the end of Proryv’s media presence quietly disappeared without 
commotion. 
Much had changed since my initial fieldwork ended. When I returned to the PMR in 
September 2010 the building that housed the Che Guevara High School of Political Leadership 
was in the process of becoming a shoe store. The school had relocated to the decrepit Hotel Aist 
a few hundred meters away (the move was ostensibly a cost-cutting measure). On September 14th 
Proryv signed a cooperation agreement with two local political parties, Obnovlenie (Renewal) 
and Spravedlivaya Respublika (Just Republic). Both of these parties are financed and controlled 
by Sheriff. The agreement concerned cooperation, collaboration, and partnership in upcoming 
national elections under the common heading “Together with Russia.” While undoubtedly the 
agreement figures into pre-election strategizing (with parliamentary elections scheduled for 
December 2010), the leaders of each party took turns denying this in their speeches. Obnovlenie, 
Sheriff’s party, is the richest and best-represented party in the PMR Supreme Soviet  
(parliament). The Just Republic party, also under control of Sheriff, is a clone of the Fair Russia 
party, a party that primarily exists in Russia as a toothless opposition to Putin’s United Russia.354 
Speaking of the recently signed agreement, Dmitri Soin stressed how the agreement inaugurated 
a new period of deeds and not simply words. 
 
 
                                                
354 The creation of Fair Russia in 2007 from the merger of Rodina, the Russian Party of Life, and the Russian 
Pensioners’ Party was meant become a catch all socialist party that would bleed the Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation. 
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The key elements in this agreement constitute a few things. First, of course, the 
common slogan "Together with Russia!" Today's signing is a logical continuation 
of the referendum results September 17, 2006, when 97% of the citizens who 
voted supported the policy of independence and entry into Russia. The second 
point - that we signed a contract about the parties' “deeds,” because we already 
have a lot of words in Transnistria, and I would like to have more deeds. This is 
an important association, which together will create a new qualitative state of the 
political and social field. Our republic, now 20 years old, lives in the conditions of 
non-recognition, so I hope that our three parties will be able to make a decisive 
and significant contribution to the prosperity of our country.355  
 
His word confirms the results of the most recent referendum and positions this alliance as the 
political form that will help the voice of the people be realized. The signing of this agreement 
was the logical culmination of Soin’s branding efforts; he had built up a product that was now 
ready to be purchased in the political marketplace. In private, however, Proryv leaders used to 
complain about how they could not compete with well-financed parties that had easy access to 
the airwaves and could draw upon Sheriff’s unlimited financial resources to buy the goodwill of 
the population. Now, it goes without saying, Proryv can draw upon the same sources as part of 
their new coalition. Proryv’s activist methods – flash mobs, marches, print media, and culture 
jamming –  have become newest additions to a well-financed political machine. No longer 
exclusively working with youth, Proryv can now concentrate on finding a niche for themselves 
in the grand dramaturgia of Transnistrian politics. The visible detachment between their slogans 
Proryv and the problems of the population are now even less apparent as they become part of a 
political machine that commands the support of the masses if only because they can offer more 
than slogans, given that Sheriff can offer them bread, butter, and other consumer goods.356 
                                                
355 “Party of ‘Real Deeds’: For Russia and for Transnistria!” http://tiras.ru/tema-dnja/20873-partii-realnykh-del-za-
rossiju-i.html Accessed August 22, 2011.  
356 Renewal and other Sheriff-sponsored parties are well-known for their generosity towards the electorate.  A 
standard pre-election or holiday gift bag includes a kilogram or two of flour, rice, cooking oil, and sugar.  For 
pensioners barely surviving, this few dollars worth of groceries buys loyalty. 
 254 
From Proryv’s humble beginnings as a group of politically active sociology students to 
its direct lineage to Modest Kolerov’s now disbanded “Department for Interregional and Cultural 
Relations,” Proryv has existed in a variety of forms: NGO, social movement, international 
revolutionary brand, pro-Russian political party, oppositional force in the PMR, and, most 
recently, part of an electoral bloc financed by local oligarchs.  Unaffiliated observers told me that 
Proryv’s alliance was the logical culmination of their activities in the region - they built up a 
brand, and they had symbolic capital that could now be sold. Some took this event as a sign that 
Proryv had “stopped playing games” and had gotten serious about entering politics. The former 
sociology professor, the Interpol-wanted fugitive, and former state security officer had cashed in 
Proryv’s political capital and saddled up to its richer, PR-deprived rival.357 Proryv’s experience 
with PR and informational warfare becomes an asset to Sheriff’s political holdings that largely 
function through less-refined methods like buying pensioners’ votes with groceries and gift bags. 
As a political entity that defies easy definition, Proryv remains a symptom of virtual politics 
insofar as its primary function is largely dependent both upon who is financing it at the moment 
and what codes, models and informational flows it seeks to exploit. From the movement’s initial 
origins as a movement designed to thwart any potential colored revolution to its current role in 
the PMR, Proryv’s mercurial form is the product of human artifice and intellect. It, like many 
political projects in the post-Soviet world, was designed to captivate, profit from, and ultimately 
perpetuated the system that had a hand in its creation. As a movement that is connected to 
geopolitics (remember that it was Transnistria’s strategic importance for Russia that enables 
Proryv’s initial startup financing) and the functional role it plays in the region. Having elaborated 
a set of state institutions, state-builders and elites now needed to add parties and democratic 
                                                
357 The Renewal Party’s young reformer (and current PMR President) Yevgheny Shevchuk, had resigned his post as 
speaker of the PMR Supreme Soviet in early 2010 because of a dispute with the President about constitutional 
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elements to the polity, knowing that without choices (or the illusion of choice) their corruption 
and nepotism would be all the more visible. Hence from within system itself there arose a need 
for a novel, image-drive political brand – Proryv emerged in response to this. Its leader 
rebranded himself a political entrepreneur with a nascent media empire actively creating fronts in 
the ongoing information war. Proryv’s utilization of new media, public relations, and political 
technology offered a means of entering politics as well as profiting socially and materially. 
Despite its peculiar origins and its singularity as a intra-Transnistrian phenomenon, above all the 
state and those interested in its continued existence gain, since above all Proryv supports PMR 
statehood irrespective of who is occupying the its institutions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
reform. 
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CONCLUSION: ON PHANTOM STATES AND AMBIGUITY 
 
 
December 2011 presidential elections in the PMR were the most competitive ever. 
Having presided over the PMR since for more than two decades ago, the incumbent President 
Igor Smirnov had lost the crucial support of Moscow. Given the prominent symbolic, material, 
and geopolitical presence of the Russian Federation both as patron, sponsor, and peacemaker in 
the region, the loss of Russia’s favor should not be underestimated. Both local and Russian 
media were inundated with news reports detailing the illicit gains of his immediate family and 
chronicling their alleged embezzlement of Russian aid. The content of the news reports 
themselves did not surprise residents — most passively accept the corruption of the ruling elite. 
Talk on the street and in Internet forums centered on what will happen if Smirnov decided not 
give up the reins of the state. Though initially in the run-up to elections there was no question of 
Smirnov losing the election — his command of administrative resources appeared to make his 
victory a foregone conclusion, yet he ended up losing in the first round. His vulnerable position 
was a result of an unsettling malaise within the PMR. Some spoke openly of a return of 
bloodshed and of the fragility of the state, while others simply registered their disgust with the 
current state of affairs, most notably a dismal economy and employment prospects. Previously, 
elections were a time of affirming and performing the PMR’s sovereignty. This crisis of 
authority sparked a crisis at a deeper symbolic level insofar as President Smirnov was the public 
face of the PMR. Given the uncertainty over Russia’s continued support of the region and its 
leadership, in the run up to elections some residents began to ponder about a future in which the 
PMR might not achieve independence and recognition. Yet what happens should the PMR’s 
tenuous existence as a de facto polity end?  
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I have tried, in the preceding pages, to illustrate how non-recognition modifies our 
understandings of sovereignty. Both in terms of the practice of international relations and as a 
theoretical concept, sovereignty is not quite what it seems in the PMR. As a state-like entity that 
has existed in defiance of Moldova’s de jure sovereignty, the PMR remains an unacknowledged 
presence capable of generating a lingering uncertainty that penetrates far beyond its borders. At 
the conceptual level, the PMR shows just how little sovereignty is dependent upon international 
recognition of external validation. Beyond challenging the link between territories and 
recognition, the PMR exposes the shortcomings of a world that discourages ambiguity.  
In a recent New York Times op-ed, Daniel Byman and Charles King spoke of a renewed 
need to engage with the 21st century’s “phantom states” — these curious entities that, while not 
quite states, “stoke wars, foster crime, and make weak states even weaker.”358 These phantom 
states run the gamut from unrecognized entities that are models of effective governance 
(Somaliland) to others that strain relations between regional powers (Northern Cyprus). Some 
are accepted as states (Taiwan), while others (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) are recognized only by 
their primary sponsor, Russia, and smaller nations such as Nauru and Tuvalu that sold the right 
to recognize others as sovereign. The leaders and elites of “phantom states” champion national 
self-determination while the states in which they reside (or which claim jurisdiction over their 
territory) stress the need for stability. In the face of these incompatible principles, phantom states 
themselves point out the uncomfortable precedents and double standards that allow for 
recognition of some states and deny it to others. Byman and King end their editorial with a call 
to engage these states not as outlaws but as partners. Their ideal model of a phantom state that 
                                                
358 Daniel L. Byman and Charles King, “The Phantom Menace.” The New York Times. August 15, 2011. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/opinion/the-phantom-menace.html Accessed October 13, 2011. 
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enjoys international legitimacy is Taiwan, a legitimate country that is unrecognized and not 
independent.359  
The insistence of territorial integrity by international actors like the United States and, to 
a lesser extent, the EU, leaves “phantom states” internationally isolated. Often they conduct the 
bulk of their trade and diplomacy through a single state (witness the outsized role of Russia in 
Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, and of Turkey in Northern Cyprus). Such isolation 
creates the conditions for these phantom states to become the illicit outposts that the world fears. 
The refusal to acknowledge these states in their own terms creates the conditions for the 
realization of their potential as rogues. As a whole there is a tendency to dismiss the internal 
workings of these states, yet they remain vital to understanding many of the established and now 
largely invisible processes that underpin any political authority.  
By creatively seizing on its own ambiguity that stretches back to the early 20th century, 
the PMR is now a political entity that remains parasitic upon the international system it exists in 
defiance of. For some, it is a jurisdictional zone of exception where complex financial schemes 
can be realized. For others, the PMR is situated on a geopolitical fault line that conveys practical 
and symbolic importance on the region. This importance translates into financial gain, political 
support, and a general lack of inertia to solidify its ill-defined status. For others the PMR remains 
a rightful successor to the Soviet Union, a place that will remain rodina despite any criticism. 
Those who fall into the last category have no use for normative concepts like corruption and 
democracy that are seen as a means of delegitimizing the PMR as a state. As I have shown in a 
variety of contexts, Transnistrian sovereignty is the result of symbolic, material, and 
representational processes that operate at distinct historical moments. The periodic re-
                                                
359 Above all, for the authors Taiwan shows the power of creative ambiguity insofar as it has prospered 
economically but has largely avoided the touchy political issues. 
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affirmations and performances of sovereignty, whether they take the form of photographs of the 
1992 war, voting in a referenda, or waving a banner at a rally each offer individuals a means of, 
at least temporarily, assuaging the PMR’s liminality-at-large. For some this liminality is 
profitable, while for others it simply constitutes the terms of their existence as current political 
subjects of a non-state and former political subjects of a superpower.  
As I have shown throughout this dissertation, liminality-at-large and its performative 
sovereignty is generative of a host of institutions, narratives, rents, and subject positions. The 
region’s liminality-at-large offered a new context for the now-devalued Soviet knowledge and 
categories to become the basis for a political project. Gradually, PMR elites would profitably 
merged with the uncertain terrain of capitalism. The fact that this performative sovereignty 
remains a work in progress, not finalized or anchored in any institution, leads to its re-staging in 
a different contexts. The ethnographic and historical examples described in this dissertation will 
undoubtedly be supplemented by new practices and forms of knowledge in response to changing 
political, economic, and social demands. The absence of a coherent narrative in the post-Soviet 
period has heightened the stakes of these performances.  
Non-recognition as phenomenon is not limited to the post-Soviet world — it is a 
fundamental aspect of our globalized world. As creative ambiguity proliferates internationally, 
from Kosovo to Abkhazia to Somaliland to Taiwan, it is useful to think about the particular 
material and symbolic processes occurring as a result of non-recognition. Transnistria and the 
other de facto states former Soviet Union offer an example of how non-recognition, existing 
within the gaping void left by the Soviet collapse, may form the basis for a community and 
create a sense of belonging. The legacies of the Soviet Union, both institutional and practical, 
will remain a defining feature in its successor states well into the future. And while the map of 
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the world may no longer reflect the ideological front of the Cold War, it behooves us as scholars 
to look at the productivity of non-recognition both in terms of its internal content as well as its 
role in the wider interconnected world. 
Though located in a peripheral region of a peripheral country, Transnistria embodies 
many of the underlying political and economic practices that underpin our existence as political 
subjects in the 21st century. As a political entity with all of the institutional and symbolic aspects 
of statehood save international recognition, Transnistria offers a unique site for reconceptualizing 
political and legal authority from the murky underside of an increasingly globalized world. 
Despite its improvisatory, performative nature, itself a result of its political liminality, 
Transnistria elucidates the increasingly contingent nature of liberal-democratic sovereignty in an 
time in which popular alienation rises in proportion to the rise of finance capital, opaque state-
corporate alliances, and increasingly militarized borders. In Transnistria, the melding of these 
processes is relatively transparent insofar they visibly undergird the PMR’s existence as a 
political entity. Elsewhere, in the West, with its own democratic traditions measured not in 
decades but centuries, elites have gone to even greater lengths to mask the “performative” 
dimension of sovereignty. The contradictory demands of the present, however, have once again 
thrust performances and the people into the political fray.  
When one looks at Transnistria through the normative lens of democracy and capitalism 
as practiced by the West, one cannot help but notice how abnormal the region and its processes 
look to us, yet how strikingly normal these same processes are for residents. While it is all to 
easy to look at Transnistria and the wider post-Soviet world with a smug sense of superiority, the 
irony is that they are not different from us — the 2008 financial crisis only reinforced the idea 
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that the interests of capital will remain ascendant. This sense of superiority overshadows any 
heuristic import a place like Transnistria might convey. 
And while one can dismiss PMR referenda as a stage-managed tool of elites seeking a 
political mandate for statehood, referenda have as of late only increased in importance in both 
Europe and the United States. Latvia recently held a referendum on adding Russian as a second 
official language in 2012. Oddly enough, the referendum was not brought about by Lithuanian 
nationalists but by an alliance of ethnic Russians who sought to blunt the eventual assimilation of 
their children. It is somewhat ironic that those on the periphery of the nation ended up realizing 
the conditions to affirm it. The referendum failed by a large margin, due in part to the fact that 
Russian speakers in Latvia (as well as in Estonia and Lithuania) are not regarded as citizens with 
full rights and privileges by the state (cf. Feldman 2005). Given that these referenda seen to 
increasingly touch upon such fundamental questions about the relationship to political authority 
to the people, it is worth exploring the circumstances surrounding them as well as the symbolic 
and performative roles they fulfill for elites, citizens, and the nation itself.  
Returning to Greece, when Prime Minister Papandreou called for a referendum in 
November 2011 on whether or not to accept EU and IMF conditions for a bailout, many saw it as 
a ploy to rally lawmakers for support. Given that this would have been Greece’s first referendum 
that would not address a change in the form of government, the referendum ever so briefly (it 
was cancelled three days after it was called for) pulled back the elaborately cultivated facade of 
accepted norms and forms of political practice. The turmoil caused referendum and its quick 
disappearance exit showed to extent to which financial capital has become the ascendant force of 
our time. Exactly how corporate and financial interests dictate to the state remains situational, for 
while international financial organizations and supranational entities like the EU determine the 
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exact contours of austerity throughout much of Europe, in a place like Transnistria economic 
entities similarly play a hidden yet omnipotent role in determining the forms taken by politics. 
One thing remains certain in both – the people will be called forth and they will fulfill a role in 
this great drama. That is perhaps the curse of popular sovereignty: by its nature it is bound to at 
least formally acknowledge an increasingly weak linkage of a state’s legitimacy with the will or 
consent of its people. It behooves us as scholars we must interrogate popular sovereignty in all 
its forms, particularly those ones that seem overly contrived, artificial, or shallow. By mapping 
the components of democracy and sovereignty in an overdetermined yet unsettled place like 
Transnistria, we can gain an insight into elements of our own democratic system (performative, 
ritual, masking) that we have long since accepted and subsequently forgotten.  
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Appendix A: Assorted photos from The White Book of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic 
 
 
Antifascist Demonstration of Transnistrians. The sign reads “Nationalism does not 
lead to prosperity of peoples.” 
 
 
Residents of Transnistria joyfully meet peacekeepers 
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(translations from upper left, counterclockwise) 
 
Raped and murdered,  
Tanya Bondarets 
 
Raped and murdered,  
Olga Dorofeyeva 
 
Murdered resident of Bendery,  
Nikolai Kotsofan 
 
Murdered in the basement of his home,  
Andrei Dorofeyev 
 
 265 
 
 
Tortured in captivity on July 5th, 1992, officer of the PMR MGB (Ministry of State Security) 
Aleksandr Polykov.  His eyes gouged out, teeth broken, his body scarred with knife wounds, 
the letter “V” was burned on his back with a blowtorch 
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